Problems of Communism

Book Reviews

Douglas Pike
Elizabeth Becker
Philip R. Nel
Deborah Duff Milenkovitch

MAY-JUNE 1985



GORBACHËV
Archie Brown

Leadership Change in China's Provinces
William deB. Mills

State and Society in South Yemen
Norman Cigar

Notes & Views
Conspiring to Kill the Pope
Paul B. Henze

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Problems of Communism

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MAY-JUNE 1985 VOL XXXIV

Problems of Communism (ISSN 0032-941x) is a bimonthly publication providing analyses and significant information about the contemporary affairs of the Soviet Union, China, and comparable states and political movements. Views of contributors, as well as geographic boundaries and names, do not necessarily reflect the policies of the United States Government.

On all editorial matters, communications should be addressed to: The Editors, *Problems of Communism*, US Information Agency, United States of America, 301 4th Street SW, Washington, DC, 20547, USA. Telephone (202) 485-2230.

On subscriptions, communications should be addressed to: The Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 20402, USA, preferably using the subscription form provided at the back of this issue. Outside the United States, please address inquiries to the Public Affairs Section, Embassy of the United States of America.

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An annual index for *Problems of Communism* appears in the November-December issue (No. 6) of each year except in the case of the first three volumes, which are covered in a combined index in the November-December issue (No. 6) of Vol. III. Material from the journal is also indexed in *ABC POL SCI, Bibliographie Internationale des Sciences Sociales* (all sections), *Current Contents, Economic Abstracts, Historical Abstracts, Index to US Government Periodicals, International Political Science Abstracts, Public Affairs Information Service, Social Sciences Citation Index, Social Sciences Index, Strategic Studies Reference Guide,* and *United States Political Science Documents*.

It is with sorrow that we report the death on April 13 of Clarke Kawakami, former Senior Text Editor of *Problems of Communism*. He will be missed and well remembered by all.

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Cover: Mikhail Gorbachëv, at the March 13, 1985, funeral of predecessor Konstantin Chernenko; to his right, Nikolay Tikhonov and Andrey Gromyko; behind him, Viktor Grishin. Photo by APN via Gamma-Liaison.

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

Gorbachëv: New Man in the Kremlin
Archie Brown

Analysis of Mikhail Gorbachëv's rise to the top shows that while he made good connections along the way, his remarkable ability was of decisive importance. As general secretary, his priority is to effect radical improvement in the Soviet economy, and he appears to have an open mind on the question of far-reaching economic reform, even though in the short term, reform may be quite modest. In foreign policy, diplomatic initiatives on several fronts may be expected. In the view of the author, though the responsibilities on Gorbachëv's shoulders are immense, the Soviet leadership this time has chosen the man best fitted to carry them.

Leadership Change in China's Provinces
William deB. Mills

In the spring of 1983, in a centrally mandated process that seemed to occur with astounding speed and lack of rancor, some 950 of China's 1,350 top provincial leaders retired and were replaced by about 160 officials. The purpose of this streamlining was to create a younger, better educated, and more efficient provincial leadership that owed allegiance to the center. Despite undeniably impressive results, however, there was local resistance to central policies. Critical in overcoming this resistance was the center's direct involvement in implementing the change and its willingness to compromise with local leaders.

State and Society in South Yemen
Norman Cigar

The Islamic society of South Yemen has proven surprisingly resistant to attempts at social transformation by the Marxist-Leninist ruling Yemeni Socialist Party. Given this societal resistance, YSP Secretary General Ali Nasir Muhammad has pursued a pragmatic, gradual approach, but others (including Abd Al-Fattah Isma'il, who recently returned after five years in Moscow) favor a harder line toward social and cultural mores and institutions.

* * *

Notes & Views

Conspiring to Kill the Pope
Paul B. Henze

Thoroughgoing investigations in Turkey, Italy, and elsewhere have brought indictments directly linking Bulgarian secret agents to Mehmet Ali Ağca's attempt on the life of Pope John Paul II. There are indications that the assassination of Turkish editor Abdi Ipekçi in February 1979—whether or not Ağca pulled the trigger—may have been used to prepare Ağca's cover for the subsequent shooting of the Pope.

(Abstracts continued on reverse side)

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Essay-reviews

Vietnamese Voices
Douglas Pike

The history of Vietnam and its war not only has been badly told, notes the author, it has been parochially told by foreigners, be they French, American, or Chinese. Some information, frequently oversimplified and often trivalized, is told over and over, while the rest is not reported at all. What has been missing in all this is the Vietnamese view, told by Vietnamese in their own words. But the dearth of Vietnamese voices is not solely the result of foreign efforts at monopolization. It also stems from the fact that the Vietnamese have always been reluctant to write and speak about themselves to the outside world.

Cambodian Tragedy
Elizabeth Becker

By the time the Vietnamese overran Cambodia, installed Heng Samrin in Phnom Penh, and publicized the atrocities of the Pol Pot regime, Cambodian studies in the United States had been decimated. Scholars of Cambodia had mostly left the field and sought employment elsewhere. Thus, the chronicling of Cambodian developments was left to newcomers to the field who lacked full command of the subject or to oldtimers who were scarred by and embroiled in the polemics over American involvement in Indochina. Without adequate support for Cambodian studies, this situation will continue.

Soviet Fortunes in Southern Africa
Philip R. Nel

Escalating internal conflicts in the Front-Line States, economic decline and drought, Western initiatives, and relative Soviet reticence have combined to produce an unexpected reversal of Soviet prospects in southern Africa, as both Angola and Mozambique have entered into agreements with South Africa. In pursuing influence or longer term strategic goals in the region, Moscow is limited by its inability to supply client states with anything other than arms, its proclivity to take sides rather than mediate in important regional disputes, and the strong desire of African states—even "Marxist-Leninist" ones—to maintain a nonaligned posture, not least because of their need for strong economic ties with the West.

Political Economy of Socialism in Eastern Europe
Deborah Duff Milenkovitch

To understand the economies of Eastern Europe, it is necessary to explain why the various countries pursue different economic policies despite basic similarities in their political, economic, and ideological structures. Multi-country studies are often methodologically innovative in demonstrating how similar problems are treated differently in the various countries. Yet, they do not say why this is so. Single-country studies add to our substantive understanding of economic policies in a given country but neglect to place them in the broader context of the economy of socialism. A synthesis of both approaches remains to be undertaken.

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Gorbachëv: New Man in the Kremlin

Archie Brown

In the 60 years between the spring of 1922 when Stalin became general secretary of the Central Committee (CC) of the Communist Party and the spring of 1982, the Soviet Union had just three general secretaries—Stalin himself, Nikita Khrushchev, and Leonid Brezhnev. In the past three years, four men have held that office—Brezhnev in the last months of his 18-year reign, Yuriy Andropov, Konstantin Chernenko, and now Mikhail Gorbachëv. If Gorbachëv lives as long as any one of his five predecessors, he can expect to be still at the helm of the Soviet Communist Party and state at the beginning of the next millenium. For that and other reasons, the choice of Gorbachëv is of exceptional significance for the Soviet Union and—given the country's role in international affairs—for the rest of the world. There is every possibility that Gorbachëv will in time become the most powerful Soviet leader since Khrushchev, though his political style is likely to be very different and his policies more carefully thought through.

Before going on to discuss Gorbachëv's path to the top, the speed of his advance, and his attributes, outlook, and priorities, it may be useful to begin by noting those respects in which Gorbachëv's election as general secretary corresponds with Soviet tradition and the respects in which it is a novel succession.

Similarities to Previous Successions

In several ways, the choice of Gorbachëv fits the pattern of elevations to the Soviet leadership. Starting with Lenin, there have been only seven undisputed top leaders in Soviet history.[1] All six of Lenin's successors were at the time they attained the top leadership position already full members of the Politburo and secretaries of the Central Committee.[2] That applies to Stalin who was already *general* secretary at the time of Lenin's death in 1924, though it was only *after* Lenin's death that he was able to consolidate the power of the general secretaryship to the extent that it became the top job. Chernenko's death on March 10, 1985, left only two Soviet politicians who were full members of the Politburo and secretaries of the Central Committee—Gorbachëv himself, who had held such joint membership since 1980, and Grigoriy Romanov, who had combined membership of the Politburo with that of the CC Secretariat only since 1983, even though he had been in the Politburo longer than Gorbachëv.

Second, career profile, as well as position at the time the vacancy in the general secretaryship occurs, is important, and it is of particular relevance that a serious candidate should have experience of party secretaryships at various levels of the hierarchy, including the regional and (as follows from the point made in the previous paragraph) the Central Committee level. The economic experience gained thereby should ideally include acquaintance with agriculture, and some foreign policy experience is an additional asset. Every general

[1] I am excluding Georgiy Malenkov, for though in 1953–54 he was accorded a higher protocol ranking than Khrushchev, it is not clear that even then he wielded greater political power than Khrushchev, and by 1955 Khrushchev had quite evidently established a superior authority to him.

[2] I noted this and other prerequisites of a potential general secretary while Brezhnev was still alive. See Archie Brown, "Leadership Succession and Policy Innovation," in Archie Brown and Michael Kaser, Eds., *Soviet Policy for the 1980s*, London, Macmillan, and Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1982, pp. 232–35.

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Mikhail Gorbachëv addressing a major party ideological conference on December 10, 1984.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

secretary thus far has had his institutional base in the party apparatus and has spent a greater proportion of his career in party work than in any other branch of political activity. Even Andropov is no exception to this rule, though his Ministry of Foreign Affairs and KGB experience made him the nearest thing to one. Gorbachëv had a model rise through the party hierarchy, and like Khrushchev and Brezhnev before him, he had significant knowledge of agriculture—indeed, greater expertise in this realm than any of his predecessors.

Gorbachëv's foreign policy experience before coming to the general secretaryship is not as great as was Brezhnev's, who as chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet from May 1960 until July 1964 had extensive contacts with foreign statesmen. Nor is his knowledge of the international scene likely initially to be as great as was Andropov's, who from 1951 until 1982 served successively in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as head of one of the foreign departments of the Central Committee (Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries), and as chairman of the KGB. Nor, for that matter, has Gorbachëv had the opportunity to take part in talks with an American president as Chernenko had when he participated in the Brezhnev-Carter summit meeting in Vienna in 1979.[3] Yet Gorbachëv, too, has had the opportunity to gain some foreign policy experience in addition to that which all Politburo members acquire simply by virtue of regularly attending Politburo meetings at which foreign relations and international issues figure prominently on the agenda.[4] He undertook an eight-day visit as head of a Soviet delegation to Canada in May 1983 in addition to his earlier lower profile visits to various Western countries and to East European ones. When Chernenko became general secretary, Gorbachëv succeeded him as chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Soviet of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet. In that capacity, he made a week-long visit to Britain (cut short by

[3]Not that Chernenko appears to have contributed much. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977–81*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983, p. 343; and (for more explicit comment on this) Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President*, New York, Bantam Books, 1982, p. 246.

[4]For further elaboration of this point, see Archie Brown, "The Foreign Policy-Making Process," in Curtis Keeble, Ed., *The Soviet State: The Domestic Roots of Soviet Foreign Policy*, Aldershot, Hampshire, Gower for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1985, pp. 191–216, especially pp. 200–203.

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a day because of the death of Marshal Dmitriy Ustinov) in December 1984, which confirmed his grasp of international issues and possession of diplomatic skills.

Third, this latest succession conforms to the general pattern in terms of the nationality of the party leader. Non-Russians in the top leadership team are at a disadvantage in the general secretaryship stakes. There are still, after all, more Russians in the Soviet Union than all other nationalities put together, and they are disproportionately well represented in the all-Union Central Committee apparatus. Gorbachëv, like all of his predecessors except one, is a Russian; Stalin remains the only exception to that rule.

Fourth, and perhaps more surprising, at age 54, Gorbachëv is in the age band at which a majority of general secretaries have acceded to the top job. The sight of three aged and infirm Soviet leaders in a row has somewhat obscured the fact that only two of the Soviet Union's seven leaders and six general secretaries have been older than their 50's when they became leaders of the country, and only one (Chernenko) was over 70 when he was elected general secretary. Insofar as it is possible to generalize about what is "normal" in accession to the general secretaryship when dealing with only six cases, it can be said that the 50's is the normal age band in which a Soviet leader accedes to the top post.

Difference from Previous Successions

There are, however, three even more important respects in which Gorbachëv differs from all previous incumbents of the general secretaryship. The first is in terms of *relative* age, that is, the general secretary's age in relation to his colleagues. No one before Gorbachëv has become top leader as the youngest member of both the Politburo and Central Committee Secretariat. This is of greater potential relevance to the power Gorbachëv may yet wield than is absolute age (though Stalin was the only one to become general secretary at a younger age than Gorbachëv).

Stalin, at the time of Lenin's death was only 44, but he was one of the two oldest members of the Politburo. (The other was Trotsky—also 44.) The average age of the Politburo in 1924 was only 42. Khrushchev was 58 when Stalin died in March 1953 and 59 when he was formally given the title first secretary of the Central Committee in September of that year. As such, he was a year above the average age of the Politburo. Brezhnev, at 57, was just a little below the average age of the Politburo (59) immediately following the removal of Khrushchev in 1964. Andropov, who was 68 when he succeeded Brezhnev in November 1982, was also fractionally below the Politburo average age, which was 69 at that point.[5] By the time Andropov died on February 9, 1984, the average age of the 12 full members of the Politburo had declined to 67, and so Chernenko, at 72, was significantly above it.

Immediately after Chernenko's death, the Politburo (by this time down to 10 voting members as a result of the death also of Marshal Ustinov in December 1984) still had an average age of 67. Of these men, five were over 70, three were in their 60's, and only two were in their 50's. Not only was Gorbachëv the youngest member of the Politburo by a full five years, he was 13 years below the average age of the voting membership. Even more remarkable, he was the youngest member of the entire top leadership team—the 21 people who in the immediate post-Chernenko period made up the full and candidate membership of the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee. This is quite unprecedented and could have important implications for the future.

Though there has been a strong element of genuine collectivity of the Soviet leadership in the post-Stalin, and especially post-Khrushchev, era, every general secretary except Chernenko, who came to the leadership too late and too infirm to make much of an impact on it, has increased his powers during his time in the top post. This is especially true of those who had a lengthy period of office, though in the case of the first three of them—Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev—each man wielded less power than the previous general secretary.[6] Though promotions to the Secretariat and to the Politburo require the approval of a majority of members of

[5]The average age of the Politburo just after Brezhnev's death was 69 if Andrey Kirilenko is counted as a member, which he formally was until released from office at the Central Committee plenary session held on Nov. 22, 1982 (see *Pravda* [Moscow], Nov. 23, 1982, p. 1). However, Kirilenko had fallen out of favor with Brezhnev and Chernenko and had in practice been dropped from the Politburo while Brezhnev was still alive. If Kirilenko is excluded from consideration, the average age of the Politburo immediately following Brezhnev's demise on Nov. 10 was exactly the same as Andropov's, 68.

[6]This point has been the subject of some misinterpretation. Writing three years before Brezhnev's death, I noted that "each General Secretary has wielded less individual power over policy than his predecessor, but within his period of office his power vis-à-vis his colleagues has grown" (Archie Brown, "The Power of the General Secretary of the CPSU," in T. H. Rigby, Archie Brown, and Peter Reddaway, Eds., *Authority, Power and Policy in the USSR*, London, Macmillan, and New York, St. Martin's Press, 1980, p. 136). Rather to my dismay, this has been treated by a number of subsequent writers as if it were, or purported to be, a general law of Soviet politics. To take a recent example, Thane Gustafson, reviewing a book by George Breslauer, refers to this generalization as " 'Brown's law' " (see *Slavic Review* [Urbana, IL], Winter 1984, p. 684). In fact, this was a generalization (which I would still uphold) limited to the only three general secretaries who had held office up to that time: Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev. *So far as the first point is concerned, there was no suggestion that such a trend* toward declining leadership power would continue. Indeed, it seems clear that Andropov was within a year wielding a degree of power that Brezhnev did not possess for at least the first six years of his general secretaryship. The second part of the statement might, however, be extended into something approaching a law of Soviet politics. It does seem to be a *zakonomernost'* of the Soviet political system that a general secretary, granted a sufficient span of life, will over a period of time increase his power vis-à-vis his colleagues in the Politburo and Secretariat.

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the Politburo itself, which gives senior members of the Politburo an opportunity to make trade-offs among potential candidates, there is no doubt that the general secretary is in a better position than anyone else to get his nominees promoted to the top leadership team. As the very title general secretary (or, in Khrushchev's time, first secretary) suggests, his supremacy within the Secretariat is more clearly institutionalized than is his position in the Politburo. A general secretary has sometimes found it easier in the early stages of his leadership to make changes in the composition of the Secretariat than in that of the voting membership of the Politburo. Gorbachëv, however, as will be noted in greater detail in the final section, has succeeded in making a dramatic impact on the composition of the Politburo little more than six weeks after becoming party leader. Even when the process of change within the Politburo is a more gradual one, a point tends to be reached at which the general secretary has a sufficient group of protégés and supporters there to make simpler the task of removing those whose presence he has earlier had to tolerate without enthusiasm. For example, there was no love lost between Leonid Brezhnev and Aleksandr Shelepin. But although Brezhnev was able to have Shelepin removed from the Central Committee Secretariat in 1967, it was not until 1975 (by which time, following other changes in the Politburo composition, the General Secretary's power had greatly increased) that Brezhnev felt strong enough to push for Shelepin's expulsion from the Politburo as well. All the signs are that Gorbachëv will continue to move very much faster than Brezhnev did.

If he lives a normal life-span, Gorbachëv may readily become the first Soviet leader to preside over an entire top leadership team that has been appointed under his chairmanship of the Politburo and Secretariat and, accordingly, during a time when he was exercising a greater influence than anyone else on the choice of candidates. At first, the pool from which he can draw people—members of the Central Committee—will be only to a very limited degree of his own choosing, but Gorbachëv is fortunate in that respect also. Whereas Andropov and Chernenko had to operate with Brezhnev's Central Committee, that elected at the 26th Party Congress in 1981 (a factor that was more of an impediment for Andropov than for Chernenko, in view of Andropov's desire for change and of Chernenko's closeness to Brezhnev), Gorbachëv has come to power within a year of the next five-yearly party congress and in time to exercise still more influence than he could before on the composition of the Central Committee which will be formally elected at that 27th congress.[7]

Thus, over the long term, Gorbachëv has quite remarkable opportunities to promote like-minded people to senior leadership positions. In the shorter term, he will, as previous general secretaries have had to do, preserve alliances with a number of the weightiest members of the Politburo and take care not to tread on too many toes at once. But even in the short and medium term, the age structure of the Politburo and Secretariat is such that a number of changes are inevitable.

A second respect in which Gorbachëv is different from all of his predecessors as general secretary is that he alone has made his professional political career (in the Komsomol and party apparatus) entirely in the post-Stalin period. I shall look at his career in greater detail below, but the main point in the present context is that he is of a different *political generation* with different generational experience from that of all of his predecessors. Unlike them, he was not involved in any way in Stalin's purges and so is unburdened either by the guilt of having denounced others or by memories of fear of being denounced. He joined the party in 1952 while he was a student at Moscow University, and it is of some consequence that his time there (1950–55) included a period of more than two years after Stalin's death. This was a time of much freer discussion in student circles than had existed for many years. Though there was not yet the explosion of criticism that was to follow the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956, the post-Stalin "thaw" was already underway in 1954 and 1955, the "anti-cosmopolitan" campaign[8] was being laid to rest, and the atmosphere at Moscow University had become perceptibly more relaxed.[9] It is certainly worthy of note that Gorbachëv's early, and perhaps formative, years in Komsomol and party work were in the Khrushchev era. It was during his first year of full-time professional employment in the Komsomol that the 20th Party Congress took place, and the very first congress that Gorbachëv himself attended was the 22nd (in 1961), at which the attack on Stalin was taken further than it had been five years earlier and delivered by Khrushchev in open rather

[7]At the plenary session of the Central Committee held on Apr. 23, 1985, it was announced that the next party congress would begin on Feb. 25, 1986 (*Pravda*, Apr. 25, 1985, p. 1). Earlier there had been suggestions in the Soviet Union that the date of the 27th congress might be brought forward to late 1985. Thus, for example, in a speech delivered on Feb. 7, 1985, the First Secretary of the Georgian party organization, Eduard Shevardnadze, spoke of 1985 being "the year of the 27th Party Congress" (British Broadcasting Corporation, *Summary of World Broadcasts: USSR* [London—hereafter SWB], SU/7877/i, Feb. 16, 1985).

[8]The "anti-cosmopolitan" campaign aimed to sow distrust of everything foreign and had strongly anti-Semitic undertones. For a discussion of it, see Adam B. Ulam, *Stalin: The Man and His Era*, London, Allen Lane, 1973, pp. 678–85.

[9]On this, see the testimony of a Czech contemporary of Gorbachëv's in the Moscow University Law Faculty: Zdének Mlynář, *Nightfrost in Prague*, London, Hurst, 1980, p. 27. A much less convincing account of these years is provided by a Soviet emigrant who graduated from the Moscow University Law Faculty in 1950 but "fairly frequently" visited the university subsequently. He contrasts what he calls the "fairly 'liberal' " early postwar atmosphere with the political and academic climate of 1950, but quite omits to mention the more fundamental atmospheric change produced by the death of Stalin. See Lev Yudovich, "Gorbachëv 2: First Rungs on the Ladder," in *Soviet Analyst* (Richmond, Surrey), Dec. 19, 1984, pp. 2–3.

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Key Soviet leaders atop the Lenin Mausoleum in Red Square at May Day 1985 observances: from left to right, Marshall Viktor Kulikov, commander of Warsaw Pact forces; Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev, Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces; Defense Minister Marshal Sergey Sokolov; party General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachëv, Premier Nikolay Tikhonov; Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko; Politburo members Viktor Grishin, Grigoriy Romanov, Mikhail Solomentsev, Yegor Ligachëv, and Geydar Aliyev.

—Wide World.

than closed session.[10] It is known, however, that Gorbachëv did not regret the fall of Khrushchev, for he was critical of Khrushchev's ill-considered agricultural reorganizations and of his maintenance in reality of the old method of arbitrary interventions from the center even when he was ostensibly decentralizing.[11]

Different members of the same generation may hold very different views, and so there can be no question of automatically assuming in every individual case a certain political outlook on the basis of a particular generational experience. What can fairly be argued is that a Soviet citizen who began his full-time political career in 1955 had a better chance of retaining or acquiring a relatively open mind than one who first set foot on the bottom rung of the ladder 20 years earlier.

A third feature that distinguishes Gorbachëv from previous general secretaries is his superior level of formal education. Of particular importance is his five years of study in the Law Faculty of the Soviet Union's leading university. As I noted when writing about Gorbachëv three years ago, he is remembered by some of his contemporaries as an able as well as an open-minded student.[12] Being in Moscow University brought him into contact with other students of ability, many of whom had had a more privileged pre-university education than geography and circumstances had afforded him (see the section below on his rise from kolkhoz to the Kremlin).

[10]For information on Gorbachëv's attendance at party congresses, see, for example, *Pravda* Mar. 12, 1985, p. 1.

[11]This point is made in an important article published by Zdének Mlynář in the daily newspaper of the Italian Communist Party to which I have had access at a late stage in the writing of this article. See Zdének Mlynář, "My Fellow Student Mikhail Gorbachëv," *L'Unità* (Rome), Apr. 9, 1985, p. 9. Here Mlynář reveals for the first time in public not only that he and Gorbachëv were fellow students throughout Gorbachëv's five years in Moscow University, but also that they took the same courses, lived in the same student residence, and were good friends. Gorbachëv's views on Khrushchev were expressed in his last meeting with Mlynář which took place in Stavropol' in 1967. At that time, Mlynář was a rising personality in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, and in 1968 he was to become a Central Committee secretary and Politburo member. In the aftermath of the "Prague Spring," he was, however, expelled from the party, and since 1977 has lived in emigration. His portrayal of Gorbachëv is at once objective, well-informed, and favorable. Since Mlynář's own hopes for Czech communism were dashed by the Soviet intervention of 1968, he can hardly be accused of *a priori* bias in favor of a Soviet leader. His sympathetic account of Gorbachëv should stand as an important piece of evidence from one who better than anyone else now living in the West knew the younger Gorbachëv.

[12]In Brown and Kaser, op. cit., p. 240. Such an assessment has now been confirmed by Mlynář (loc. cit). Yudovich, who produces a determinedly negative view of Gorbachëv as a student on the basis of his own return visits to his alma mater, states, in contrast, that other students regarded Gorbachëv as "dull and badly educated" (loc. cit., p. 3). The assertion that he was "dull" flies in the face of the recollections of Mlynář and others who, unlike Yudovich, were Law Faculty undergraduates at the same time as Gorbachëv, and of the testimony of practically every Western politician, businessman, and official who has met him in more recent years. So far as the assertion that he was "badly educated" is concerned, it would be surprising if he were academically as well prepared as those students who had had the privilege of an uninterrupted education in city schools. What is evident, and more to the point, is that he had a considerable capacity for learning, which he was to put to good use.

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There is a vast difference between five years of full-time university education in Moscow and the education picked up, often on a part-time basis, in provincial institutes by many of the older generation of leading party officials. Gorbachëv himself later added a second degree by part-time study when he received the qualification of "agronomist-economist" from the Stavropol' Agricultural Institute in 1967.[13] Although academic degrees awarded to established party officials often owe more to their political standing than to their scholarly endeavors, Gorbachëv's life-long connection with agriculture and political interest in it, together with his intellectual curiosity, almost surely mean that in this case the degree was earned. At any rate, Canadian agricultural specialists who met with Gorbachëv in May 1983 were impressed by his detailed technical knowledge of the subject.

Gromyko's Nominating Speech

Fascinating light on Gorbachëv's qualities, as seen by Andrey Gromyko, and insight on Gromyko's view of the attributes to be looked for in a general secretary were provided by the Foreign Minister's surprisingly informal and genuinely enthusiastic speech of recommendation of Gorbachëv to the Central Committee on March 11, 1985.[14] It is of interest to compare it with the nomination speeches of Gorbachëv's two immediate predecessors, Andropov and Chernenko, and to consider why Gromyko's speech was accorded a much more restricted circulation than the previous two nomination addresses.

In certain respects, the nomination speech that is the odd one out among the last three is Chernenko's nomination of Andropov at the Central Committee plenary session held on November 12, 1982.[15] Whereas Nikolay Tikhonov's recommendation of Chernenko to the Central Committee on February 13, 1984,[16] and Gromyko's proposal of Gorbachëv 13 months later were clearly the speeches of strong and influential supporters of the prospective general secretary, Chernenko's speech proposing Andropov was that of a senior and defeated rival. Chernenko devoted by far the greater part of his speech to praise of Brezhnev and his leadership style before informing those present that the Politburo had instructed him to propose Yuriy Andropov as general secretary. He proceeded to recommend him in terms that

[13] *Pravda*, Mar. 12, 1985, p. 1.

[14] See *Materialy vneocherednogo plenuma tsentral'nogo komiteta KPSS 11 marta 1985 goda* (Materials of the Extraordinary Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee of March 11, 1985), Moscow, Politizdat, 1985, pp. 6–8.

[15] *Pravda*, Nov. 13, 1982, pp. 1–2.

[16] Ibid., Feb. 14, 1984, p. 2.

There has been unusual turnover in the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the last two-and-a half years, with the deaths of three general secretaries: at top, the November 1982 funeral of Leonid Brezhnev; at center, the February 1984 funeral of Yuriy Andropov; and at bottom, the March 1985 funeral of Konstantin Chernenko, with his successor Mikhail Gorbachëv (second from right) and Andrey Gromyko (right).

—Wide World.

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exaggerated Andropov's closeness to Brezhnev, emphasizing the similarities between the two men and the prospect of continuity. There was an element both of wishful thinking and of an attempt to constrain Andropov in Chernenko's stress on how well Andropov had grasped "the Brezhnevist style of leadership, a Brezhnevist concern for the interests of the people, and a Brezhnevist relationship to cadres," and in his emphasis on Andropov's "respect for the opinion of other comrades" and his "predilection for collective work."[17] In describing Andropov as "the closest comrade-in-arms of Leonid Il'ich [Brezhnev],"[18] Chernenko was according him a proximity to Brezhnev that many in his audience must have known applied more precisely to Chernenko himself. In fact, of course, Andropov lost little time in distancing himself from Brezhnev, quickly adopting his own distinctive style of rule with different priorities and a more demanding personnel policy that involved quite rapid rejuvenation of, and turnover in, the ranks of party and governmental cadres.[19]

When Andropov died some 15 months later, Tikhonov, in a measured address to the Central Committee, devoted approximately a third of his time to warm praise of Andropov and the second half of his speech to praise of Chernenko. As a close Brezhnev associate from the 1930's, Tikhonov, not surprisingly, brought the name of his former patron back into the public view, praising Chernenko as "a true comrade-in-arms of such leaders of the Leninist type as were Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev and Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov."[20] Tikhonov characterized Chernenko's attitude toward cadres as both "highly exacting and at the same time benevolent" (by implication a blend of Andropov and Brezhnev), and among Chernenko's special qualifications to which Tikhonov drew attention was the "prominent part" he had played in "the elaboration of theoretical problems of the perfecting of a developed socialist society" and in ideological work more generally.[21]

The speeches of Chernenko at the Central Committee plenum that elected Andropov and of Tikhonov at the plenum that endorsed Chernenko were made available in tens of millions of copies through their publication in *Pravda*, in other daily newspapers, and in party journals. One reason why Gromyko's speech of recommendation of Gorbachëv to the March 1985 Central Committee plenum was, in contrast, not published in *Pravda* may well be that, for the first time in Soviet history, the Central Committee elected a new general secretary on the very day (March 11) that the leadership made public the death of the previous general secretary (though Chernenko had, in fact, died at 7:20 p.m. on the previous day).[22] Thus, whereas on the death of Brezhnev and Andropov, *Pravda* was able to devote entire issues to the departed leader before giving full coverage to the election of a new one, the unprecedented speed with which Gorbachëv was elected may have meant that a difficult balancing act had to be preserved in the same issue of the newspaper between due respect to the dead leader and a welcome to his successor. As it was, Gorbachëv's picture appeared on page one and Chernenko's only on page two. To have included Gromyko's speech as well might have tilted the balance too far away from the appropriate obsequies.

That there may have been some disagreement on how wide a distribution to give to Gromyko's speech was, however, suggested by the fact that, unlike the two previous nomination speeches, it did not appear in the issue of the party journal, *Partiynaya zhizn'*, which carried an account of the March plenum, though it *was* published in full in the Central Committee's journal *Kommunist*, which went to press six days later.[23] It was, however, not published in another Central Committee journal, *Politicheskoye samoobrazovaniye*,[24] which went to press two days later than *Kommunist*. There are, perhaps, four reasons for such inconsistency. In the first place, it seems fairly clear that Gromyko was not speak-

[17]Ibid., Nov. 13, 1982, p. 2.

[18]Ibid.

[19]I have elaborated on these points in articles on the last two successions. See Archie Brown, "Andropov: Discipline *and* Reform?" in *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January–February 1983, pp. 18–31; and Brown, "The Soviet Succession: From Andropov to Chernenko," in *The World Today* (London), April 1984, pp. 134–41. In the latter article I noted that during Andropov's 15 months as general secretary there was a turnover of over a fifth of the Moscow-based members of the Council of Ministers, more than a fifth of the regional party secretaries, and over a third of the heads of department of the party's Central Committee. Immediately after Andropov's death, the full and candidate members of the Politburo and secretaries of the Central Committee consisted of 23 people. Just over a sixth of them had been brought into that inner circle during Andropov's brief tenure, and as many as a quarter of the full members of the Politburo received their promotions to voting membership during the same period.

[20]*Pravda*, Feb. 14, 1984, p. 2.

[21]Ibid.

[22]*Pravda*, Mar. 12, 1985, p. 2.

[23]The relevant issues are *Partiynaya zhizn'* (Moscow), No. 6, March 1985, which went to press on March 14, and *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 5, March 1985, which went to press on March 20. Though *Partiynaya zhizn'* has a greater circulation (1,030,000) than *Kommunist* (952,000), the difference is hardly substantial enough to be decisive. The fact that Gorbachëv's supporters had had a further week in which to establish their and his enhanced authority may well be of greater consequence, and one should not totally disregard the possibly divergent wishes of the two editors. The chief editor of *Kommunist*, Richard Kosolapov, is a full member of the Central Committee and was a contemporary of Gorbachëv's at Moscow University. For biographies of Kosolapov and of the chief editor of *Partiynaya zhizn'*, Mikhail Khaldeyev, see *Yezhegodnik Bol'shoy Sovetskoy Entsiklopedii 1981* (1981 Yearbook of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya," 1981, pp. 584 and 607.

[24]*Politicheskoye samoobrazovaniye*, like the two journals mentioned in note 23, published the nomination speeches by Chernenko and Tikhonov at the previous two successions. The journal is aimed at party propagandists and other ideological workers and has a circulation of 2,388,000.

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A frail Konstantin Chernenko casts his ballot on February 24, 1985, in elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR's Russian republic.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

ing from a written text.[25] The style of the speech is very direct (almost a thinking aloud), and the words and phrases are those of everyday discourse. It may be that the almost total absence of official language rendered the speech inappropriate for such wide distribution as its predecessors. Second, the speech is very frank and provides several hitherto undisclosed details about Gorbachëv's duties under Chernenko's general secretaryship. Third, the assessment of Gorbachëv is eulogistic and gives every impression of sincerity. To give full publicity in the mass-circulation newspapers to such praise of Gorbachëv from the normally low-key Gromyko (who is highly respected in the Soviet Union and whose responsibility for the conduct of Soviet foreign policy keeps him very much in the public eye) might have seemed too much like the launching of a personality cult of the new general secretary. Fourth (and related to the third point), since the authority and prestige of a general secretary can be an important political resource, and enhance his actual power, the possibility should not be excluded that different parts of the Central Committee apparatus have different views on how fast and how far Gorbachëv's authority should be strengthened and that this may reflect varying assessments of what they take to be his policy preferences and priorities. While the exclusion of Gromyko's speech from the newspapers is understandable for the reasons given above, the fact that only one out of three party journals—all of which published the speeches nominating Gorbachëv's two predecessors—included it is perhaps revealing of diversity of view within the higher party echelons.

Perhaps because it appeared originally only in booklet form, Gromyko's speech has attracted little or no Western attention up to the present, but it is certainly worth bringing out a number of its salient features. It is noteworthy that Gromyko referred to Chernenko only once—in the context of his absence through illness from the Politburo—choosing instead to devote the whole of his speech to outlining Gorbachëv's qualifications for the general secretaryship. Like Chernenko and Tikhonov, in their speeches nominating Gorbachëv's two predecessors, Gromyko observed that he was proposing Gorbachëv's election to the Central Committee on the instructions of the Politburo.[26] He suggested by implication that Gorbachëv may have been running the Secretariat of the Central Committee for some considerable time. As Gromyko put it: "He led the Secretariat *(On vël Sekretariat)*, as is known." Gromyko followed that remark with the sentence: "He also took the chair at sessions of the Politburo in the absence of Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko."[27] This was the first definitive confirmation that Gorbachëv had indeed been chairing the Politburo when Chernenko was too ill to attend. But the fact that Gromyko did not relate Gorbachëv's leading of the Secretariat (as distinct from his chairmanship of the Politburo) specifically to Chernenko's absence through illness in the last months of his leadership sug-

[25]Gromyko almost certainly had no time in which to prepare a complete written text. From mid-morning until mid-afternoon of March 11 (including a luncheon at which he made a speech on Soviet-French relations) he was engaged in discussions with the French Minister for External Affairs, Roland Dumas. Thus, between the Politburo meeting that chose Gorbachëv and which must have been held either in the late evening of March 10 or, more probably, early in the morning of March 11, and the Central Committee plenary session in the late afternoon of the 11th, Gromyko was fully occupied.

[26]*Materialy vneocherednogo plenuma tsentral'nogo komiteta . . .* , p. 6.

[27]Ibid.

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gests that Gorbachëv may have been in day-to-day charge of the Secretariat for much of Chernenko's general secretaryship.

In the first reference, so far as I am aware, by one Soviet leader to another's abilities as a chairman, Gromyko remarked apropos of Gorbachëv's chairmanship of the Politburo: "Without any exaggeration, he conducted himself brilliantly."[28] Gromyko made no reference to ideology or to the economy or to any other branch of domestic policy, but singled out for praise the degree of flexibility and lack of dogma in Gorbachëv's approach to problems. As he put it:

You know, it often happens that problems—both internal and external—are very difficult to consider if you are guided by the law of "black and white." There may be intermediate colors, intermediate links, and intermediate decisions. And Mikhail Sergeyevich [Gorbachëv] is always able to come up with such decisions that correspond with the party line.[29]

Gromyko also drew attention to one of Gorbachëv's attributes that he said was "perhaps a little clearer to me, in the performance of my duties, than to certain other comrades"—namely, how well and quickly Gorbachëv grasped the essence of developments taking place in other countries and in the international arena. Characterizing in general terms Gorbachëv's foreign policy orientation, Gromyko said: "He always defends the point of view that the holy of holies for us all is to struggle for the cause of peace and to maintain our defense at the necessary level."[30]

To put them with the maximum brevity, these and other attributes of Gorbachëv on which Gromyko enlarges can be summarized in 10 points that are revealing both of Gromyko's own desiderata (though not necessarily in this order) for the office of general secretary and of Gorbachëv's qualifications in his eyes for this post: (1) experience of party work at various levels, including the regional level and the Secretariat of the Central Committee; (2) skill in chairmanship (of the Politburo and Secretariat); (3) keen intelligence; (4) grasp of international issues; (5) strong convictions and directness; (6) political sensitivity (not seeing everything in "black and white" terms); (7) an analytical mind and ability to draw conclusions after dividing a problem into its component parts; (8) broad erudition; (9) organizational ability; and (10) capacity to establish a rapport, and common language, with others.[31]

[28]Ibid.
[29]Ibid., p. 7.
[30]Ibid., p. 8.
[31]Ibid., pp. 6–8.

From Kolkhoz to Kremlin

Assessments of Gorbachëv's route to joint membership of the Politburo and Secretariat have previously appeared in academic writing,[32] but it is now possible, while summarizing what was already known, to add some details.[33]

Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachëv was born on March 2, 1931, in the village of Privol'noye in the Krasnogvardeyskiy district of Stavropol' region *(kray)* to the northwest of the city of Stavropol'. Both his parents and his grandparents were peasants. His father was killed in the war, and he was brought up mainly by his grandparents.[34] If Gorbachëv was too young to fight in World War II (he was only 10 years of age when Hitler's armies invaded the Soviet Union), he was by no means too young to suffer the war's consequences. Not only did he lose his father, but he was in a part of the country that was for several months under German occupation (August 1942–January 1943) and for even longer close to the front.[35] Moreover, since the Soviet forces that relieved the city of Stavropol' came from the south, it is possible that Gorbachëv's native district was under German occupation for somewhat longer. Finally, because of an acute shortage of adult male labor in the Russian countryside during these war years, children, including Gorbachëv, had to spend time working in the fields, and thus did not receive regular schooling.

His education in the early postwar years was also, in all probability, disrupted. There is some uncertainty about how much time Gorbachëv spent as a manual

[32]See my contributions to Brown and Kaser, op. cit., esp. pp. 240–42 and 269–70; Jerry F. Hough, "Soviet Succession: Issues and Personalities," *Problems of Communism*, September–October 1982, esp. pp. 35–37; and Hough, "Andropov's First Year," ibid., November–December 1983, esp. pp. 61–63.

[33]I draw upon Soviet published sources, conversations with contemporaries of Gorbachëv's in Moscow University, and conversations and interviews with some of those who met Gorbachëv in Canada and Britain in 1983 and 1984—especially his British hosts. These conversations were on a non-attributable basis, but where the same points have appeared in the press, I cite such sources. Since not all press comment on Gorbachëv's visit to Britain was accurate, I try to cite only those published points that I have been able to verify independently.

[34]The information about Gorbachëv's father and grandparents emerged in his conversations in Britain.

[35]The impact of this on Gorbachëv must have been all the greater because of the extreme brutality of German soldiers at the Russian front where (as is too often forgotten) they behaved incomparably worse than on the Western front. On this brutality, and its ideological underpinnings, see an important forthcoming study by Omer Bartov, *The Eastern Front, 1941–45, German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare*, London, Macmillan, 1985. See also the two major volumes by John Erickson, *The Road to Stalingrad*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975, and *The Road to Berlin*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983. Mlynář does not provide any confirmation for the suggestion that Gorbachëv may have lived for a time in an area under German occupation, but he writes of him having lived through the war "near the Caucasian front" and of the war as "a fundamental experience for him," which he had known as a source of suffering for the civilian population (Mlynář, loc. cit.). For the occupation of Stavropol' city, see *Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya* (The Great Soviet Encyclopedia), 3rd ed., Vol. 24, I, Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya," 1976, p. 393.

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worker and how much time at school between 1946 and 1950. His official biographies in central newspapers and reference books state that he began work in 1946 at the age of 15 as an assistant to a combine harvester operator in a machine-tractor station.[36] Yet Jerry Hough has drawn attention to a biography in a Stavropol' local newspaper that suggests that Gorbachëv remained at school until 1950 and worked in the machine-tractor station only during school holidays.[37] Before one accepts the local, rather than the national, version of the biography as the whole story, however, it is worth noting that several of Gorbachëv's Moscow University contemporaries have remarked that one of the things that made him unusual was that he had already received, and sometimes wore, the insignia of the Order of Red Banner of Labor.[38] It seems highly unlikely that such an award would have been given to a schoolboy whose working experience was restricted to school holidays.[39]

What needs to be remembered is the appalling devastation of industry and agriculture and disruption of education and much else caused by the war—still very evident in the early postwar years—and the fact that 10-year schooling was at that time the exception rather than the rule in the countryside. Though the precise timing and proportions remain a minor mystery, it seems most likely that Gorbachëv spent *part* of the period between 1946 and 1950 as a full-time worker and *part* of it at school. Indeed, the recently published evidence of Zdének Mlynář makes it clear that it was the fact that he was an *exemplary worker* (with insignia to prove it) which, together with his obvious intelligence, earned him a place at Moscow University. Mlynář is quite categorical that Gorbachëv did not belong to either of the two main groups of students in Moscow University—in terms of background—at that time. That is to say, he was neither an ex-soldier nor someone who had come straight to university from secondary school.[40]

Gorbachëv was 19 when he began his studies at Moscow University in September 1950, and he remained there until June 1955 (the normal span of a Soviet first degree course), when he received his law degree. Given the time and place of his pre-university education and the fact that he arrived as a new student in Moscow at the height of the anti-cosmopolitan campaign, it is hardly surprising that he did not have an opportunity to learn foreign languages, and so the myth should not be perpetuated that when he was in Britain he was "answering even difficult questions *with ease in excellent English.*"[41] He joined the Communist Party in 1952 and was active in the Komsomol. As *komsorg kursa* (the Komsomol leader of his particular student year in the Law Faculty), he served also on the faculty committee of the Komsomol. But Gorbachëv's Komsomol duties do not appear to have been on so high and exacting a level as to have prevented him from being a serious, and indeed outstanding, student.[42]

It was, nevertheless, Gorbachëv's part-time work in the Komsomol while a student that paved the way for his full-time employment in the Komsomol after graduating. He returned to his native Stavropol' region and began a rapid rise in the Komsomol organization. In 1955–56, he was deputy head of the department of propaganda and agitation of the Stavropol' regional committee *(kraykom)* of the Komsomol, and from 1956 to 1958, he served as first secretary of the Stavropol' city committee of the Komsomol. In 1958, he moved back to the regional apparatus of the Komsomol, serving as second and then first secretary of the Stavropol' Komsomol *kraykom*.

In 1962, Gorbachëv moved from Komsomol to party work and began his still more remarkable rise through the party apparatus. The speed of his advance naturally owed something to luck, especially in the form of good connections, but it clearly owed still more to his abilities and performance which impressed those senior party officials who got to know him. From 1960 until 1964, Fëdor Kulakov was first secretary of the Stavropol' party organization, and he was to become an extremely important patron of Gorbachëv. In the early 1960's, when Gorbachëv was running the regional Komsomol organization, the two men worked together closely, and it must have been on Kulakov's invitation that Gorbachëv moved into the party *kraykom* apparatus. In 1962–63, Gorbachëv was party organizer of the Stavropol' regional party organization's territorial production administration of collective and state farms, and from 1963 until 1966 he was head of the party organs department of the party *kraykom*.

[36]See, e.g., *Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR: Desyatyy sozyv* (Deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet: 10th Convocation), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Izvestiya Sovetov Deputatov Trudyashchikhsya SSSR," 1979, p. 119; *Yezhegodnik Bol'shoy Sovetskoy Entsiklopedii 1981*, p. 573; and *Pravda*, Oct. 22, 1980, p. 1. The brief official outline of Gorbachëv's career published since he became general secretary puts the point in the following terms: "Soon after the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945, at the age of 15 he began his working activity. He worked as a machine operator *(mekhanizatorom)* at a machine-tractor station." See, e.g., *Partiynaya zhizn'*, No. 6, March 1985, p. 6.

[37]See Jerry F. Hough, *Soviet Leadership in Transition*, Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 1980, p. 58; and Hough, "Soviet Succession: Issues and Personalities," p. 35. Hough's source is *Stavropol'skaya pravda*, Feb. 6, 1979.

[38]I first drew attention to this in Brown and Kaser, op. cit., pp. 240 and 252–53.

[39]The memories of several Soviet scholars on Gorbachëv's Order of Red Banner of Labor find further corroboration in the article by Mlynář, who describes this decoration as "an extraordinary honor" for a 19-year-old.

[40]Mlynář, loc. cit.

[41]*International Herald Tribune* (Paris), Mar. 12, 1985, p. 1 (emphasis added).

[42]Thus, so far as I am aware, Gorbachëv did not hold a rank as high as that of "Komsomol secretary of Moscow University in 1954–55," which Jerry Hough attributes to him ("Soviet Succession: Issues and Personalities," p. 34). Mlynář reports that Gorbachëv passed his university examinations with distinction (loc. cit.).

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In 1964, Kulakov had moved to Moscow to head the agriculture department of the Central Committee, and in 1965 he became a secretary of the Central Committee. This was helpful for Gorbachëv in more ways than one. Not only did he have a friend at court, he had one who was well-connected. Kulakov was on good terms with Chernenko (who had been a secretary of the Penza regional party committee from 1945 to 1948 at a time when Kulakov headed the agricultural department of that same *obkom*)[43], and, through Chernenko, with Brezhnev. This was confirmed in 1971 when Kulakov became a voting member of the Politburo while retaining his Central Committee secretaryship. It was also useful for Gorbachëv that Kulakov was replaced in Stavropol' in 1964 by a high party official on his way down—Leonid Yefremov. Yefremov had become a candidate member of the Politburo under Khrushchev in 1962 and first deputy chairman of the Bureau for Party Work in the Russian Republic (a Khrushchevian creation that was to be abolished by his successors). The Stavropol' regional party secretaryship was for Yefremov a clear demotion, and though he held that post until 1970, it was evidently his being out of favor that caused him to lose the post at the age of only 58. With a party congress to be held the following year, the leadership clearly did not want Yefremov on the Central Committee for another five years.[44]

Meanwhile Gorbachëv had made himself Yefremov's obvious successor. From 1966 to 1968, he was back in city politics as first secretary of the Stavropol' *gorkom*. But already in 1968 he was evidently being groomed for the *kraykom* succession, for it was then that he was appointed second secretary of the regional party committee. His acquisition of an agricultural degree a year earlier had strengthened his qualifications for taking over as party chief of this important agricultural region. (Both Kulakov and Yefremov had also acquired such educational qualifications in the agricultural sphere.) Gorbachëv's support at the center ensured that it was indeed he who succeeded Yefremov as first secretary of the Stavropol' *kraykom* at the early age of 39. A year later, at the 24th Party Congress, he became a full member of the Central Committee.

Gorbachëv was very successful as a regional party secretary, and the Stavropol' *kray* under his leadership achieved a particularly good agricultural performance. He evidently approved of the "link system,"[45] which had gone out of fashion under Brezhnev, and supported both in theory and in practice the giving of greater autonomy to agricultural workers to farm a particular piece of land.[46]

These were years in which Gorbachëv also broadened his horizons and implemented his wish to see things for himself by taking motoring holidays with his wife through France and Italy[47]—not the vacations of a conventional party secretary. It appears that he also read widely, adding to his knowledge of Russian literature (which emerged in his discussions in Britain) a reading of some of the Western books translated into Russian during the Brezhnev years. Gorbachëv told one of the British politicians with whom he had conversation that the first modern English novel he read was C. P. Snow's *Corridors of Power*, a work that must at least have provided some insight into British-style bureaucratic politics for a Soviet *kraykom* secretary. It became apparent that he had also read *Parkinson's Law* (which was published in Russian by Progress Publishers in the mid-1970's and rapidly sold out). Instantly taking up a reference by the chairman of ICI to "Parkinson's Law," Gorbachëv responded: "If you're referring to C. Northcote Parkinson, I've got news for you. He lives in Moscow now."[48] Not the happiest of omens for overstaffed ministerial bureaucracies in the Soviet Union, but entirely consistent with the views of a man who, while still first secretary of the Stavropol' *kraykom* but shortly before he became a secretary of the Central Committee, had recorded his support for the controversial Shchekino experiment designed to reward enterprises that release surplus labor.[49]

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[43]On Kulakov, see *Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR: Devyatyy sozyv* (Deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet: 9th Convocation), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Izvestiya Sovetov Deputatov Trudyashchikhsya SSSR," 1974, p. 243; and on Chernenko's earlier career, *Yezhegodnik Bol'shoy Sovetskoy Entsiklopedii 1981*, p. 608.

[44]That Yefremov had blotted his copybook is indicated by the way he faded out of the reference books. He does not appear in the appropriate volume (Vol. 9) of the *Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya*, published in 1972. For very different reasons Gorbachëv does not appear in this most recent edition of the major Soviet encyclopedia. Given that the volume in which Gorbachëv should have appeared (Vol. 7) was published as recently as 1972 (though sent for typesetting on Mar. 22, 1971), this merely underlines the rapidity of his rise from relative obscurity to the leadership of his party and country. For Yefremov's career, see *Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR: Sedmoy sozyv* (Deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet: 7th Convocation), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Izvestiya Sovetov Deputatov Trudyashchikhsya SSSR," 1966, p. 157.

[45]For a brief account of the "link" or "autonomous work-team" system *(beznaryadnoye zveno)* see Alec Nove's chapter on agriculture in Brown and Kaser, op. cit., esp. pp. 179–80.

[46]See M. Gorbachëv, "The Rural Labor Collective: Paths of Social Development," *Kommunist*, No. 2, January 1976, pp. 29–38. The support in print for the "link" system became all the more explicit once Gorbachëv had become the secretary of the Central Committee responsible for agriculture. On this, see the contributions of Nove and of Brown in Brown and Kaser, op. cit., pp. 179–80, 244–45, 269–70, and 272. See also Sidney I. Ploss, "Soviet Succession: Signs of Struggle," *Problems of Communism*, September–October 1982, p. 50. It was only under Andropov, however, as will be noted later in this article, that Gorbachëv was able to expound in some detail his personal support for the autonomous work-team in agriculture.

[47]Laurence Marks, "Gorbachovs Let the Kremlin Mask Slip," in *The Observer* (London), Dec. 23, 1984, p. 4.

[48]Ibid.

[49]See M. Gorbachëv, "Leading Experience—An Important Reserve," *Kommunist*, No. 14, September 1978, p. 82.

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When Fëdor Kulakov died suddenly, at the age of 60, in 1978, it was his protégé, Gorbachëv, who was brought to Moscow to succeed him as Central Committee secretary responsible for agriculture. He was then only 47, an unusually early age for anyone to join Brezhnev's top leadership team. Though Kulakov was no longer around to give support, one can be certain that he had in the course of the 1970's drawn Gorbachëv's good record in his former *kray* to the attention of his colleagues. Two of them had, moreover, a special interest in the Stavropol' region and almost certainly also supported the advancement of Gorbachëv's career—Mikhail Suslov, who had been first secretary of the Stavropol' *kraykom* from 1939 until 1944 and for whom this was still a regional base, and Yuriy Andropov, who was a native of the Stavropol' region and was said to have taken holidays there while chairman of the KGB. If that is correct, Andropov would already have become acquainted with the *kraykom* First Secretary even before Gorbachëv moved to Moscow. In outlook, Gorbachëv was much closer to Andropov than to Suslov, but a combination of political skill and personal charm enabled him to have good relations with Soviet leaders of different views.[50]

Once Gorbachëv began to attend Politburo meetings in his capacity as a secretary of the Central Committee, he had an opportunity to impress those Politburo members, such as Gromyko, who had a high regard for real ability and professional competence. Indeed, only on the basis of such wide support could he, between the ages of 47 to 49, have risen to full membership of the Politburo while retaining his seat in the Secretariat: in November 1978 he became a Central Committee secretary, in November 1979 a candidate member of the Politburo, and in October 1980 a voting member of that body.

When, on the death of Brezhnev, there were two senior members of the Politburo who aspired to the general secretaryship, Gorbachëv was one of several important members of the Politburo (who included also Gromyko and Ustinov) who put their weight behind Andropov rather than Chernenko.[51] The twin elements of Andropov's approach—discipline together with struggle against corruption *and* the placing of economic reform on the political agenda in a way that it had not been since the mid-1960's—were fully in line with Gorbachëv's own thinking. He not only supported innovation in the organization of agriculture but had also, while still a regional party secretary in Stavropol', attacked indiscipline, corruption, and drunkenness, themes that were to be given an enhanced salience when Gorbachëv himself became general secretary after the Chernenko interregnum.[52]

Gorbachëv in the Wings

In the last year of Brezhnev's life, the importance the leadership attached to agriculture—the sphere of activity that Gorbachëv supervised—was underlined by the adoption of the comprehensive "Food Program" at the May 1982 plenary session of the Central Committee.[53] Gorbachëv no doubt was heavily involved in its preparation and was a strong advocate of some of its main elements, such as the further development of the agro-industrial complexes and the devoting of significantly greater resources to the development of the rural infrastructure, including better roads, transport and storage facilities, and social amenities.[54] What the program failed to do, however, was to offer greater autonomy to groups of farmers, and it may be partly because of this and other limitations of this major policy statement that Gorbachëv was content not to be one of the speakers at the May plenum[55] and, in a subsequent article, to speak of Brezhnev's "leading role" in initiating and formulating the program.[56]

When Andropov succeeded Brezhnev as general secretary in November 1982, he lost no time in calling for practical measures to "extend the independence *(samostoyatel'nost')* of associations *(ob"yedineniya)* and enterprises, [and] of state and collective farms."[57] Andropov's selection apparently also made it possible for Gorbachëv to introduce elements of agricultural reform that he had not been able to include in Brezhnev's "Food Program"—in particular, the extension in principle of the "link" system (but under a new name) to the country as a whole. In a speech to an agricultural conference at Belgorod in March 1983, Gorbachëv indi-

[50]It has been noted that at Suslov's funeral, Gorbachëv was the only Politburo member to stop and speak with each member of Suslov's family and that when Andropov was lying in state, Gorbachëv was the only member of the Politburo shown on Soviet television sitting with Andropov's family. See Hough, "Soviet Succession: Issues and Personalities," p. 37; and Marc D. Zlotnik, "Chernenko Succeeds," *Problems of Communism*, March–April 1984, p. 20.

[51]For somewhat different accounts that agree, however, on these three names, see Zhores Medvedev, *Andropov*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1983, p. 112; and Brown, "The Soviet Succession: From Andropov to Chernenko," pp. 136–37.

[52]For an assessment of Andropov's priorities at the outset of his general secretaryship, see Brown, "Andropov: Discipline *and* Reform?" and for Gorbachëv's renewed emphasis on discipline, and combatting corruption and drunkenness and alcoholism, see his speech at the March 1985 plenum of the Central Committee (*Pravda*, Mar. 12, 1985, p. 3) and the reports of the Politburo meetings held on Mar. 21 and Apr. 4, 1985 (ibid., Mar. 22, 1985, p. 1, and Apr. 5, 1985, p. 1).

[54]M. Gorbachëv, "The Food Program and the Tasks in Bringing It to Fruition," *Kommunist*, No. 10, July 1982, p. 6.

[55]*Partiynaya zhizn'*, No. 11, June 1982, p. 3.

[56]Gorbachëv, "The Food Program and the Tasks in Bringing It to Fruition," p. 6.

[57]*Pravda*, Nov. 23, 1982, p. 1.

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cated that the Politburo had recently given its approval to "the introduction of the collective contract *(kollektivnogo podryada)* in collective and state farm production."[58] He went on to make clear that this meant that autonomous work teams and brigades should be given the opportunity to make long-term contracts with their collective and state farms whereby they would have operational independence to organize their own work and distribute among themselves group income that, in turn, would be directly related to production results, though with a necessary minimum guaranteed by the parent farm to take account of years of bad weather. Such teams, said Gorbachëv, should be formed voluntarily and be allowed to elect their own leaders.[59]

It would appear that this is one of a number of Soviet partial economic reforms that have not been fully implemented, and the theme of increasing both the independence and responsibility of groups of workers is one to which Gorbachëv has reverted more recently.[60] It seems fair to say that nothing short of the powers of the general secretaryship enables an innovatively inclined Soviet leader to effect radical changes in established organizational and behavioral patterns in agriculture or industry, and even with these powers at one's disposal, it is a far from straightforward task.

Under Andropov, Gorbachëv's responsibilities within the Secretariat of the Central Committee were extended from control of agriculture to general oversight of the economy as a whole, and he also became the secretarial overlord of the department of the Central Committee responsible for lower level party appointments.[61] This meant that the two new secretaries of the Central Committee who had been brought in under Andropov—Nikolay Ryzhkov and Yegor Ligachëv (who headed, respectively, the Economic Department and the Department of Party Organizational Work)—and who could be presumed to be both sympathetic and responsive to Andropov's and Gorbachëv's priorities, came under Gorbachëv's jurisdiction. (Since Gorbachëv became party leader, Ryzhkov and Ligachëv have received further highly significant promotion—a point to which I shall return in the concluding section.)

The personnel changes at the top of the Soviet party hierarchy made by Andropov during his 15 months as general secretary, taken as a whole, helped to strengthen Gorbachëv's power base within the leadership. It is far from evident that Grigoriy Romanov, who became a secretary of the Central Committee in June 1983 while remaining a full member of the Politburo, or even Geydar Aliyev, who was advanced to full membership of the Politburo in November 1982, would necessarily have leaned toward Gorbachëv rather than Chernenko when it became clear that Andropov was dying. But two others who were promoted to full membership of the Politburo under Andropov, Mikhail Solomentsev and Vitaliy Vorotnikov, were people whose careers had either stagnated or (in Vorotnikov's case) suffered a setback under Brezhnev;[62] given the influence Chernenko was exercising in those years, they would be more than likely to favor Gorbachëv who had become the Politburo member closest to Andropov and who was, quite clearly, the man Andropov wished to succeed him.[63] It is also probable that Viktor Chebrikov, who had worked closely with Andropov at the KGB for 15 years and who was promoted to candidate membership of the Politburo in December 1983, would be favorably disposed toward Gorbachëv.

Taken together with the support of Ryzhkov and Ligachëv, this undoubtedly gave Gorbachëv a strong position within the top leadership team even while Andropov's health was declining. Yet, Chenenko remained the senior secretary in terms of length of time as joint member of the Politburo and Secretariat, and, during Andropov's absence through illness, he was able to regain some of the influence he was visibly losing in the earlier months of Andropov's general secretaryship. It was he who chaired Politburo meetings in Andropov's absence, and it was to him that those who were alarmed at the speed of Andropov's departure from Brezhnev's policy of "stability of cadres"[64] turned for respite when it became evident that Andropov would not recover and that the choice of successor was essentially between the elderly protégé of Brezhnev and the much younger and more vigorous protégé of Andropov. Within the top leadership team and, no doubt, within the Central Committee as a whole, there was a majority ready to settle for a quieter life.

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[58]Ibid., Mar. 20, 1983, p. 2.

[59]Ibid.

[60]That is a point to which I shall return when discussing Gorbachëv's policy orientations in the final section of this article.

[61]Some of the evidence for this is collected by Jerry Hough in his "Andropov's First Year," and by Marc Zlotnik in "Chernenko Succeeds."

[62]Solomentsev had spent 12 years as a candidate member of the Politburo before being promoted to full membership at the December 1983 Central Committee plenum. Vorotnikov, after serving as first deputy chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers from 1975 until 1979, was dispatched to Cuba as Soviet ambassador (a definite demotion) and only brought back to the center in two stages by Andropov. First, after Andropov became one of the senior secretaries of the Central Committee in May 1982, he recalled Vorotnikov to clean up the Krasnodar *kray* after securing the removal of the corrupt Sergey Medunov. Then, in 1983, when Solomentsev succeeded Arvids Pelše as chairman of the Party Control Committee, Vorotnikov was given Solomentsev's previous job of chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers.

[63]That Andropov, even from his sickbed, still had his hands on the levers of power in late 1983 is indicated by the four changes made to the top leadership team at the December plenum and by his remarkably authoritative speech, written in the first person, and read to the plenary session in his absence (see *Pravda*, Dec. 27, 1983, pp. 1–2).

[64]See note 19.

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Politburo member Geydar Aliyev addresses the April 22, 1985, party gathering marking the 115th anniversary of Lenin's birth; at the right in the second row is the new party general secretary, Mikhail Gorbachëv; to Aliyev's right is Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi.

—Wide World.

It seems likely that Gorbachëv and his supporters recognized that there was a majority for Chernenko and did not push his candidacy too hard. Instead, they used his strong power base as a bargaining position to ensure that his responsibilities would be still further extended and that he would become the number two man in the Chernenko Politburo and Chernenko's heir apparent. That is not to say that the succession to Chernenko was definitively settled at the same time as the succession to Andropov, for no Politburo can bind its successors. It could not have been known then how long Chernenko would live, which other members of the Politburo would die or fall into political disfavor in the meantime, and, hence, what would be the composition of the selectorate that would choose Chernenko's successor when the time came. There was at least enough uncertainty to give any waverers within the leadership who were not firmly committed either to Chernenko or to Gorbachëv, but who might themselves nurture aspirations to the top job, an incentive to support the older man.

That some of those close to Chernenko may not have been wholly reconciled to Gorbachëv's number two position was suggested by the rather peculiar treatment of his speech to the Central Committee plenum on February 13, 1984, which elected Chernenko to the general secretaryship. The official communiqué from the plenum, published in *Pravda* and the other daily newspapers the following day, did not so much as mention the fact that Gorbachëv had addressed the Central Committee members. It was only when the proceedings of the plenum appeared in booklet form and in the pages of party journals such was *Kommunist*[65] and *Partiynaya zhizn'*[66] several days later that the text of Gorbachëv's address was published. His short speech was notable both for its emphasis on the fact that the party would continue on the course worked out by the 26th Party Congress and by the November 1982 and June and December 1983 plenums of the Central Committee (that is to say, emphasizing preponderantly the course set in the Andropov period) and for its expression of his conviction that members of the Central Committee would act "in the spirit of unity and cohesion" that had characterized the February 1984 plenum.

The strength of Gorbachëv's position was made still clearer in April 1984 when it was he who proposed Chernenko for the chairmanship of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The main emphasis of Gorbachëv's speech was on how the experience of the past few years had shown the necessity of combining

[65] *Kommunist*, No. 3, February 1984, p. 14.
[66] *Partiynaya zhizn'*, No. 5, March 1984, p. 12.

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the posts of general secretary and head of state in view of the party's leading role within Soviet society and the part played by the general secretary in the conduct of foreign policy.[67] When Andropov had become general secretary, there was just one precedent—that of Brezhnev—for the general secretary combining the party leadership with the chairmanship of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and it was for only the last five years of his 18 years as general secretary that Brezhnev was also the Presidium chairman. That there was still some doubt after Brezhnev's death as to whether this was not too much authority to place in the hands of one man was indicated by the fact that it was not at the first meeting of the Supreme Soviet after Andropov became general secretary (the one held in late November 1982) but only in June 1983 that he became head of state. The elevation of Chernenko to the chairmanship of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet within two months of his becoming general secretary, and the terms in which Gorbachëv proposed him, have surely made the combination of these posts a firmly established convention. It is to be expected that at the first meeting of the Supreme Soviet to be held during his general secretaryship, Gorbachëv will become chairman of the Presidium, just as it can be taken for granted that (like Andropov and Chernenko before him) he has been acting as chairman of the Defense Council from the outset of his party leadership.

Apart from his role in proposing Chernenko as head of state, Gorbachëv's number two position within the party was evident early on in Chernenko's general secretaryship from his additional responsibilities—negotiated, no doubt, at the time of the succession. Gorbachëv took over from Chernenko the chairmanship of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Soviet of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet,[68] becoming at the same time the overseer of international affairs within the Central Committee Secretariat. He also became secretarial overlord of ideology and culture.[69] Thus, he was accorded what was, in effect, the old Suslov portfolio but without having to relinquish his responsibilities for the economy and party cadres—a stronger position than even Suslov ever had and which was made possible by the fact that he was one of only two senior secretaries[70] (the general secretary apart) throughout Chernenko's 13 months as party leader. The other was Romanov, who appeared to be supervising both the Administrative Organs Department of the Central Committee (which in turn oversees the military and the KGB) and the Defense Industry Department.[71]

One institutional interest with which Gorbachëv has had few links hitherto is the military. He was too young to serve in the armed forces during the war, and the time when he reached military age was one in which demobilization was taking precedence over recruitment. This could have been a disadvantage for him as compared with Romanov who served in the Soviet army from 1941 until 1945[72] and whose official duties in the Secretariat preserved his links with the military. But the fact

The medals of Marshal Dmitriy Ustinov, Politburo member and minister of defense, on display at the Kremlin wall where his ashes were interred on December 24, 1984.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

[67] *Pravda*, Apr. 12, 1984, p. 1.

[68] Gorbachëv has had varied experience of Supreme Soviet work. Before taking over the Foreign Affairs Commission chairmanship, he was from 1970 to 1974 a member of the Nature Conservation Commission, from 1974 to 1979 chairman of the Commission for Youth Affairs, and from 1979 to 1984 chairman of the Legislative Proposals Commission of the Soviet of the Union.

[69] The fullest confirmation of this came when Gorbachëv made a major speech on Dec. 10, 1984, to the All-Union Conference on "The Perfecting of Developed Socialism and the Ideological Work of the Party in the Light of the Decisions of the June (1983) Plenum of the Central Committee."

[70] Or *super-secretaries*—those who combine their secretaryship with full Politburo membership and so qualify to supervise several departments of the Central Committee and one or more of the other secretaries.

[71] It was, for example, Romanov who chaired Marshal Dmitriy Ustinov's funeral commission and who made the principal funeral speech. See *Pravda*, Dec. 22, 1984, p. 1, and Dec. 25, 1984, p. 1.

[72] See *Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR: Desyatyy sozyv*, p. 379.

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British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher with Soviet Politburo member Mikhail Gorbachëv during his visit to London in December 1984.

—Sagansky-Spooner/Gamma-Liaison.

that the military remains under firm party control has been clearer than ever in recent years, and there is no evidence that the army played any part in the elevation to the general secretaryship of either Chernenko or Gorbachëv.[73] One succession earlier, Ustinov had been a strong supporter of Andropov, but Ustinov was essentially a civilian (albeit one with quite exceptional military experience), and in the context of the succession, his party standing was more important than was his office as minister of defense. The fact that there is not the slightest reason to suppose that his successor, Marshal Sergey Sokolov, played any role in the election of Gorbachëv merely underlines this. It may have been helpful for Gorbachëv that the assertive Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov was replaced in early September 1984 as chief of the General Staff by Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev.[74] Ogarkov's demotion put him out of the running for the succession to Ustinov as minister of defense. Ustinov died on December 20, 1984, and had been seriously ill since October.[75] He was still in the public eye in September and must have played a part, and possibly the leading part, in the removal of Ogarkov as chief of staff. But this merely underlines the fact that the Soviet top brass have been even more firmly subordinated to the civilian party leadership in the post-Brezhnev era than under Brezhnev (who had closer connections with senior officers, dating from the war, than had any of his successors).

When Gorbachëv made his December 1984 visit to Britain, his position as number two man within the Soviet leadership was so strong that it was unlikely that his British stay would be of decisive importance to his leadership prospects. Nevertheless, he accepted an element of risk inasmuch as by engaging in discussions with a wide variety of British politicians—including the Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher—and by bringing himself within focus of the Western mass media, he was guaranteeing that if he made serious mistakes they would be widely publicized. In fact, however, he so much impressed all who met him both with his ability and personality that the visit could only have strengthened his already strong position in Moscow, not least in the eyes of the Soviet foreign policy establishment.[76] Commentary in the British mass media, while not always on the most serious level, was overwhelmingly favorable. Even Mrs. Thatcher delivered an accolade that she has accorded no other Soviet leader: "I like Mr. Gorbachëv. We can do business together."[77] And one of the British politicians with the broadest international experience, Dennis Healey, former defense minister and chancellor of the exchequer and now shadow foreign secretary, described Gorbachëv as "a man of exceptional charm" who was "frank and flexible with a composure full of inner strength."[78] Healey, whose discussions with Soviet leaders stretch back to Khrushchev, added: "For all who met him in Britain, he left one puzzling question: how can a man who appears so genuinely nice and human run the Soviet system?" The answer, he suggested, might lie in the "immense authority" that Gorbachëv had impressed on those who met him.[79]

[73]At Chernenko's funeral, in a break with tradition, the top military men did not appear (presumably because they were not invited) with the party leaders on the Lenin mausoleum.

[74]*Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), Sept. 7, 1984, p. 1.

[75]*Pravda*, Dec. 22, 1984, pp. 1–2.

[76]The Soviet press, radio, and television accorded extensive coverage to Gorbachëv's visit to Britain and reported a number of the positive comments of British politicians and businessmen and the British media on the way it was going. See *SWB*, Dec. 17–24, 1984.

[77]*Financial Times* (London), Dec. 22, 1984, p. 26.

[78]Dennis Healey, "Gorbachev Face to Face," *Newsweek* (New York), Mar. 25, 1985, p. 15. This tallies with the following recollection of Mlynář: "Gorbachëv the student was not only very intelligent and gifted, he was an open man, whose intelligence never carried over to arrogance; he wanted—and was able—to listen to the opinions of all he spoke to. Loyal and personally honest, he won an informal and spontaneous authority.... He was conscious of himself as a man who knows that everything he has, he possesses thanks to his own powers, his own talent, his own hard work, and that he has gained nothing via protection or social origin" (loc. cit.).

[79]Ibid. Those British politicians who found it easy to establish a rapport with Gorbachëv did not, however, mistake charm for weakness. One who spent a lot of time with Gorbachëv in Britain in his capacity as chairman of the British branch of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the Conservative Member of Parliament Peter Temple-Morris, observed later: "He is a serious and cultivated man with a great deal of style. Nevertheless, he is as tough as old boots—that's important to remember" (*Newsweek*, Mar. 25, 1985, p. 10).

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Gorbachëv's strong position in Moscow was reflected also in the extent to which Chernenko, though accorded constant praise in the Soviet mass media and treated in the speeches of other Soviet politicians as the ultimate authority, was operating with Andropov's agenda. He, too, had to take up the themes of discipline and reform, and though they were pursued with less vigor and expounded with less urgency than by Andropov, they became more pronounced as Chernenko's health weakened and as Gorbachëv's influence grew. This was reflected in some of Chernenko's later speeches and articles,[80] as well as in the further disciplinary action taken against Chernenko's former colleague from Moldavian days, Nikolay Shchëlokov, who had been dismissed from his post as minister of internal affairs under Andropov in December 1982 and expelled from the Central Committee in June 1983, and who as far into Chernenko's general secretaryship as November 1984 was additionally stripped of his rank of army general.[81] Shchëlokov died the following month and was rumored to have committed suicide.[82]

There were numerous other signs during the last months of Chernenko's life of Gorbachëv's enhanced authority and of the fact that he had a clearly established lead over any potential party rival. For certain purposes, protocol demanded that Tikhonov, as chairman of the Council of Ministers, should take precedence over Gorbachëv. Thus, when the leaders gave speeches to their RSFSR Supreme Soviet constituents in ascending order of rank, the last three speeches were given by Gorbachëv, Tikhonov, and Chernenko (in absentia)[83], the same order in which they had made their USSR Supreme Soviet speeches a year earlier.[84] The leaders' acceptances of their Supreme Soviet nominations were printed in the same order of importance (with Gorbachëv in third place after Tikhonov, who, at the age of 79 and with a background of ministerial work, was not, of course, a remotely conceivable candidate for the succession to Chernenko) and, in terms of number of constituency nominations of leaders as published by *Pravda*, Gorbachëv was actually put on a par with Tikhonov, with only Chernenko receiving more nominations and all other Politburo members getting fewer.[85]

When these various esoteric signs are taken in conjunction with Gromyko's statements, quoted earlier, that Gorbachëv had already been "leading" the Secretariat and chairing the Politburo during Chernenko's lifetime, it can be seen that Gorbachëv had the succession firmly within his grasp before Chernenko died. The very fact, furthermore, that the Soviet Union had had three leaders in a row who were for lengthy periods incapable of carrying out all of their public functions had made Gorbachëv's relative youth—considered a handicap during the two previous successions—into a positive asset. Thus, while there may well be those within the top leadership team and the Central Committee who are apprehensive lest Gorbachëv's new broom should sweep them aside, or lest he should encourage too much policy innovation, there is little reason to doubt Gromyko's assertion that the Politburo members were unanimous in nominating Gorbachëv[86] since it is not the custom for Soviet politicians to oppose directly what is clearly the winning side.

Gorbachëv as General Secretary

What is the political climate in which Gorbachëv has come to power, and what can be said of his policy orientations, priorities, leadership style, and personnel changes, as well as future prospects?

The political climate in the Soviet Union today is more conducive to policy innovation than it has frequently been in the past. In Soviet terms, there are both "objective" and "subjective" reasons for this. Objectively, there has been the slowdown in economic growth rate, and this is being openly analyzed by Soviet scholars.[87] The ordinary Soviet citizen may be unfamiliar with the statistics, but is only too well aware of the problems that remain to be overcome. In the international arena, there is the dilemma posed by the significant increase in American military expenditure, by a general worsening of relations with the United States and with Western Europe dating from the late 1970's, and by relatively static relations with China and Japan, which by the time of Chernenko's death, had improved only marginally. Subjectively, there is the fact that Andropov had raised expectations of qualitative improvements in the economy and of a greater sense of purpose in Soviet society, and there was some popular frustration that under Chernenko the country seemed to be marking time again. There is widespread public support for a revival of

[80] See, for example, Chernenko's speech to the conference of People's Controllers, *Pravda*, Oct. 6, 1984, pp. 1–2; his article, "To Meet the Demands of Developed Socialism," in *Kommunist*, No. 18, December 1984, pp. 3–21; and his RSFSR Supreme Soviet election speech, read for him in his absence (through illness) little more than two weeks before his death, in *Pravda*, Feb. 23, 1985, pp. 1–2.

[81] For the dates during which Chernenko and Shchëlokov worked together in Moldavia, see *Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta: Desyatyy sozyv*, pp. 475 and 494. For the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet decree depriving Shchëlokov of his military rank for bringing discredit to it and for abuse of office, see *Vedomosti verkhovnogo soveta SSSR* (Moscow), No. 46, Nov. 14, 1984, p. 860.

[82] *The Times* (London), Dec. 19, 1984, p. 12.

[83] *Pravda*, Feb. 21, 1985, p. 2; Feb. 22, 1985, p. 2; and Feb. 23, 1985, pp. 1–2.

[84] Ibid., Mar. 1, 1984, p. 2; Mar. 2, 1984, p. 2; and Mar. 3, 1984, pp. 1–2.

[85] Ibid., Jan. 4, 1985, pp. 1–2.

[86] *Materialy vneocherednogo plenuma tsentral'nogo komiteta KPSS* . . . , p. 8.

[87] See, notably, M. I. Piskotin, *Sotsializm i gosudarstvennoye upravleniye* (Socialism and State Administration), Moscow, Nauka, 1984.

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détente (which the more sophisticated Soviet party intellectuals recognize would have to be accompanied by more clearly defined "rules of the game") and a readiness to welcome more Soviet diplomatic initiatives as distinct from mere reactions to events.

On the specific issue of economic reform, it is of great importance to recognize that a shift of opinion has taken place within the Soviet party intelligentsia, so that while argument continues, far more people now accept that minor tinkering with the economic mechanism is not enough. There is, however, resistance from powerful sections of the party and state apparatus to reducing the powers of ministries and giving greater autonomy to industrial associations and enterprises and still greater resistance to incorporating market elements within the economic system. But from the very top of the party hierarchy, and not least from Gorbachëv himself, there has been encouragement to social scientists to be less slow and timid in tackling "the resolution of the key theoretical problems of our development."[88]

The *short-term* changes that actually take place are unlikely to be as far-reaching as some of the proposals that have been published by Soviet scholars. But while Gorbachëv was already exercising influence on the broad lines of economic policy under Andropov and Chernenko, encouragement was given to the reform-oriented Institute of Economics and Organization of Industrial Production of the Siberian Division of the Academy of Sciences, based in Novosibirsk. At the June 1983 plenary session, two economic institutes were singled out for criticism by Chernenko in his speech, and it is difficult to say how much of an influence Gorbachëv had over that, though it is very likely that he had some. Chernenko criticized, on the one hand, the relatively conservative Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences in Moscow and the much more reformist Central Institute of Economics and Mathematics (TsEMI). The common thread in the criticism, however, would appear to be that neither institute was sufficiently closely in touch with real economic life or was offering enough practical guidance to policymakers—a charge that could not be leveled against the Novosibirsk Institute, which works in close cooperation with industry, as can be seen from the pages of its monthly journal, *EKO*. Academician Abel Aganbegyan of Novosibirsk appears to be in good standing with Gorbachëv,[89] and it is worth recalling that the frank critique by his Institute colleague Academician Tat'yana Zaslavskaya of the obstacles to economic progress in the Soviet Union and of the deficiencies of Soviet social science in producing a "fully elaborated 'model' for the new economic mechanism"[90] was delivered to a closed seminar under the joint auspices of the economic departments of the party's Central Committee, the State Planning Committee (Gosplan), and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.[91]

Interesting though Zaslavskaya's paper is, it should not distract attention (as it has tended to) from works officially published in the Soviet Union that are no less open-minded and innovative. On the issue of economic reform, these have in the last few years included the works of jurists and political scientists as well as economists.[92] One significant example is a book published in September 1984 (which appears to have been quite overlooked by Western scholars) written by the chief editor of the journal, *Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo*, Mikhail Piskotin. Entitled *Socialism and State Administration*,[93] this work records the secular decline in the Soviet economic growth rate from the 1950's to the early 1980's and observes that the decline has "deeper causes than simple mistakes in the work of particular organs of government, a low level of exactingness, or negligence in moral-educational work."[94] It is impossible to do justice to Piskotin's quite lengthy and closely argued book in a few lines, but it is worth noting his emphasis on the fact that the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers did not consider their July 14, 1983, joint resolution on the broadening of the rights of production associations and enterprises to be a "full and final solution of the problem of strengthening the independence of the primary economic unit."[95] Piskotin criticizes "market socialism" but, significantly, is not opposed to every use of the market mechanism. As he puts it: "Market socialism does not exist wherever there is a market and commodity-production relations, but only where this market becomes the sole or main regulator of the economy."[96] Accordingly, he is sympathetic to the Hungarian economic reform, though he stresses that this experience is "impossible to transfer mechanistically to the conditions of the Soviet Union."[97]

[88]M. S. Gorbachëv, *Zhivoye tvorchestvo naroda* (The Living Creation of the People), Moscow, Politizdat, 1984. This was a speech delivered on Dec. 10, 1984, to the All-Union Conference on "The Perfecting of Developed Socialism and the Ideological Work of the Party...."

[89]See his articles in *Pravda*, July 14, 1984, p. 2; and *Trud* (Moscow), Aug. 28, 1984, p. 2.

[90]"The Novosibirsk Report," *Survey* (London), Spring 1984, p. 100.

[91]Philip Hanson, "The Novosibirsk Report: Comment," ibid., p. 83.

[92]I have drawn attention to some of them in my article, "Political Science in the Soviet Union: A New Stage of Development?" in *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), July 1984, pp. 317–44, esp. pp. 334–35.

[93]*Sotsializm i gosudarstvennoye upravleniye*, op. cit.

[94]Ibid., p. 9.

[95]Ibid., p. 147.

[96]Ibid., p. 157.

[97]Ibid., p. 161. *Gorbachëv's* positive evaluation of the Hungarian economic reform may be inferred from an editorial published in *Pravda* less than three weeks after his succession which speaks of Hungary's "bold, innovative, and at the same time realistic, approach to the working-out of plans for socioeconomic development" (*Pravda*, Mar. 30, 1985, p. 1).

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Even more radical calls for economic and, indeed, political reform have come from a sector head in the Institute of State and Law, Boris Kurashvili,[98] who has laid great stress on the need for "democratization of the state administration," and has noted that many of those working in the state apparatus consider the present ministerial system—a product, essentially, of the 1930's—to be the only system possible. Kurashvili profoundly disagrees with such a view but recognizes that reform will meet with the opposition of "conservative and inactive elements in the state apparatus."[99]

Whether Gorbachëv will follow the advice of the advocates of more far-reaching economic reform will depend not upon him alone, but upon the strength of the various interest groups involved (above all, in the apparatus), many of whom are opposed to reform. The opposition is to be found not only within the state administration, for at every level of the party apparatus there are departments that work closely with the ministerial network and whose functionaries tend to view issues through the same lenses. Already under Andropov and even under Chernenko, it was clear that within the top party leadership there were those acutely aware of current problems, and who had a more open mind about ways of tackling them than had many lower level officials. Certainly, Gorbachëv himself has given every indication of willingness to listen to constructive proposals for within-system change, and those jurists with ideas for reform should not have too much difficulty of access. It is worth noting in that connection that the director of the Institute of State and Law in Moscow, Academician Vladimir Kudryavtsev (under whose guidance a more sociological approach to the study of law has been encouraged in the Institute over the past decade) was one of the speakers at the RSFSR Supreme Soviet election meeting addressed by Gorbachëv on February 20, 1985.[100]

Though Gorbachëv's speeches generally repay close study, the one that is more revealing of all those he has made to date in respect of the insight it affords on his policy orientation and priorities is his speech to the conference on ideological work in December 1984. Though what was published from it in the mass media made interesting reading,[101] it was less than half of what Gorbachëv actually said. In directing attention to some of the salient points from the speech, I draw in the following paragraphs exclusively from the parts that were not published in *Pravda*. These include some of the most innovative passages and those most revealing of Gorbachëv's style—and at the same time the least known because of their more limited circulation.[102]

On the economy, Gorbachëv directly referred to the "slowdown of economic growth at the end of the 1970's and beginning of the 1980's" and said that this was to be explained "not only by the coincidence of a number of unfavorable factors but also by the fact that the necessity of changes in some aspects of production relationships was not discovered in good time."[103] This particular argument is very much in line with the views of economic reformers such as Piskotin and Zaslavskaya, as is his attention to the problem of the correspondence of production relations and productive forces.[104] Gorbachëv himself insists that "the correspondence of production relations to productive forces is not reproduced just by itself, but demands constant, purposeful work in the perfecting of the entire economic system of socialism."[105] While he observes that the dialectical relationship between production relations and productive forces cannot under socialism be an antagonistic one, he also notes that the unwarranted preservation of "obsolete elements in production relations may bring about a deterioration of the economic and social situation."[106]

Among the practical economic issues touched upon by Gorbachëv in his December 1984 speech were those of commodity-monetary relations and the need for "serious scientific recommendations on the application in contemporary conditions of such economic levers as price, cost, profit, credit, and certain others";[107] the built-in conservatism of much of existing investment policy;[108] and the importance of improving distribution relations, since "this is a most sensitive sphere that exercises an active influence not only on production but also on the consciousness and the mood of people."[109]

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[98]See B. P. Kurashvili, "State Administration of the National Economy: Prospects for Development," *Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo* (Moscow), No. 6, 1982, pp. 38–48; Kurashvili, "Objective Laws of State Administration," ibid., No. 10, 1983, pp. 36–44; and Kurashvili, "The Fates of Branch Management," *EKO* (Novosibirsk), No. 10, 1983, pp. 34–57.

[99]Kurashvili, "Objective Laws...."

[100]*Pravda*, Feb. 21, 1985, p. 2. One of the scholars whose advice Piskotin acknowledges in the introduction to his recent book is Zaslavskaya. Both he, in that book, and Zaslavskaya in her 1983 report single out for special praise the work of Kurashvili. This is a good example of the kind of opinion grouping or informal group that is of great importance in Soviet politics. These three scholars are, of course, just part of a much wider opinion grouping with broadly similar views on the direction the Soviet economy and Soviet society should be taking. Needless to say, there are informal groups of conservatives and dogmatists as well as of reformers. For a pioneering discussion of the group phenomenon in the USSR by a Soviet scholar, see A. V. Obolonskiy, "Formal and Informal Groups in the State Administrative Apparatus," *Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo*, No. 5, 1983, pp. 28–35. See also Brown, "Political Science in the Soviet Union," esp. pp. 332–33 and 335.

[101]See, e.g., *Pravda*, Dec. 11, 1984, p. 2.

[102]Gorbachëv, *Zhivoye tvorchestvo naroda*. The print-run of this Politizdat booklet is 100,000 which is, of course, substantial, but not to be compared with *Pravda*, which has a circulation of over 10 million. The booklet very rapidly sold out.

[103]Ibid., pp. 12–13.

[104]See Piskotin, *Sotsializm i gosudarstvennoye upravleniye*; and "The Novosibirsk Report."

[105]Gorbachëv, *Zhivoye tvorchestvo naroda*, p. 12.

[106]Ibid., p. 13.

[107]Ibid., p. 14.

[108]Ibid., p. 22.

[109]Ibid., p. 31.

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In his references to the social sciences, Gorbachëv's interest in theoretical issues comes out strongly, but so does his insistence that theory should lead to practical benefit. Thus, he observes:

Not all research institutions work in close connection with practice. Some scholars at times are not able to part company with obsolete conceptions and stereotypes. Their theoretical investigations not infrequently are fitted into preconceived schemes, and they revolve in a circle of scholastic reasoning.[110]

Later in the same speech he referred to the force of inertia and to the attempt "to squeeze new phenomena into the Procrustean bed of moribund conceptions."[111] The tone and content of Gorbachëv's remarks make clear that he is no friend of dogmatists and that reform-minded social scientists can expect encouragement under his leadership, provided they devote attention to "the problems of perfecting developed socialism." This, for Gorbachëv, is "the pressing demand of the times, the basic criterion for evaluating the activity of social scientists."[112]

It was of greater importance than has generally been recognized that under Andropov there was a shift from Brezhnev's somewhat complacent view of "developed socialism" to the standpoint that the Soviet Union was only "at the beginning" of the stage of developed socialism, a shift that emphasized existing shortcomings and how much scope there was for improving (or in Soviet terms, "perfecting") both the economic and the political system. In his December speech, Gorbachëv did not neglect the political system and made much use of the term, "self-management" *(samoupravleniye)*,[113] urging that the various levels and units within the political system be given more space *(prostor)* within which to operate. He attacked attempts to regulate all and everything from the center and stressed the importance of "every link of the political system" exercising its own functions.[114] In a significant passage, he observed: "A qualified leadership not only does not limit but, on the contrary, opens up space for initiative of people, of work collectives, and of local organs."[115]

As general secretary, Gorbachëv has returned to the theme of devolving greater responsibility and financial autonomy to enterprises and to brigades of workers. In a speech to a meeting of economic managers and specialists in April of this year he spoke of the need to release managers from the fetters of superfluous instructions, arguing that economic management was now at a level where accountability to higher organs could be decisively decreased. This would free them from "the paper chase" and simultaneously contribute to "the reduction of the managerial apparatus."[116] On brigades, Gorbachëv observed that a considerable number had gone over to "a progressive method of work," but there were still many that were going over to financial autonomy only slowly and in which labor productivity was rising only slightly.[117]

It is tempting to see Gorbachëv's emphasis on devolution of responsibilities and financial autonomy from the center to industrial associations and enterprises in part as a result of the fact that he has a clearer idea of what life is actually like for a provincial factory manager than some of those who have been in the Central Committee apparatus for far longer. Not only has he evidently paid attention to the findings of Academician Aganbegyan and his colleagues on such matters, he has very recent memories of the frustrations of regional life for a highly intelligent official or manager who feels that his abilities are constantly being reined in. (It is the less able officials and managers who feel more comfortable with less responsibility.) It is, indeed, yet another unusual feature of the Gorbachëv succession that the present general secretary should have worked in Moscow for a mere six-and-a-half years. This has its undoubted advantages. It is one reason why there is a breath of real life in Gorbachëv's speeches, a sense of how people are living and working far from the confines of the Central Committee building. Like Andropov, Gorbachëv stresses discipline—"Ultimately, everything stems from a high degree of exactingness toward people, toward leading cadres, toward all of us, comrades"[118]—however, he knows that this cannot be achieved by exhortation or by cadres policy alone, but has to be built into the economic mechanism.

An important theme for Gorbachëv has been that of the need for the party to give people more information. It is of interest in that connection that the length of the published *Politburo* communiqués has increased since Gorbachëv took over. But to change the habits of a lifetime within the party as a whole is not easy. In his December speech, Gorbachëv quoted a letter from a party member in Minsk who expresses his satisfaction and that of his colleagues with the publication of information

[110]Ibid., p. 11.
[111]Ibid., p. 41.
[112]Ibid., p. 11.
[113]See, e.g., Ibid., pp. 14–15.
[114]Ibid., p. 16.
[115]Ibid., p. 17.

[116]"Initiative, Organization, Effectiveness—Speech of M. S. Gorbachëv," *Pravda*, Apr. 12, 1985, pp. 1–2.
[117]Ibid.
[118]Ibid.

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about Politburo meetings (a practice that Andropov began), but who goes on to point out that "often we members of the party are better informed about the activity of the Politburo of the Central Committee than about the work of the bureau of the primary party organization or of the district committee"![119] Gorbachëv's response was: "A true observation, and it must be given every attention."[120]

Gorbachëv clearly has political as well as economic changes in mind. But to attempt to foist upon him notions of pluralistic democracy would be wrong and misleading. Pluralism is simply not on the political agenda in the Soviet Union. Economic reform is, and even if the next installment of it should fall short of the demands of the situation and of Soviet economic reformers (though they, of course, are not all of one mind), the evidence available on Gorbachëv suggests that he at least will not be deterred by conservatism or, as his power base grows stronger, by vested interests from taking the reform further. If it be true that the Soviet Union is at present a military but not an economic superpower, Gorbachëv's domestic policy can be summarized by saying that he intends to give the highest priority to ensuring that the USSR becomes the second while, in common with other Soviet leaders, remaining determined that it should not cease to be the first. It can, indeed, be argued that for the Soviet Union to maintain its military superpower status, it must increase its economic efficiency and its capacity to generate and diffuse the most advanced technology.

In personnel policy, it is already clear that the Gorbachëv period is not going to be marked by the extremely slow pace of change of the Brezhnev years, still less by the immobility at the top that characterized Chernenko's 13 months as general secretary. Gorbachëv's first six weeks as party leader saw the replacement of many officials at the republican, regional, and city level, and at the first normal Central Committee plenum over which he presided—that held on April 23, 1985—no fewer than five promotions within the top leadership team took place.[121] What is more remarkable is that these included three promotions to full membership of the Politburo and all of them people who can be identified as Gorbachëv allies. No previous general secretary has ever been able to consolidate his position within the leadership so quickly.

The two most important promotions were those of Yegor Ligachëv (aged 64) and Nikolay Ryzhkov (55). Both became full Politburo members without passing through the candidate stage (the first people to perform that feat of upward political mobility since Gromyko did it in 1973) while retaining their secretaryships of the Central Committee. The only other person in that category is Romanov, and it was, of course, because the ranks of senior secretary had become so depleted that Gorbachëv had the opportunity to promote further his colleagues who had been brought into the leadership by Andropov. The fact, however, that it was they rather than the 60-year-old Vladimir Dolgikh—to whose secretaryship of the Central Committee candidate membership of the Politburo was added at Brezhnev's last Central Committee plenum in May 1982, suggesting he was destined for senior secretaryship—who received promotion indicates how swiftly and effectively the Andropov-Gorbachëv group has overtaken the Brezhnev legatees. In terms of their policy orientation, Ryzhkov and Ligachëv are also closely aligned with Gorbachëv. Ryzhkov seems to be at least as sympathetic toward innovation in economic policy and organization as the General Secretary himself, and Ligachëv has been pursuing with some vigor the policy that Andropov began and Gorbachëv favors of crackdown on corruption and ineptitude within the party apparatus and replacement of officials who do not meet the more exacting standards now being applied.

The elevation of Viktor Chebrikov (62), the KGB chairman, from candidate to full membership of the Politburo, should also strengthen Gorbachëv's position within the top leadership. Chebrikov worked closely with Andropov for 15 years,[122] and it was during Andropov's general secretaryship that he received both of his previous major promotions—to the chairmanship of the KGB and to Politburo candidate membership.[123] There is every reason to suppose that Chebrikov transferred his loyalty from Andropov to Gorbachëv, the man Andropov was grooming for the succession. Chebrikov's full Politburo membership was presumably also well received at KGB headquarters, since it restores to that body the political status it enjoyed between April 1973 and May 1982 when Andropov, as KGB chief, was also a full member of the Politburo.

The promotion of Marshal Sokolov, Ustinov's successor as minister of defense, to candidate membership of the Politburo, gives the military an institutional voice once again in the highest counsels of the party. Sokolov would appear to be the only one of the five people promoted to be without links to Gorbachëv, though given his age (73) that is of no long-term significance. The fifth person to receive advancement at the April plenum

[119]Gorbachëv, *Zhivoye tvorchestvo naroda*, p. 31.
[120]Ibid.
[121]*Pravda*, Apr. 24, 1985, p. 1.

[122]See *Yezhegodnik Bol'shoy Sovetskoy Entsiklopedii 1981*, p. 608.
[123]See *Pravda*, Dec. 18, 1982, p. 2; and Dec. 27, 1983, p. 1.

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Individuals promoted at the April 23, 1985, plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: above, from left to right, three new full members of the CC CPSU Politburo—party secretaries Nikolay Ryzhkov and Yegor Ligachëv, and KGB Chairman Viktor Chebrikov—and a new candidate Politburo member, USSR Minister of Defense Marshal Sergey Sokolov; at right, new CC secretary for agriculture, Viktor Nikonov.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

was Viktor Nikonov (56) who has become a secretary of the Central Committee. As minister of agriculture for the Russian republic, he was obviously well known to Gorbachëv and had been working under his jurisdiction. He has now been elevated by Gorbachëv to a position more important than that of the minister of agriculture for the USSR as a whole, since it seems clear that he will be the agricultural overlord within the Secretariat.[124]

All in all, these April plenum changes strengthen and at the same time somewhat rejuvenate the top leadership team, though Gorbachëv himself remains the youngest member. They confirm that Gorbachëv is already wielding great authority within the party and should make it easier for him to put forward and to implement those policies that he believes will meet the needs of the Soviet Union.

In the realm of foreign policy, Gorbachëv has already demonstrated in his meetings with Western politicians visiting Moscow that detailed grasp of the issues which had impressed his British hosts last December. The speaker of the United States House of Representatives, Thomas P. (Tip) O'Neill, Jr., is but the latest to assess Gorbachëv as formidably accomplished. "About his ability, his talents, his frankness, his openness, I was tremendously impressed," he said.[125] O'Neill added that he did not perceive any major change in Soviet policy.

Policy change, however, is unlikely to be announced unilaterally[126] and is more likely to emerge in the course

[124]For Nikonov's biography, see *Yezhegodnik Bol'shoy Sovetskoy Entsiklopedii 1981*, p. 592.

[125]*International Herald Tribune*, Apr. 11, 1985, p. 1.

[126]However, Gorbachëv did announce a Soviet unilateral moratorium due to last until November 1985 (when the position would be reviewed) on the further deployment of Soviet

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of serious negotiations, should these take place. It is not surprising that so far what the outside world has seen is mainly a change of style. But Gorbachëv seems determined to improve the Soviet Union's external relations on several fronts. He has accepted invitations to visit France and the Federal Republic of Germany, and he has accepted in principle an invitation to meet with President Ronald Reagan, though the details of time and place have still at the time of writing to be decided.[127] He is likely to make a determined effort to improve relations with China, and the current leaderships in Moscow and Beijing would appear to have better prospects of moving closer together than at any time over the past two decades. Already the two countries had renewed their recognition of each other as "socialist states," and the editor of *Pravda*, in an interview given in Belgrade, has noted that more recently there has been in Chinese statements an improvement "in tone and in terminology, such as 'Comrade Gorbachëv,' which did not exist before."[128] Given Gorbachëv's acknowledged ability to argue the Soviet case flexibly and reasonably, and without resort either to dogma or to a script, the Soviet Union can well afford to be much more active diplomatically in the coming years than it has in the recent past.

Gorbachëv, who has made the journey from kolkhoz to Kremlin in record time, is about as likely to question the foundations of the system that enabled him to rise from humble origins to the highest office in the land as an American president who rose from log cabin to White House would be to question the wisdom of the Founding Fathers. He is a true believer in the Soviet system who is at the same time far from complacent about it and conscious of many of the ways in which it must be improved. He may yet have a greater opportunity than any individual since the death of Stalin to make an impact on it.

Gromyko said in his nomination speech that Gorbachëv was "a man of strong convictions" who "states his position frankly, whether or not it is to the liking of his interlocutor."[129] Mlynář has described Gorbachëv as one for whom convictions play a decisive role in politics: "He has never been a cynic, and he is, in character, a reformer who considers politics as a means to an end, with its objective being to meet the needs of people."[130]

Gorbachëv is not, however, the kind of "conviction politician" who does not listen to what others have to say. Because of the extent to which power is shared at the top of the Soviet hierarchy, he *could* not be (especially before he became general secretary). But it is noteworthy that he listens also to specialist advisers and to his subordinates. British politicians who had extensive dealings with Gorbachëv last December observed that he had an easy relationship with the group he led. There was neither bullying from the one side nor obsequiousness from the other. Members of the group with something to say felt free to speak up, though there was never any doubt about Gorbachëv's ultimate authority.

Every Soviet leader so far has been different in political style and, to a degree, in political priorities. Already Gorbachëv has revealed some of his policy preferences, but these may become clearer as his power increases (as it surely will). His policy aims may also be modified by changing circumstances since he is a man who learns from his experiences and who is open to reason. The responsibilities and burdens placed on Gorbachëv's shoulders are immense. But this time round the Soviet selectorate has chosen the man who, of all those in their midst, seems best equipped to carry them.

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medium-range missiles in Europe. This announcement came in the course of an interview of Gorbachëv by the editor of *Pravda* (see *Pravda*, Apr. 8, 1985, p. 1). In his meeting with Speaker O'Neill and other US congressmen in the Kremlin on April 10, Gorbachëv said that the United States had displayed "absolutely incomprehensible haste" in declaring its negative attitude to this "important and constructive gesture of good will." See *SWB*, SU/7923/i and SU/7923/A11–2, Apr. 12, 1985.

[127]On this, see *International Herald Tribune*, Apr. 3, 1985, pp. 1–2; and *Pravda*, Apr. 8, 1985, p. 1.

[128]*SWB*, SU/7920/B/1, Apr. 9, 1985.

[129]*Materialy vneocherednogo plenuma tsentral'nogo komiteta KPSS . . .* , p. 6.

[130]Mlynář, loc. cit.

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Leadership Change in China's Provinces

William deB. Mills

If any lesson can reliably be drawn from the zigzag course of domestic politics in the People's Republic of China (PRC) since 1949 it is that no leader can leave office confident that his policies will be implemented faithfully in his absence. The apparent permanence of the recent shift in emphasis from politicization to professional expertise as the basic criterion of bureaucratic excellence, and the concomitant focus on economic development at the expense of political goals, is an illusion camouflaging a much less stable political reality. That reality includes a massive Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with some 40 million members, one-third of whom joined the party during the leftist upheavals of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) and are therefore for reasons of both training and self-preservation likely to oppose the current stress on technical competence and economic pragmatism.[1] The potential for resentment on the part of these millions of party members is considerable, especially since these Cultural Revolution activists now see their careers threatened by the suddenly favored experts, many of whom they had personally driven out of office in the late 1960's.

That Deng Xiaoping foresees this as a threat to the perpetuation of his policies once he steps down—which can hardly be postponed much longer, given his advanced age—has been evident since the 12th Party Congress in September 1982, for it was there that he launched his program to transfer power from veteran revolutionary leaders of his own era to a new generation of younger, better educated officials. As a result, nearly half of the members of the previous Central Committee (CC) were dropped.[2]

But it was not until the spring of 1983 that the seriousness and scope of Deng's commitment to bring a new generation of leaders to power before the old leadership retired became apparent. Between early March and late April, in a centrally mandated streamlining and rejuvenation process which to the outsider seemed to occur with astounding speed and lack of rancor, some 950 of China's 1,350 top provincial leaders retired and were replaced by about 160 new officials. This left China's provinces under the control of much smaller leading bodies composed of officials, who, presumably, would be both more efficient and more responsive to central policies. In brief, Deng attempted to transfer regional power to men of his own choosing to solidify the changes that had been made in the spring 1982 streamlining of the State Council apparatus[3] and in the fall 1982 selection of the 12th Central Committee.

Following a summary of the leadership changes that took place during the spring of 1983 at the provincial

[1]See William deB. Mills, "Generational Change in China," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December 1983, pp. 16–35, esp. pp. 16-20, for a discussion of this assumption. "Generational Change in China" treats the central leadership changes that constituted the basis on which the events analyzed in the present article unfolded.

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[2]See Hong Yong Lee, "China's 12th Central Committee: Rehabilitated Cadres and Technocrats," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, CA), June 1983, pp. 673-91, and Mills, loc. cit.

[3]State Council reorganization is discussed in John Burns's useful background study "Reforming China's Bureaucracy, 1979–82," *Asian Survey*, June 1983, pp. 692–722, esp. pp. 707–14. In brief, according to a May 4, 1982, New China News Agency (hereafter Xinhua) report, the State Council reduced its number of vice-premiers from 13 to 2 and its number of ministries from 52 to 41. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS–CHI*), May 4, 1982, pp. K/1–5.

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level, this essay will examine the experiences of two provinces—Shanxi and Hunan—in order to get some sense of the problems underlying the superficially smooth transfer of power. Shanxi has been selected because in many ways it is typical of a number of provinces: the center replaced the former leaders with its own men, who then proceeded to manage the province with little subsequent central interference. Hunan is a much more unusual case. Not only did the incumbent first secretary there retain his position, he did so despite direct and persistent high-level central intervention. In each case, however, the center revealed a willingness to compromise. In so doing, Deng rejected the Cultural Revolution model of politics by class struggle, choosing instead to coopt potential opponents in order to unify the party behind his reforms. The second part of this essay, therefore, will focus on the methods used by the center to attain this goal of party unity.

Unwieldy Provincial Leaderships

The violent overthrow of China's revolutionary generation during the Cultural Revolution set the stage for the evolution of an awkward system of leadership at the provincial level. What had emerged in 1967 and 1968 as a unitary administrative structure (with the establishment of the "three-in-one" revolutionary committees to replace the old party and state organs) gradually degenerated by 1980 into a three-tiered faction-ridden committee system composed of the party, the government, and the provincial people's congress (PPC—the province's legislature).[4] The first major change occurred between December 1970 and August 1971 when provincial party committees were reestablished. Interestingly, the restored party committees emerged directly from within the revolutionary committees and had no separate administration of their own. Thus, there was no separation between party and state bureaucracies, as was evidenced by the fact that provincial party first secretaries served concurrently as revolutionary committee chairmen.[5] As the 1970's unfolded, leaders of the revo-

[4]For the details of this process, see David S. G. Goodman, "The Provincial Revolutionary Committee in the People's Republic of China, 1967–1979: An Obituary," *China Quarterly* (London), March 1981, pp. 49–79. In theory, the "three-in-one" revolutionary committees were to combine "revolutionary mass organizations, the People's Liberation Army, and revolutionary leading cadres of party and government organizations" (ibid., p. 49). In practice, although they initially reflected this "Maoist coalition of revolutionary forces," they increasingly came to be dominated by party-state cadres (see Table 3 in ibid., p. 69).

[5]Ibid., p. 72.



The rostrum at the September 10, 1982, plenary session of the 12th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, which elected a new Central Committee and the Central Advisory Commission: in the first row from left to right, Zhao Ziyang, Deng Xiaoping, and Hu Yaobang; in the second row from left to right, Li Xiannian, Ye Jianying, Chen Yun, and Xu Xiangqian.

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lutionary generation who had been purged during the Cultural Revolution began to regain leadership positions,[6] a process that continued and even accelerated after Mao Zedong's death in September 1976. Finally, by early 1980, the pre-Cultural Revolution system of provincial government reemerged, replacing the revolutionary committees,[7] as recently resurrected people's congresses were convened to elect governors and vice-governors to head the provinces' people's governments.[8]

As a result, by 1983, there were three leadership committees in each province, with rehabilitated party veterans of the revolutionary generation sitting alongside younger officials who had gained high office at the veterans' expense during the years of leftist ascendancy. Of the three, the party committee appeared to be the most powerful. Totaling perhaps a dozen secretaries, including a first secretary and occasionally a second or permanent secretary, the committee was assisted by a similar number of standing committee members as well as by several dozen regular committee members. While theoretically charged with general guidance on matters of party line and principle, party secretaries in fact took over a good deal of the day-to-day administrative work from the governors and vice-governors,[9] who constituted the second most powerful leading body. Heading a bureaucracy of some two- to three-thousand cadres, this group of roughly 12 officials was formally responsible for the day-to-day administration of government affairs. The third group was composed of the chairman and about a dozen vice-chairmen of the people's congresses in each province (or municipality or region). Although formally

[6]Goodman reports that as of "September 1975, 84% of provincial leadership cadres were serving in the same province where they had been provincial-level cadres at the start of 1966" (ibid., p. 77).

[7]For a note on this restoration and a table of new provincial government leaders, see *Beijing Review*, Feb. 4, 1980, p. 5.

[8]Basic facts on people's congresses are given in Jacques Guillermaz, *The Chinese Communist Party in Power, 1949–1975*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1972, pp. 114–15. For a discussion of provincial people's congresses before the Cultural Revolution, see Frederick Teiwes, "Provincial Politics in China: Themes and Variations," in John Lindbeck, Ed., *China: Management of a Revolutionary Society*, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1971, pp. 117–25.

[9]The terms governor and vice-governor are used generically throughout this article. Included in addition to the heads of the provincial people's governments are the mayors and vice-mayors of the three provincial-level cities—Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin—as well as the chairmen and vice-chairmen of the five provincial-level autonomous regions: Xinjiang, Xizang (Tibet), Ningxia, Guangxi, and Nei Monggol (Inner Mongolia).

Figure 1: Numbers of Responsible Leaders at Provincial Level Before and After the 1983 Streamlining



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Table 1: Standardizing the Size of Provincial Leadership Bodies

	Range of members in old organizations		Range of members in new organizations	
	Minimum	Maximum	Minimum	Maximum
Number of party secretaries	5	15	4	6
Members on party standing committees	13	33	8	16
Number of governors and vice-governors	9	18	4	8
Number of chairmen and vice-chairmen of standing committees of provincial people's congresses	8	22	8	15

charged with overseeing the government, this group's real power does not appear to have been commensurate with its formal position of authority.

The work of these leadership bodies suffered because of overlapping functions, disunity, aging members, and sheer inefficiency of size. Before the spring streamlining, the average provincial leadership body—defined here as being composed of the first and deputy secretaries of the party committee, the governor and vice-governors, and the chairman and vice-chairmen of the standing committee of the provincial people's congress—had 16 members. If the full party committee or full standing committee of the people's congress were included, the number would of course be considerably larger.

Streamlining and Replacement

The first objective of the reform was to slash the size of the provinces' leading bodies, which were cut by some 38 percent, from 1,082 to 669 members, as shown in Figure 1. If one excludes the provincial people's congress standing committees, the least powerful of the three groups, the percentage of reduction is even greater, fully 50 percent. Indeed, the number of party secretaries was cut in half, declining from 295 to 146, that is, from an average of 10 to 5 per province. The number of governors and vice-governors decreased by a similar amount, from 371 to 176, or from an average 12.8 to 6.7 per province. Only the chairmen and vice-chairmen of the people's congresses managed to survive the huge cuts, decreasing by less than 17 percent, from 416 to 347, or from 14 to 12 per province.

The aim of this streamlining was twofold: to create a more efficient provincial leadership, and to narrow the variations in leadership body sizes from province to province (see Table 1). The most striking move toward uniformity of size occurred among party secretaries. Before the reform, the number varied from five in Fujian[10] to 15 in Sichuan; after the reform, the range was narrowed to only four to six. But if this effort succeeded in both reducing and making uniform the size of the leaderships of the provincial party committees, it also led to a marked variation in party leaders' titles. While the 18 incumbent first secretaries who remained in office retained this title, newly appointed provincial party chiefs were entitled "secretary." With rare exceptions,[11] their newly appointed subordinates were entitled "deputy secretary." Why the center allowed incumbents to retain their titles is unclear, though I suspect that central leaders may have considered such a concession a harmless compromise on the road to postreform stability. At any rate, despite this confusion of party titles, through the end of 1983, at least, the leadership situation appeared stable in China's provinces.

A second goal of the reform, and one accomplished with an even greater degree of success, was removal of those incumbents who were old, uneducated, or politically suspect. In the process of reducing the total size of leadership bodies by approximately 40 percent, 72 percent of the incumbents were removed. Of the 1,082 secretaries,[12] governors and vice-governors, and PPC chairmen and vice-chairmen, only 307 kept their positions. Another 125 (12 percent) obtained other assignments, frequently at lower levels. The majority of the remaining 650 (60 percent) appear to have retired in the conventional sense of the word,[13] while those too influential to be easily forced into retirement succeeded in trading in their leadership posts for newly created advi-

[10]This had been reduced from 8 to 5 on October 15, 1982.

[11]The exceptions are Heilongjiang, which has five secretaries, Qinghai, with three secretaries, and Shandong, which has two secretaries. In each of these cases, however, it is clear which of the secretaries is the chief of the party, although he has the same title as his deputies. See, e.g., Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, *Directory of Chinese Officials: Provincial Organizations*. Washington, DC, CIA, August 1983, pp. 53, 115, and 127.

[12]If party committee standing committee members were included in this count, an additional 341 party officials just below the secretaries would be added to the 1,082 pre-reform total and an additional 187 to the postreform total.

[13]Some officials who lost their party secretarial posts and are here counted as having retired did retain membership in the provincial party committee. This is known to have occurred in Sichuan, which published a list of committee members. The extent to which officials in other provinces were downgraded from leadership posts to lower levels is uncertain, however, since most provinces have not published similar lists.

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sory positions. The most important such advisory body was the Central Advisory Commission (CAC), created by Deng as an honorary halfway house for veteran leaders reluctant to relinquish their leadership roles and perquisites.[14] Below the central level, numerous lesser advisory positions have been constitutionally sanctioned,[15] though their actual establishment has been slow, perhaps because those veterans who avoided retirement in the spring of 1983 have seen the writing on the wall.

The creation of these veterans' advisory bodies indicates a further refinement of the Chinese conception of retirement. For one thing, it suggests that the current leadership has found it politically expedient to introduce such mechanisms to help persuade veteran leaders to relinquish formal authority. For another, it implies that these "retired" leaders will continue to influence politics as long as they stay healthy. Their military achievements during the Chinese Civil War (1946-49), as well as their three decades of political experience since then, make this virtually inevitable.

In practical terms, such an approach to retirement may be quite beneficial to China's current modernization drive. These veterans' collective knowledge of local problems and local personalities is certainly a valuable resource, for senior central officials cannot possibly have such an intimate and detailed understanding of local conditions. Thus, even though some party veterans may have remained active members of party or advisory committees, this does not detract from the stunning nature of the 1983 provincial transfer of power. Indeed, the peaceful removal over a six-week period of some 72 percent of a nation's top provincial leaders, under conditions that allow the new leaders to benefit from their predecessors' knowledge and experience, is an achievement few countries have ever matched.

The rather substantial figures on transfer and retirement conceal wide variations according to institution and level in the hierarchy. Perhaps most surprising was the relative stability of the provincial party first secretaries, 62 percent of whom (18) remained in office. Some, such as Ren Zhongyi of Guangdong and Xiang Nan of Fujian, were not expected to retire, since they were relatively recent appointees whose career patterns suggested ties to Deng Xiaoping. Others, however, such as 70-year-old Duan Junyi of Beijing and Liu Jie of Henan, resisted retirement despite public calls for the aged to make way for youth and despite being elected to the CAC. Moreover, the resistance of another group of first secretaries—younger leaders with leftist ties—was something of a surprise. Most notable among this group was Hunan's Mao Zhiyong, whose fortunes will be the focus of a later section of this essay.

Xiang Nan (left), leader of the Fujian Provincial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, shown in 1981 with Lu Jiaxi, President of the Chinese Academy of Sciences.

—EASTFOTO.

In contrast to party first secretaries, only three governors[16] and seven PPC chairmen retained their posts. Seven of the 26 removed governors were appointed chairmen of their provincial people's congresses, a "promotion" to a nominal position of authority over the provincial government.

Below these three top positions, the picture becomes increasingly complex. Only 74 (25 percent) of China's 295 provincial party secretaries[17] retained their posts. Of the 221 removed, 167 (57 percent of the original total) retired and 54 (18 percent) were transferred. Interestingly, not all of those removed were long-entrenched members of provincial party apparatuses. Some had been in their positions for just a year or so, having assumed office during a preliminary change of personnel that had taken place throughout the provinces in 1982.

[14]For a description of the CAC, see Mills, loc. cit., pp. 29–31. In theory, election to this body at the 12th Party Congress in September 1982 singled out veteran leaders for retirement. As of February 1984, however, four first secretaries so "honored" remained in their old posts. How these durable veterans—Duan Junyi of Beijing, Gao Yang of Hebei, Liu Jie of Henan, and Guo Feng of Liaoning—have managed to accomplish this is unclear.

[15]See Article 28 of the Party Constitution in *Beijing Review*, Sept. 20, 1982, p. 17.

[16]The three governors are Chan Lei of Heilongjiang, Wang Daohan of Shanghai, and Ismail Amat of Xinjiang.

[17]The generic term "secretary" refers to all first secretaries, second secretaries, third secretaries, permanent secretaries, secretaries, and deputy secretaries. In addition to the secretaries of various rank, standing committees also have other members who rank below the secretaries. The term "standing committee" as it is used in this essay includes all the secretaries, who together generally constitute about half the standing committee, as well as these other officials. The full party committee of a province is several times as large and, judging from its virtual invisibility in the media, may well wield very little power. The fate of the lesser members of the party committees in the spring 1983 streamlining is unclear.

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Only about half of these 35 newly promoted secretaries retained their posts after the spring 1983 reform.

Even fewer incumbent governors and vice-governors—18 percent, or 65 of the 371 total—retained office. Of the 306 removed, 237 (64 percent of the total) retired and 69 (19 percent) were transferred. Only seven of these were transferred to posts clearly constituting a promotion. Of the other 62, 60 were sent to a PPC post and two to even less important Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference[18] posts.

A considerably larger number of PPC chairmen and vice-chairmen retained office—fully 40 percent (168) of the 416 incumbents. Of the 248 removed, all but two retired, as far as can be determined from the very limited information available on individuals at this level. The exceptions were Wang Fang, who was promoted to party head of Zhejiang, and Xu Jiatun,[19] who concurrently was Jiangsu provincial first secretary.

Rejuvenation and Professionalism

With aged and leftist incumbents replaced in the top leadership posts by a dramatically smaller number of officials, formal positions of authority in China's provinces were transferred to a considerable degree to a new generation of younger and better educated leaders. The average age of provincial party leaders dropped from 63 to 56, and the proportion with college educations nearly quadrupled, increasing from one-tenth to nearly two-fifths—thereby exceeding the Central Committee's new standards, announced on February 22, 1983, that one-third of provincial party leaders be college-trained and that at least one member of the party committee be no more than 55 years old.[20]

While recognizing the rapid progress made in improving the quality of provincial leadership, one must be careful not to overstate this achievement, particularly since Chinese media made considerable effort to give the impression than the personnel changes were even more striking than they actually were. Both provincial and central media consistently distorted the magnitude of the reforms, giving only partial statistics, overlooking the relative importance of the various members of a given leadership body, and publishing biographic information only on exceptionally young or well-educated appointees. A typical report on Shanxi's new leaders, for example, singled out two of six new party officials because of their engineering backgrounds, ignoring the other four.[21] And in another highly publicized case, a 42-year-old Western-educated chemist, Kang Beisheng, observed in an interview on Fujian radio that her election as vice-chairman of the Fujian PPC "represents the attention paid by the whole country to intellectuals."[22]

But are these young technicians the founding generation of a new ruling class in China, or are they merely token members of leadership bodies controlled by party activists? Put somewhat differently, did the streamlining succeed in setting the stage for the transfer of power to a new elite composed of technocrats, or did it merely accomplish the much more modest goal of transferring power to younger leaders with traditional backgrounds? At present, at least, the latter seems to be the case (although the rate of advancement over the next five years of the young experts newly appointed to high rank—see Table 2 on page 30—will be a good indicator whether the technocrat is gaining in relative influence vis-à-vis the political cadre). While it is undeniable that China's new provincial leaders are *on average* younger and more familiar with technical subjects than were their predecessors, political careerists do not appear to have lost their predominant position to intellectuals. The clearest evidence of this is provided by the fate of party chiefs. Not only were two-thirds of the incumbents retained, but even among new appointees, no pattern of youth or exceptional professional expertise is apparent. Rather, they tend to have fairly traditional backgrounds as party or government administrators. For example, Shandong's new party chief, Su Yiran, is a rehabilitated revolutionary-generation Shandong official. Shanxi's Li Ligong and Jiangsu's Han Peixin both have administrative backgrounds. Zhejiang's Wang Fang spent most of his career in public security work.[23] These individuals may, of

[18]The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) is an advisory body composed of numerous groups outside the formal party structure, including such diverse groupings as national minorities, overseas Chinese, noncommunist political parties, religious sects, and mass organizations, among others. The CPPCC has no actual political power, although it has been called upon in recent years to lend support to the CCP in its current modernization drive. For example, in her Apr. 8, 1985, speech closing the 3rd Session of the 6th CPPCC National Committee in Beijing, Chairwoman Deng Yingchao urged members to "work hard" to "make even greater contributions to invigorating China's economy and reforming the economic structure." See Xinhua, Apr. 8, 1985, in *FBIS–CHI*, Apr. 10, 1985, p. K/8.

[19]Xu was later appointed as the first director of the Hong Kong Bureau of Xinhua (June 1983).

[20]Xinhua, Feb. 22, 1983, in *FBIS–CHI*, Feb. 22, 1983, pp. K/3–4. Apparently, the new CC standards announced in February 1982 are still very much in force. In a recent interview with reporters from Hong Kong and Macao, party General Secretary Hu Yaobang noted that some 900,000 veteran cadres had already stepped down throughout the country. The number would reach 2 million next year, he said. Hu also noted that a reshuffling of the top leaders of 107 departments of the CC and the State Council, as well as of the 29 provincial, municipal, and autonomous region governments, was underway and that by June 1985 more than 70 percent of the leading cadres of these units would be under 60 years of age. See Xinhua, Apr. 9, 1985, in *FBIS–CHI*, Apr. 10, 1985, p. E/3. It should be noted that the ages given throughout this text are as of the streamlining of 1983.

[21]Shanxi radio, Mar. 21, 1983, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 22, 1983, pp. R/2–4.

[22]Fujian radio, May 2, 1983, in Joint Publications Research Service, *China Report: Political, Sociological, Military* (Washington, DC—hereafter *JPRS*), No. 83583, May 31, 1983, p. 8.

[23]Brief biographies of Su, Wang, Han, and Li are given in "Four Secretaries of the CCP Provincial-Level Committees," *Issues and Studies* (Taipei), June 1983, No. 6, pp. 97–100.

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Table 2: Young Technocrats to Watch

Individuals singled out by the media during the 1983 streamlining of their youth and expertise.

Name	Province or Municipality	Position	Age in 1983	Specialty
Bainma Dandzin	Qinghai	Vice-Governor	52	Doctor
Kang Beisheng	Fujian	Vice-Chairman, Standing Committee, Prov. People's Congress	42	Chemist
Li Debao	Zhejiang	Vice-Governor	47	Agronomist
Li Guixian	Liaoning	Member, Party Standing Committee	46	Engineer
Li Tieying	Liaoning	Secretary, Party Committee	47	Computer specialist
Ni Tianzheng	Shanghai	Vice-Mayor	45	Engineer
Wang Lianzheng	Heilongjiang	Vice-Governor	52	Agronomist
Zhu Zhongbao	Shanghai	Vice-Mayor	50	Engineer

course, be personally predisposed to listen carefully to the advice of specialists, but power at the highest level of provincial party politics appears to remain beyond the grasp of officials with college educations and careers in technical or economic fields.

At the next level, that of provincial governor, such officials play a greater, although still minority, role. Henan's governor, He Zhubang, 50 in 1983, was graduated from the Moscow Economic Institute[24] and was a former head of the Henan Planning Commission. Shanxi Governor Wang Senhao, a 50-year-old former chief engineer, replaced Luo Guibo, a vice-minister of foreign affairs in the late 1950's and 1960's, who retired at age 73. Jiangsu's new governor, Gu Xiulian, was a technician and former vice-minister of the State Planning Commission.[25] However, while education and technical competence are now highly acclaimed assets in China, information gleaned from biographic data, though sketchy, suggests that political reliability remains a far more important qualification for high office than does technical expertise.

Provincial Responsiveness

The speed and consistency with which the streamlining was implemented suggest that the reformers were in firm control nationwide. Following the usual Chinese practice of emulating selected pilot programs, most notably in this case the model reform in Sichuan, new leading bodies were announced for all remaining provinces—two-thirds between late March and mid-April alone. Almost formulaic Xinhua releases stressing the backgrounds of the youngest and most technically skilled appointees heralded the change of leadership in most provinces.

Such an extensive transfer of power required close central supervision and coordination. The first, and most important, order of business was reform of the provincial party apparatus. Central party control rested on three props: use of innovative institutions; central guidance during the selection of local leaders; and Central Committee review of the results. Two institutions in particular facilitated the implementation of the changes: the Young Cadres Bureau under the CC Organization Department; and the Central Guiding Group for Structural Reform. The first was apparently designed to encourage the promotion of young cadres into leadership ranks; the second was responsible for sending work teams to various provinces to guide reform efforts there. The extent of Politburo supervision is generally unknown, but in at least one case, Deng is reported to have personally "perused the name list of middle-aged and young candidates for posts in Shanghai's leading municipal body" during a visit to Shanghai in February 1983.[26] Ordinarily, once new leadership lists were drawn up, they were sent to Beijing for CC approval; in some cases, most notably in Shanxi, the provincial party committee met not to elect its new leadership but merely to relay a CC decision on its makeup.[27]

That central influence, while less blatant than in the party reforms, also played a crucial role in the government case is suggested by the speed and consistency of the results of the streamlining. Settlement of the more controversial party reforms before the convening of the

[24]Xinhua, Apr. 29, 1983.

[25]For Wang, see Xinhua, Apr. 29, 1983, in *FBIS–CHI*, May 5, 1983, p. R/6; for Gu, see Xinhua, Apr. 29, 1983.

[26]Shanghai radio, Apr. 20, 1983, in *JPRS* No. 83422, May 6, 1983, p. 97.

[27]Shanxi radio, Mar. 21, 1983, in *FBIS–CHI*, Mar. 22, 1983, pp. R/2–3. The standard language in Xinhua announcements of the formation of new party leading bodies was that they were formed "with the approval of the CCP Central Committee," as the March 23 report on Xinjiang's reform stated (in *FBIS–CHI*, Mar. 23, 1983, pp. T/1–2). The report noted that the decision was made "by secret ballots cast by more than 1,000 cadres who are party members at or above county and Communist Youth League levels in democratic nomination, through

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people's congresses may well have enabled Dengists and their provincial allies to arrange governmental selections ahead of time. Twenty-three provinces elected government leaders between April 26 and May 5 alone, the others having selected their new leaders somewhat earlier. Consistency in terms of the number of vice-governors in each province and the virtually complete replacement of governors are indicative of the degree to which central standards were applied. Finally, the party policy recommendations for reform of provincial governments that had been announced at the 12th Party Congress the preceding fall were consistently implemented. The proceedings of the 12th congress also provided a clue to future provincial government appointments: 16 of the 26 new governors were elected to the Central Committee, 13 of them for the first time.

Despite the impressive results of provincial leadership streamlining, the steady stream of complaints in the media shortly thereafter about continued local resistance to central policies suggests that the upbeat public accounts of resounding success concealed a serious degree of opposition behind the scenes. The remainder of this essay will examine the ways in which this resistance manifested itself in two quite different provinces—Shanxi, which came under a new leadership; and Hunan, which retained a first secretary who rose to power during the last decade of Mao Zedong's life. The tactics adopted by the center to overcome this resistance will be the focus of the analysis that follows.

Shanxi: A Clean Sweep

While Chinese leaders were able to obscure the degree of opposition to the replacement of veteran leaders, media commentary on the implementation of Dengist reforms in Shanxi before and after the transfer of power reveals many of the party's techniques for eliciting regional compliance with central goals. The appearance of speed and harmony with which the media portrayed the selection of Shanxi's new leadership is belied by the complex range of techniques that had to be employed in the province to persuade local officials to implement central reforms.

The essence of the streamlining process in Shanxi seems to have been the replacement of indigenous factions with leaders not just who were younger and better educated but who owed allegiance to the center. The case of new party chief Li Ligong is illustrative. Prior to his return to Shanxi from Beijing in 1981, Secretary Li had not served in his native Shanxi for some 15 years, since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966. His background in the Communist Youth League (he served on the CYL Central Committee from 1954 to 1966)[28] and recent service at the center suggest ties to party General Secretary (and former CYL head) Hu Yaobang. Two of Li's three deputy secretaries are newly appointed, and the third is an incumbent who had been transferred to Shanxi from Wuhan (Hubei Province) in 1978. Moreover, the governor and four of the five vice-governors are also new.

The limited available biographic information supports Chinese claims of a younger, better educated, and more technically competent provincial leadership.[29] The average age of the Shanxi party standing committee dropped from 65 to 55, and the new leadership includes officials with expertise in such areas as economics, mining (in particular, coal), and chemicals, suggesting something about the province's current priorities. Rejuvenation of government leaderships was even greater—with the average age of governor and vice-governors dropping from 65 to 49, and the percentage with university education tripling from 22 to 66. At 50, Governor Want Senhao, formerly an engineer in the Ministry of Coal Industry, exemplifies this trend.

The backgrounds of members of the old leadership had been very different from those of their replacements. The pre-reform provincial party leadership, for example, consisted of 20 individuals—11 secretaries and 9 members of the standing committee of the party committee—most of whom fell into one of two groups. One group consisted of nine individuals who had been Shanxi officials before the Cultural Revolution, under party secretary Wang Qian. Wang, second secretary and governor in 1965, was purged during the Cultural Revolution but returned to power as first secretary in 1975. He remained in office until 1980, at which time he was replaced by Huo Shilian. This first group may be described as the revolutionary generation whose return to power is personified by Deng Xiaoping. The second group consisted of eight officials who gained leadership

observation and screening by the organization departments and with the approval of the party Central Committee after examination." The Xinhua report on Jiangxi differed, stating only that the leading body had been "readjusted" with CC "approval" (Mar. 24, 1983, in *FBIS–CHI*, Mar. 24, 1983, p. 0/2). A March 21 Shanxi radio report of that province's reform gave a picture of much tighter central control, stating that the Shanxi party standing committee met to announce the "Central Committee's notice" on the new leadership, which had been selected "with the help of" a central work group. The standing committee meeting, attended by over 800 cadres, lasted two days and resulted in unanimous "support for the Central Committee's decision" (in *FBIS–CHI*, Mar. 22, 1983, p. R/2).

[28]See Wolfgang Bartke and Peter Schier, *China's New Party Leadership: Biographies and Analysis of the Twelfth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party*, Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 1985, p. 134.

[29]Shanxi radio, Mar. 21, 1983, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 22, 1983, p. R/2; *Shanxi Ribao* (Taiyuan), Mar. 22, 1983; Xinhua, Apr. 29, 1983, in *FBIS–CHI*, May 5, 1983, p. R/6; *Shanxi Ribao*, Apr. 30, 1983, in *FBIS-CHI*, May 26, 1983, pp. R/3-4.

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Wang Senhao, a senior engineer in the coal industry, who was elected governor of Shanxi Province in 1983.

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positions in Shanxi for the first time after 1978. At least five of these were experienced officials who had been transferred to the province apparently to offset the considerable leftist influence that persisted there despite the reemergence of rehabilitated revolutionary-generation officials like Wang Qian.

Thus, by early 1983, the Shanxi leadership was fairly evenly divided between those who had *regained* power in Shanxi and those, of the same generation, who had been *transferred* to Shanxi by the center after 1978. In terms of authority, the transferred officials, led by the newly appointed first secretary Huo Shilian, the second secretary and governor Luo Guibo, and secretary Ruan Bosheng, seemed clearly dominant. Huo and Ruan were both members of the 11th CCP Central Committee (elected in 1977), the former the minister of agriculture in 1979, the latter a Jilin Province official.

Residual leftist influence in the Shanxi leadership was most prominently represented by Guo Fenglian, a 34-year-old peasant activist who rose rapidly under Dazhai Brigade leader and CCP Politburo member Chen Yonggui. In 1968, Guo served as Brigade deputy party secretary, when Chen was both Brigade secretary and vice-chairman of the provincial revolutionary committee. Three years later, Guo joined the committee's standing committee, and in late 1973—on Chen's recommendation—he replaced Chen as Dazhai Revolutionary Committee chairman, soon after Chen had gained Politburo membership. During the mid-1970's, Chen and Guo both actively propagated the Dazhai experience through publications, speeches, and personal contacts (in particular, with visiting delegations). Another Shanxi party leader who may also have had leftist leanings ws Li Shunda, who first gained public notice as a labor hero in 1946. Li subsequently was a vice-chairman in 1955 (along with Chen) of the Shanxi peasants' association preparatory committee, a "model producer" as a brigade leader in 1966, and a founding member of the Shanxi Revolutionary Committee in 1967.[30]

The central backgrounds, low prominence, and lack of clear ties to former Shanxi leaders observable in the new leadership selected in 1983, as well as the center's involvement in their selection, suggest that Beijing was concerned primarily with establishing a leadership body that owed allegiance to it. Of the three officials retained from the old leadership body, two had relatively weak ties to the province, at least as far as political loyalties were concerned. Li Ligong, as noted above, served in Beijing for a decade and a half before coming to Shanxi in 1981; Wang Kewen, the new deputy secretary, spent the bulk of his career in Wuhan before being transferred in 1978. Only Wang Tingdong had had continuous experience in Shanxi as a party leader since the early 1970's. But Wang is neither a native of the province (having been transferred there in 1971) nor a leader of formidable stature. Indeed, in the recent reorganization, he was demoted from secretary to standing committee member. Moreover, Wang's past assignments suggest that he is a specialist in agronomy, and therefore he may have been retained for that reason. He ran a conference on agricultural construction in 1976, for example, and spoke at a national science meeting in 1978. Although several members of the new leadership apparently are Shanxi natives, they do not appear to have close links to either the Shanxi revolutionary generation or the leftists.[31] In sum, an old, experienced team of outsiders appears to

[30]Two other leaders—Wang Tingdong, a cadre since the late 1950's who was rehabilitated in 1970 and sent to Shanxi in 1971, and Jia Jun, a Shanxi urban youth "sent down" to the countryside, who became a cadre by 1973—are harder to evaluate, but they may also have been leftists.

[31]Even the ties to Huo Shilian and Luo Guibo seem more a function of these leaders' having been transferred by the center at roughly the same time than a function of longtime subordination to Huo and Luo. Li Ligong, Wang Kewen, and Zhang Jianmin are cases in point.

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have been sent to Shanxi in 1979–80 to pave the way for a smooth transition from a chaotic situation, in which Cultural Revolution leftists were pitted against rehabilitated revolutionary-generation Shanxi natives, to a united leadership under a new generation of technically trained figures who owed primary allegiance to the center and its predominant goal of economic development.

Shanxi: Revitalizing the Bureaucracy

Beneath this seemingly smooth process, which in retrospect appears to have been so logically planned, lay a far more complex political reality. Judging from the hints in China's public media, this reality included widespread distrust of and opposition to central reforms, the overcoming of which required the application of a vast array of political techniques. Replacing the leadership with individuals more capable, more energetic, and more responsive, while doubtless crucial, was only the first step in a far-reaching effort to restructure and revitalize the regional bureaucracy—an effort that is today still barely out of the starting gate.

Li Dongye, Minister of the Metallurgical Industry, who visited the Taiyuan Iron and Steel Company of Shanxi Province in February 1983.

—EASTFOTO.

The most dramatic and no doubt most effective technique used was direct central involvement. The basic mechanism for such involvement was the work team *(gongzo zu)*, which was sent to Shanxi by the Central Guiding Group for Structural Reform *(Zhongyang jigou gaige zhidao xiaozu)*. Dispatched there to aid in "revolutionizing, rejuvenating, intellectualizing, and professionalizing"[32] the new provincial leadership, the work team set out to ensure that the new leadership would meet with the center's approval. In Shanxi's case, this was the culmination of central efforts over a prolonged period to create a responsive provincial leadership. In fact, the announcement made by the Shanxi Party Committee of the makeup of the new party leadership was no more than a proclamation of the CC's notice, which frankly described the two previous leaders—Huo Shilian and Luo Guibo—as well as the newly appointed party head, Li Ligong, as having been "sent" by the Central Committee.[33] While the details of such direct central interference in provincial affairs tend to be concealed, numerous references to analogous cases exist. On February 10, 1983, for example, Shanxi radio noted that Minister of Metallurgical Industry Li Dongye attended a meeting at which the Taiyuan Iron and Steel Company adopted the contract management responsibility system to improve profits, an approach strongly advocated by the central leadership. Also, numerous references to the activities of discipline inspection groups—which are subordinate to the Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC)[34]—indicate that this new hierarchy of watchdogs is playing an active role. A Shanxi discipline commission circular in early 1983, for instance, "urged party committees and discipline inspection commissions at all levels to firmly check unhealthy tendencies in housing distribution."[35] A few months later, Secretary Li criticized people for "taking revenge on discipline inspection cadres,"[36] who apparently were doing an embarrassingly good job of exposing local corruption.

Another technique employed by central reformers was the holding of meetings to study central documents. This task was backed up by numerous exhortations in the press and carried out through study classes and the use of explanation teams. Following the 12th Party Congress, for example, "party organizations at all levels" in Shanxi were reported to regard the study of the congress's documents as "the cardinal task." Despite the use of rotating study classes and explanation teams,

[32] *Shanxi Ribao*, Mar. 22, 1983.
[33] *Shanxi Ribao*, Mar. 21, 1983, in *FBIS–CHI*, Mar. 22, 1983, pp. R/2–4.
[34] See Mills, loc. cit., pp. 31–32.
[35] Shanxi radio, Jan. 26, 1983.
[36] *Shanxi Ribao*, June 10, 1983.

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however, some three months later, in mid-February 1983, Shanxi media were still calling on the people of that province "to wage the struggle on two fronts,"[37] that is, to clear away the influence not only of "leftist ideology and the 'two whatevers',"[38] but of rightist ideology as well. In another context, Shanxi radio reported that a pilot rectification meeting had "conveyed the important speech of a leading central comrade."[39] In brief, even when central representatives were not present, their thoughts were.

A third technique was the use of pilot programs. At the meeting on Shanxi's pilot rectification program, for example, in addition to the speech of the "leading central comrade," cadres also "studied the experiences of pilot project work in Beijing and Heilongjiang."[40] In keeping with standard CCP practice, following a central decision to implement a reform nationwide, pilot programs were to be launched to test the effectiveness of the center's original conception. This allowed for modifications (perhaps to accommodate local conditions) and, if all went well, provided models for others to emulate. Party rectification, scheduled well in advance to begin in late 1983, involved a great deal of pilot work in Shanxi. An early 1983 forum on pilot rectification projects held by the Shanxi party Organization Department reported that over 200 grass-roots units in 17 departments throughout government, industry, security, universities, and communes had received work groups in late 1982 to "train a backbone force for party rectification."[41]

Party leaders at both the central and provincial levels also made considerable use of moral appeals, especially when trying to persuade prospective retirees to step down with a positive attitude. Calling on retirees in terms that became familiar throughout China in 1983, new party boss Li Ligong noted:

Although the veteran comrades are retiring, that does not mean they are not making revolution or working. They may have retired from their jobs, but their thinking cannot retire, and their sense of the revolution and of responsibility for it cannot weaken in the slightest. The old comrades must happily support the work of the new leadership groups with minds at ease. They must truly succeed in providing wholehearted and sincere support. Thus, they will be worthy to be called revolutionary veteran comrades and will be caring for the overall situation and thinking of the party's cause.[42]

Such appeals were backed up by a wide-ranging, innovative program of inducements to prospective retirees, inducements alluded to by Li in the same speech:

The new leadership groups must care for, respect, and cherish the old comrades. They must genuinely regard them as staff officers, and consult more with them when problems in work crop up.

Between the restructuring of the State Council in spring 1982 and the streamlining of personnel in mid–1983, over 470,000 veteran bureaucrats retired in China.[43] Many were allowed continued access to official documents and permitted to attend official meetings.[44] Others were assigned new duties. In Beijing, for example, some performed public service, forming price and service investigative teams.[45] Other inducements included retirement with full pay,[46] continued access to official cars, medical care, and retirees' clubs. A favored few were appointed advisers to the units on which they had formerly been ranking members or were elected to prestigious advisory committees being established at various levels.

Borrowing a page from the more legalistic approach of Western bureaucracies, Deng and his followers also began instituting formal criteria governing the age, tenure, and educational levels of individuals, as well as the size of leadership bodies. A Shanxi organizational work conference, for example, "demanded" that cadres under 50 years of age be given remedial training in order to raise their educational level to that of a senior high-school graduate by 1990.[47] In his report to the Shanxi Provincial People's Congress Standing Committee in the fall of 1983, Shanxi Governor Wang Senhao illustrated how such new standards were being implemented in his province.[48] According to Wang, projected structural reform of the provincial bureaucracy, which "was launched on a full scale following the election of new leading members of the provincial government in April," would reduce government work departments from 62 to 38 and trim government personnel by some 42 percent.

[37]*Shanxi radio*, Dec. 1, 1982.

[38]The "two whatevers" refers to the Maoists' attempt to invoke Mao's sacred authority to justify their policies: "Whatever policy Chairman Mao has decided upon, we shall resolutely defend; whatever instructions the Chairman has issued, we shall steadfastly obey." Quoted in Parris Chang, "Chinese Politics: Deng's Turbulent Quest," *Problems of Communism*, January–February 1981, p. 3.

[39]Shanxi radio, Feb. 25, 1983.

[40]Ibid.

[41]Ibid. Other important reforms also began with pilot work. For example, the experimental reestablishment of township (*xiang*) governments in two communes, enabling reform of the commune system to be "accelerated," was reported to have been completed in early 1983. See *Shanxi Ribao*, Feb. 8, 1983.

[42]Shanxi radio, Sept. 27, 1983, in *FBIS–CHI*, Sept. 29, 1983, pp. R/1–2.

[43]Xinhua, Jul. 16, 1983.

[44]Ibid.

[45]Beijing radio, Apr. 23, 1983.

[46]Xinhua, Jul. 16, 1983.

[47]Shanxi radio, Sept. 28, 1983.

[48]Shanxi radio, Sept. 21, 1983, in *FBIS–CHI*, Sept. 23, 1983, pp. R/4–6.

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In the 31 departments already streamlined, he noted, the number of leading officials was cut from 245 to 112; moreover, newly assigned personnel were considerably younger (by an average of seven years) and better educated (42 percent versus 13 percent with college degrees) than their predecessors.

Backing up such tactics as personal intervention by central officials, moral exhortations, pilot programs, study classes, inducements, and new legal standards was a final, powerful technique—the use of negative examples. Consider the December 1982 arrest of Huang Ruian, a former member of the Shanxi Revolutionary Committee Standing Committee, a top leadership post during the Cultural Revolution. Expelled from the party and arrested for peddling pornography and committing "many crimes in the economic, political, and cultural fields,"[49] Huang's fate exemplifies the threat that hung over cadres who refused to toe the new political line. Coverage of the case by the Shanxi media made clear the political nature of the arrest by linking his crimes to his leftist past, labeling him a factional leader who had "actively" participated in seizing power and persecuting old cadres during the Cultural Revolution:

It should be noticed that certain rebel leaders and beaters, smashers, and looters of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution period have turned to economic or cultural crime after collapsing politically. They thus continue to confront us. Painful lessons tell us that we must by no means underestimate their capacities and influence. At present, leading comrades in certain units lack vigilance against people of this type. The masses are very worried about this. We hope that the report openly exposing the illegal activities of rebel leader Huang Ruian will sharply awaken these politically color-blind people.[50]

Such, in brief, could be the fate of cadres with politically suspect pasts unless they wholeheartedly joined the reformist bandwagon. The handful of similar trials held publicly across China in 1982 and 1983, many of which resulted in 15- to 20-year convictions, must have sent a clear message to hesitant cadres.

Hunan: Uneasy Compromise

Hunan Province's extraordinary continuity of leftist leadership (Hua Guofeng was a party secretary there for 12 or so years before coming to Beijing in 1971) and post–Mao Zedong record of coolness toward Dengist reforms made it a likely target for a full-scale purge of leadership. Moreover, Hunan's first secretary, Mao Zhiyong, had made repeated self-criticisms in the month preceding the spring 1983 streamlining. These self-criticisms seemed to make his demise almost inevitable. Yet, although hundreds of provincial leaders throughout China, including a number of first secretaries, lost their positions, Mao survived and remains Hunan's first secretary to this day. An examination of the reasons for his survival (to the degree that such information can be gleaned from the scattered hints in the public media) will help illuminate the nature of central-regional relations under Deng Xiaoping.

Mao Zhiyong, First Secretary of the Hunan Provincial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

—New China Picture Company.

Mao Zhiyong's reluctance in 1978 to give even pro forma support to the fundamental Dengist slogan "practice is the sole criterion of truth" indicated his disenchantment with and lack of commitment to the extensive reforms then being advocated by Deng and his associates. Indeed, Hunan was one of the last provinces to endorse this code-phrase for pragmatism—an endorsement that took the form of a markedly unenthusiastic statement of support by Mao on December 6 of that year. Judging from the Hunan media commentary in

[49]Shanxi radio, Dec. 11, 1982, in *FBIS–CHI*, Dec. 15, 1982, pp. R/2–3.
[50]*Shanxi Ribao*, Dec. 12, 1982.

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1981, the province also had shifted only slowly from leftist agricultural policies—with stress on grain production, egalitarianism, and centralized decision-making—to the Dengist agricultural production responsibility system, which eased restrictions on crop selection and relied on the profit motive to stimulate production.[51] On March 7, 1981, for example, Hunan radio's Commentator criticized the province's leaders for leftist tendencies, accusing them of attempting "to achieve unrealistically high production quotas."[52] A few days later, the Commentator intensified this criticism, noting that "class struggle" with its stress on egalitarianism and rejection of market forces "was overexaggerated" in Hunan.[53]

In an apparent effort to adjust to political realities after Hua Guofeng's demotion at the 6th Plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee in June 1981, the official provincial party daily *Hunan Ribao* published a review of the plenum's landmark reassessment of party history, taking this opportunity to lash out at residual leftism in Hunan.[54] This was highly unusual given the generally mild reaction to the resolution elsewhere. *Hunan Ribao* charged that the province had been slow to eliminate its "sincere belief in the 'two whatevers'" and had "carried out inappropriate, excessive, and even unfounded propaganda about Comrade Hua Guofeng." "We publicized some of his leftist ideas as correct," the paper continued. "We also put forward certain erroneous slogans such as the 'true light,' with the result that his new personality cult ran rampant in the province for a long time."[55]

First Secretary Mao was personally implicated in this politically suspect stance, not only by virtue of his preeminent authority in Hunan, but also because of his personal ties to Hua Guofeng and because of his earlier self-criticism. Hua, an official in Chairman Mao Zedong's home county of Xiangtan (Hunan), in 1951 became on Mao's recommendation a provincial party secretary there in 1959, and Hunan first secretary in 1970. Mao Zhiyong, who, like Hua, benefited from the leftist policies of the Cultural Revolution, has run the province since 1977. He belonged to a core of Hunan leaders with similar career patterns, suggesting the existence of a tightly knit political force there. At the time of the streamlining, eight of the top 20 Hunan party and government leaders had been provincial officials since before Chairman Mao's death in 1976, five of these since 1970 or earlier—including Hunan's three top leaders, Mao Zhiyong, Second Secretary Wan Da, and Governor Sun Guozhi. Two of the 20, like Hua Guofeng, were former leaders of Xiangtan Prefecture.

Moreover, Mao Zhiyong had admitted complicity in the evolution of Hunan's political stance. In 1981, for example, he took responsibility for Hunan's "leftist mistakes."[56] In late 1982 and early 1983, he admitted that his province had failed to measure up to central standards across virtually the full range of Dengist reform policies. On September 4, 1982, at the 12th CCP Congress, he conceded that "our understanding is still very insufficient with regard to the role of education and science in socialist modernization.... Particularly in the selection of ... well-educated and professionally competent young and middle-aged cadres for leading bodies ... we are lagging even farther behind."[57] At a meeting in Hunan some two-and-a-half weeks later, he made a speech in which he admitted that his province had failed not only to correct injustices committed during the Cultural Revolution but also to implement properly the agricultural responsibility system even after the landmark 11th CC 3rd Plenum in December 1978.[58] And in a speech in early 1983, he repeated a general self-indictment made in his earlier self-criticism, admitting that "for rather a long period around the time of the third plenary session we did not follow the arrangements of the Central Committee on certain major issues," such as opposing the cult of personality and eliminating leftist influences.[59]

The streamlining in the spring of 1983 left Mao isolated, his closest allies having been removed from power. Of the nine party secretaries subordinate to Mao before the reform, only one—Jiao Linyi, Guangzhou first secretary until his transfer to Hunan in 1980—remains in office. Governor Sun Guozhi was transferred to the less powerful post of provincial people's congress chairman, and six of the eight vice-governors retired. So did Second Secretary and Provincial Party Committee Chairman Wan Da and six PPC vice-chairmen. Moreover, a campaign to bring Hunan into line with central policies on making full use of intellectuals, promoting technical experts in industry, and preventing corruption during bureaucratic reorganization emerged in full force immediately following the streamlining.

That Mao Zhiyong survived in spite of all this is remarkable. It is also instructive. An examination of the center's tactics in dealing with Mao and his

[51]On the production responsibility system, see David Zweig, "Opposition to Change in Rural China: The System of Responsibility and People's Communes," *Asian Survey*, July 1983, pp. 879–900.

[52]Hunan radio, Mar. 7, 1981.

[53]Hunan radio, Mar. 13, 1981.

[54]In this regard, it is interesting to note that the "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of our Party since the Founding of the People's Republic of China" essentially blamed Mao Zedong for the excesses that had occurred during the Cultural Revolution. See Article 22 of the Resolution in *FBIS–CHI*, July 1, 1981, p. K/8.

[55]*Hunan Ribao* (Changsha), Aug. 3, 1981.

[56]Beijing radio, Mar. 28, 1981; and Hunan radio, Mar. 28, 1981.

[57]Xinhua, Sept. 4, 1982.

[58]*Renmin Ribao* (Beijing), Sept. 28, 1982.

[59]Hunan radio, Feb. 10, 1983.

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unresponsive province reveals a good deal about how the Chinese political system functions under Deng's leadership. One essential point to keep in mind in this regard is that the purpose of the streamlining in Hunan was not so much to eliminate leftist leaders per se as it was to attain certain substantive policy goals, namely the acceptance and promotion of Dengist reforms. Nowhere was this distinction illustrated more clearly than in the center's efforts to rectify the mistreatment of professors at Hunan University.

Hunan: Local Stonewalling

The struggle on the part of Hunan University professors to gain better treatment broke into the open media in June 1982 when Beijing's *Guangming Ribao* published a letter of protest against maltreatment of university professors.[60] The difficulties these professors would encounter illustrate the problems Beijing has faced in gaining effective implementation of its reforms at the local level because of its need to rely on provincial-level responsiveness. The issue centered on the university administration's attitude toward intellectuals, which was said to reflect Cultural Revolution biases. In the fall of 1982, in response to the letter of protest, party officials in Changsha, Hunan's capital, sent a provincial investigation team to the university to rectify this improper attitude. While at the school, the team instead "conducted a counterinvestigation," the result of which, according to officials at the center, was that "the problems there were even more tightly covered up."[61] Despite First Secretary Mao's public support for the party line calling for better tretment of intellectuals, nothing more was done until the issue reappeared in the central media serveral months later.

On February 24, 1983, the official CCP daily *Renmin Ribao* published another letter by two Hunan University professors criticizing the university for its continued failure to "reverse Cultural Revolution verdicts" on persecuted teachers.[62] Mao endorsed the letter, noting that Hunan intellectual policy was still under leftist influence and thus "a prime issue determining whether we can reach political unanimity" with the Central Committee.[63] Two weeks later, Liu Xuechu, head of a Hunan work team sent by the CC Guiding Group on Structural Reform, visited the professors and commended them for having had "a great influence on the whole province."[64]

[60]*Guangming Ribao* (Beijing), June 16, 1982.
[61]*Renmin Ribao,* May 6, 1983.
[62]*Ibid.*, Feb. 24, 1983.
[63]Ibid., Mar. 11, 1983.
[64]Hunan radio, Mar. 31, 1983.

Wang Zhen, member of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, visited the Jianxiang Porcelain Factory in Changsha, Hunan Province, in November 1984.

—New China Picture Company.

Himself a former university official, Liu seemed to have been carefully selected as Beijing's man to provide guidance on local treatment of intellectuals. Further central pressure on the university came in the form of a visit in early April by Politburo member Wang Zhen, who stressed the role of intellectuals.[65]

Apparently, Mao personally participated little in the province's dealings with the work team—judging from his failure to figure prominently in media commentary on the issue. This task he left to party Secretary Jiao Linyi, who brought provincial influence to bear. Jiao accompanied Liu to Hunan University in late March, published an article on intellectuals in the Hunan press in early April, and at an April 19 meeting announcing new leaders of the Hunan Culture Department called for a "new situation in Hunan's cultural work" to eliminate leftism.[66] By late April 1983, following appointment of the new provincial leadership, the province appeared to be giving full support to Beijing and once again sent a work team to the university.[67] In addition, provincial leaders established special organs at various levels of government to inspect treatment of intellectuals.

[65]Hunan radio, Apr. 4, 1983.
[66]Hunan radio, Apr. 19, 1983, in *JPRS,* No. 83422, May 6, 1983, pp. 89–90.
[67]Hunan radio, Apr. 29, 1983.

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Despite this intense central pressure and apparent support by the province's new leaders, Hunan University officials continued to resist reform. *Guangming Ribao* reported on May 7, for example, that during the two previous months, "the university leadership" had made "only little and slow progress" in redressing mishandled cases, which, according to Liu, still numbered over 900 in early May.[68] Nevertheless, *Renmin Ribao* was able to announce a narrow victory at this time—namely, the appointment to the university administration of the two professors who had written the letter three months earlier criticizing the university leadership.[69] Far from being critical of provincial authorities, the paper credited them with responsibility for having resolved a situation caused by a "small number of responsible cadres in the university . . . fending off the implementation of the policy on intellectuals." That Hunan University had been featured in the media for broader purposes was made clear by an announcement the same day that Hunan was conducting a review of its policy toward intellectuals, including over 40,000 teachers, throughout the province.[70]

Even as *Renmin Ribao* spoke of a "breakthrough," however, it admitted that some "responsible cadres" opposed to the party's policy on intellectuals were "thinking of a comeback," causing implementation of the policy to proceed "at a snail's pace." By mid-June, the limited nature of the "breakthrough" was becoming increasingly evident, as some opponents of reform remained powerful enough to influence the local media. Hunan radio, for example, began to portray in a positive light events that had been treated negatively by newly appointed Hunan leaders and the central media.

In May, representatives of the Ministry of Machine-Building, with which the university is affiliated, joined in the work of the provincial work team, but this did not seem to deter provincial opposition to central policy, a point reinforced by commentary on Hunan radio. Toward the end of the month, the center stepped up its efforts. On May 21, *Guangming Ribao* stated that the university's "leading members have not yet corrected the erroneous ideas in their minds,"[71] and on May 26, *Renmin Ribao* criticized the university's continued leftism, quoting Ministry of Machine-Building representative Xu Nianchu as saying that "the issue of Hunan University has become serious."[72] Interestingly, the official party paper gave no indication that the problem was being solved. The next day, however, Hunan radio observed that Hunan University personnel had "gradually reached unanimity of opinion" on eliminating leftism,[73] a markedly more optimistic evaluation.

Another example of central-regional media disagreement occurred a few days later. A June 3 speech by Jiao Linyi in which he criticized leftism was summarized by Hunan radio as calling leftism a "problem . . . not only at Hunan University but also in some other units."[74] The central media gave a much more negative assessment in its summary of the speech. According to the *Renmin Ribao* version, Jiao noted that leftism at the university was "very serious" and "quite typical" of general attitudes throughout the province. "Regardless of whether on the economic, political, or cultural front," he is reported to have said, "Hunan is a bit more backward than other provinces in sorting out 'leftist' things."[75]

Hunan: Experts in Industry

That the issue of ensuring a "proper" attitude toward intellectuals encompasses, in the center's view, far more than the academic world was clearly indicated by a May editorial in *Renmin Ribao,* which called on industrial leaders to reward experts for technical achievements and to give them political power as well.[76] Central figures toured Hunan during the spring to implement just such a policy. During visits to various industrial plants, Politburo member Wang Zhen, who had also earlier visited Hunan University, inquired into the status and role of technicians and stated unequivocally that "we must boldly select, promote, and employ experts and technical personnel."[77] Although Mao Zhiyong accompanied Wang throughout his visit, the Hunan party leader, as noted earlier, seems to have eschewed the opportunity to lend support publicly to the center's position.

Nevertheless, in the wake of the spring leadership changes and inspection by central representatives, certain symbolic steps to enhance the authority of experts and to make better use of their knowledge were reported. On April 29, with the aid of a provincial investigation team, an engineer who had been mistreated by the officials of a factory in Hengyang City was elected to the city government, and the factory leadership, which included a director of production and technology with only a primary-school education, was reorganized. Point-

[68] *Guangming Ribao,* May 7, 1983.
[69] *Renmin Ribao,* May 6, 1983. See also Beijing radio, May 8, 1983; and Hunan radio, May 6, 1983, in *JPRS,* No. 83539, May 24, 1983, pp. 42–43.
[70] Hunan radio, May 6, 1983.
[71] *Guangming Ribao,* May 21, 1983.
[72] *Renmin Ribao,* May 26, 1983.
[73] Hunan radio, May 27, 1983.
[74] Hunan radio, June 3, 1983.
[75] *Renmin Ribao,* June 7, 1983, in *FBIS-CHI,* June 8, 1983, p. P/6.
[76] *Renmin Ribao,* May 22, 1983.
[77] Hunan radio, Apr. 4, 1983.

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ing out that this case was "by no means an isolated or occasional one," *Renmin Ribao* portrayed the poorly educated leaders of this 100-man factory as consistently discriminating against its 18 university-graduate employees, even driving one in despair to flee to Hong Kong because his quiet efforts to improve technology were taken as a sign of "ideological backwardness."[78]

Again, as in the Hunan University case, exposure of minor local inequities in the central press served a dual purpose. By focusing attention on the case, pro-reform elements were given vital support. Once they had won, their victory became a lesson for all other units in the country with similar problems. Following the victory of the reformers at the Hengyang factory, for example, *Renmin Ribao* did not hesitate to lecture its readers on the lessons they were to learn. "The 'leftist' influence of despising knowledge and discriminating against intellectuals cannot be underestimated," the paper stated. "In order to really implement the policies toward intellectuals, not only is it necessary to solve the ideological problems, but it is also imperative to carry out necessary reorganization. Otherwise, . . . we still cannot prevent the occurrence of similar cases." The article went on to reveal other, similar cases of injustice, and concluded by pointing out ominously that "if the intellectuals continue to be looked down upon, the four modernizations can never be realized."[79]

The leftist Hong Kong daily *Ming Pao* described the case of another engineer who, after making a "technical breakthrough," was fired from his position as head of a technical research group by cadres who "looked down on technology and were jealous of talented people."[80] Following a visit by CC Secretariat member Gu Mu and newly appointed Hunan Governor Liu Zheng, the engineer was appointed deputy director of his plant, and the plant's party secretary and director were dismissed.[81]

Whether or not these steps will prove to be more than tokens remains unclear, however. Surely the high central investment of the leadership's time incurred by sending Politburo and CC Secretariat members to handle individual cases personally cannot be continued indefinitely. As *Ming Pao* observed, such defeats of leftists in Hunan industries remain "rare."[82]

Hunan: Bureaucratic Corruption

Hunan has also figured prominently in central media criticism of local corruption during the ongoing nationwide bureaucratic restructuring. A CDIC circular in April 1983 calling on all levels to prevent the illegal distribution of public property to individuals by governmental units about to be abolished used Xiangtan Prefecture as its primary example,[83] and several prefectural officials have been disciplined by the provincial party committee for such transgressions.[84] The rescinding of unauthorized promotions made at lower levels by Hunan's party committee was also reported in the central press.[85]

While central media criticism has been carefully directed at local levels, the provincial party committee was required to submit a report to the CDIC on its handling of the Xiangtan case, suggesting that Hunan's provincial leadership remained under close central scrutiny even after the spring streamlining.

Conclusion

The similarities in the techniques employed by central reformers in the two very different cases of Shanxi and Hunan suggest certain conclusions about the nature of the political system being fashioned in post-Mao China. Unity and stability seem predominant concerns, presumably on the assumption that only these conditions will permit sustained economic development. Veteran central leaders, personally familiar with the effects of Cultural Revolution purges of political opponents, have, judging from the events of 1983, put a great deal of thought into how to remove opponents in a way that will avoid future recriminations. Some were elected to advisory bodies, at times amid considerable fanfare; others were transferred to lesser positions, such as to the vice-chairmanship of provincial people's congresses, where they could continue to hold office but be a step removed from day-to-day administration of government affairs. Even some politically undesirable figures, such as Mao Zhiyong, retained their positions—a strikingly different fate from that of officials in the 1960's, who were publicly humiliated, then summarily fired following their self-criticisms.

The streamlining of provincial leadership in the spring of 1983 and the subsequent reforms at the provincial level and below have also demonstrated a move toward the establishment of a modern bureaucratic system in which the selection, promotion, and retirement of per-

[78] *Renmin Ribao*, Apr. 29, 1983, in *JPRS*, No. 83646, June 10, 1983, pp. 25–27. Such cases formed the background to more general appeals to workers to respect intellectuals, as in the *Renmin Ribao* May Day editorial on May 1, 1983, in *FBIS–CHI*, May 2, 1983, pp. K/19–20.

[79] *Renmin Ribao*, May 1, 1983.

[80] *Ming Pao* (Hong Kong), May 5, 1983.

[81] Hunan radio, May 15, 1983.

[82] *Ming Pao*, May 5, 1983.

[83] Xinhua, Apr. 25, 1983.

[84] Hunan radio, Apr. 16, 1983.

[85] *Renmin Ribao*, May 20, 1983.

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sonnel is based on predictable, clearly stated regulations. The efforts over the past several years to establish limited tenure for high officials, define maximum permissible sizes for leadership bodies, and set minimum qualifications for office will, if expanded and observed in practice, go far toward establishing a predictable system of government with a life of its own, independent of individual top leaders.

Flexibility and forethought have characterized the Dengist leadership's first steps toward developing such a system. In Shanxi, the combination of role models, pilot programs, a variety of study sessions, and media instruction orchestrated in part by a central work team carried the main burden. In the more difficult case of Hunan, a stream of high-level central officials bypassed the provincial leadership and went directly to local sites where, in conjunction with detailed exposés in the central press, they publicized negative examples and resolved local issues with national implications in favor of the reformers.

Nonetheless, despite the decisive Dengist victory at the 12th Party Congress and repeated self-criticism by Mao Zhiyong thereafter, Mao survived the provincial leadership streamlining. Too young to be retired on grounds of old age and no doubt the beneficiary of residual support for Hua Guofeng, Mao also appears to have been too firmly entrenched in Hunan's leading political body to be removed without incurring both a divisive struggle and loss of control over provincial affairs, had the province been handed over to a leadership team lacking any veteran Hunan leaders. The extraordinary unity of the pre-reform Hunan leadership, in contrast to other provinces which often had leaders who had been transferred in by the center or were split by factional contests between Cultural Revolution activists and rehabilitated veterans from the early 1960's, combined with Mao's willingness to admit his errors, at least verbally support the reform program, and acquiesce in the removal of his older allies from the provincial leadership apparently convinced Beijing to give him another chance.

But even the cloud of Mao Zhiyong's continuation in office, while suggesting that real limits exist on the central reformers' ability to compel provincial compliance, may have a silver lining for the reformers. Resistance to compromise during the Cultural Revolution provoked such factional bitterness that it poisons Chinese politics to this day. Thus, Beijing's willingness to compromise was in itself an important message. To the hundreds of thousands of opponents of reform, Mao Zhiyong indirectly served as a model. They too would be allowed to remain in office, provided they switched to Deng's side and promoted his policies. Just such a message was virtually spelled out in a recent report from another problem province, Guangxi, where the Commentator of the provincial daily defined the party's policy as "leniency for those who confess."[86] The fact that Beijing was willing to compromise in the cases of Hunan and Guangxi must make the permanent acceptance of Dengist reforms a far less distasteful and less threatening prospect for many cadres, thereby further enhancing the likelihood of political stability in a post-Deng China.

The streamlining of provincial leadership throughout China was implemented in accordance with a schedule that had been publicly announced well in advance. As one step in a long series of reforms that began at the central level in 1982 and reached the subprovincial level in earnest by mid–1983, the outwardly smooth and rapid transfer of provincial leadership was an impressive exercise of reformist power. The techniques employed suggest that Beijing's goal is the establishment of a stable political system led by a unified party operating according to a set of rules that would facilitate the self-replication of an energetic, highly professional leadership on the basis of performance—primarily economic performance. While an ambitious goal that is no doubt ultimately dependent on the rate and nature of economic growth, its short-term prospects have been greatly enhanced by the current leadership's stress on persuasion. As demonstrated by the process now being set up and refined, this system envisions remedial training for uneducated cadres, promotion of educated cadres, and retention of those who have permanently missed out on the chance for education, provided they can and will support reform efforts from this point on. While it is still too early to tell if this ambitious goal will be attained, the historic transfer of provincial authority to a new generation of younger, more professionally competent leaders greatly enhances the likelihood of success.

[86] *Guangxi Ribao* (Nanning), June 14, 1983.

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State and Society in South Yemen

Norman Cigar

The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY or South Yemen) is the only state in the Arab world with a Marxist government. While observers outside the Middle East are primarily interested in the results of the PDRY's policies because of the country's strategic location, Arabs are perhaps more interested in the success or failure of the Aden government's attempts to achieve social mobilization, as some indication of whether a Marxist model of social development has applicability in a traditional Arab environment.

Rapid social change through state intervention has been one of the PDRY government's fundamental goals since the National Liberation Front (NLF) emerged victorious over its rivals in the civil war that paralleled the struggle for independence from Great Britain. Since independence in 1967, the NLF-based regime has become more radical in stages. In 1978, after merging with two minuscule leftist organizations, the NLF was renamed the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP), an avowedly Marxist-Leninist vanguard party. However, the "Marxist-Leninist" faction, espousing the creation of a "new society," had already become dominant within the NLF by 1969.[1]

The creation of a "new Yemeni man" and of a "new," "rational, socialist" society are seen by the regime as a necessity for its own internal ideological consistency, as well as for securing its legitimacy on a long-term basis among the country's population. New social values, institutions, and relationships reflecting the new "reality" are to replace the "remnants of the past" based on "bourgeois and feudal" models. South Yemeni dissidents, on the other hand, have claimed that certain aspects of the government's social planning are primarily intended to help the government consolidate and retain power. Regardless of the motivation, the promoting and controlling of rapid change in society is of considerable importance for the PDRY government.

The Soviet Union has consistently prompted the PDRY to follow this path. For example, one Soviet observer, writing in 1978, underlined the imperative for restructuring South Yemen's society:

The ideological function—consisting of the liquidation of the colonial heritage in the fields of education and culture, and the inculcation of a world view of the ruling classes or social groups in the consciousness of all members of society—is a vitally important activity for a government having a socialist orientation.[2]

Similarly, another Soviet observer wrote in 1983:

It is no secret that the prospects of the revolution depend to a large extent on the shaping of the national self-consciousness, the formation of a new attitude to labor, and the surmounting of tribalism and other remnants of the past and of the influence of bourgeois ideology.[3]

[1]Fred Halliday, "Yemen's unfinished revolution: Socialism in the South," *MERIP Reports* (New York), October 1979, p. 12.

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[2]Valeriy Vorob'yëv, *Politicheskaya i gosudarstvennaya sistema NDRI* (The Political and State System of the PDRY), Moscow, Nauka, 1978, p. 74.

[3]Aleksandr Gus'kov, "South Yemen on the Path of Progressive Transformations," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'* (Moscow), October 1983, pp. 24–28.

Speaking in a more general vein, Karen Brutents, the highest ranking Soviet official specializing in Third World affairs, noted that "the problem of achieving political stability in the liberated countries and the very prospects for successful opposition to neocolonialism" are directly centered on "the task of democratizing social life in its various aspects," (i.e., restructuring society according to a Marxist model). See *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 3, February 1984, p. 111.

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South Yemeni leader Ali Nasir Muhammad, third from left, with Konstantin Chernenko and Boris Ponomarëv in the Kremlin on October 2, 1984.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

While promoting "progressive" change, however, Moscow has placed even greater insistence on the need for a vanguard party to oversee the restructuring of society—this as a result of the Soviet Union's own bitter experience with other Third World "socialist" regimes.[4]

To what extent has the YSP succeeded in modifying South Yemen's social reality to fit the model promoted through ideological pronouncements and legislation? Some aspects of PDRY society, unfortunately, remain beyond the scope of analysis, given the closed nature of the country. Local researchers have done little systematic fieldwork, while few foreign scholars have even visited the country. Nevertheless, available indicators, particularly those one can cull from the local press,[5] offer a useful basis for a preliminary evaluation of the degree of the PDRY government's success. Although, admittedly, social change is a slow, long-term process—and the period since independence is only a relatively short phase in South Yemen's history—that decade and a half should be sufficient to permit one to gauge the general magnitude and direction of change. Moreover, a large share of the country's population has known no other government, having been born, or at least having gone through its formative years, since 1967.[6]

The Aden government has tried to restructure social groups by simultaneously undermining their material bases while attacking their old values and bonds and attempting to substitute new ones. We shall examine this

[4]At first, the danger to such regimes seemed to come from the army (as in Algeria, Ghana, and Indonesia), a social force that Soviet theorists had once viewed as one of the most progressive elements in the Third World. Later, even regimes that had been able to establish a secure domestic position sometimes simply turned away from the Soviet Union (in Egypt, Somalia, Sudan, and Peru), despite treaties of friendship with Moscow (such as the PDRY signed in 1979). These experiences led Soviet writers on the Third World to focus on the need for a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party, which would both guarantee the local regime against coups and give Moscow the necessary influence to ensure the regime's loyalty. See, e.g., S. Agayev and I. Tatarovskaya, "Paths and Stages of the Revolutionary Process in the Countries of Asia and Africa," *Aziya i Afrika Segodnya* (Moscow), July 1978, p. 31.

With regard to South Yemen in particular, a Soviet commentary in 1978 stated: "When the left wing gained power [i.e., in 1969] its immediate tasks in the national-liberation revolution were unification of the country's national and patriotic forces and *the creation of a vanguard party of the working people.*" V. Naumkin, "Southern Yemen: The Road to Progress," *International Affairs* (Moscow), January 1978, p. 65 (emphasis added).

[5]Although the media in the PDRY are a state-controlled monopoly, the press sometimes contains surprisingly frank articles and letters to the editor. The candor in the press has been decreasing since the devastating floods of 1982–83 and the resulting economic difficulties, which apparently have made the government more sensitive to criticism. There are indications, moreover, that this outlet for discontent may become increasingly restricted. The editor of the Aden daily *14 October*, for example, recently chided those who write to express a grievance for being too critical, noting that many letters "are not grounded in an objective base" (*14 October*, Nov. 15, 1984).

[6]As of 1977, for example, 49.1 percent of all South Yemenis were 14 years of age or younger, that is, were no more than 4 years old at the time of independence. See *United Nations Demographic Yearbook*, New York, United Nations, Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Office, 1979.

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process specifically as it has affected the status accorded various social groups, and the treatment of religion, the family, women, youth, and culture. We shall also explore briefly the machinery charged with implementing state policy with regard to social mobilization and indoctrination.

Social Groups and Status

Traditionally, South Yemeni society has been characterized by hierarchical hereditary strata, with loyalties focused at the local level—on one's family, tribe, or village.[7] Moreover, although Islam might conceivably have provided this society with a higher common denominator of loyalty, it in fact remained tied to local social hierarchies. (The sole exception to this pattern was Aden, which as a cosmopolitan entrepôt since its seizure by the British in 1839, had always offered greater opportunities for social mobility than existed in the hinterland.) Britain's policy of either installing clients as rulers or coopting existing ones in each political sub-unit outside of Aden ensured that the nationalists would turn the fight for independence against these clients and the social system they represented, as well as against the British.

In a short but violent power struggle immediately after independence in 1967, the victorious NLF eliminated the elite composed of local sultans, tribal chiefs, religious leaders, and merchants, who had sided with the British, and with them also the non-leftist nationalists who had fought against the British. This done, the new Aden regime undertook to establish control over the economic base to undermine the old social system and prevent any group outside the NLF from challenging its control over the country. However, nationalization of property (including land) and installation of central planning have been implemented only gradually. As can be seen from Table 1, a very sizable portion of South Yemen's gross domestic product still originates in the private sector—particularly in retail trade, some services, and agriculture. Although the regime wages a persistent media campaign against small businessmen, who are portrayed as "parasites" and "reactionaries," plans to shrink and eventually eliminate the private sector have been hampered by the country's econoomic straits. Efforts to effect economic control over the society are further inhibited by the fact that a large proportion of the country's labor force work abroad in the Gulf states.[8]

Table 1: South Yemen's Gross Domestic Product by Sector

(in percent of total)

	General economy		Agriculture	
Sector	1973	1982	1973	1982
Private	61.3	48.7	60.3	58.6
Mixed and cooperative	14.1	8.5	31.1	30.7
Of which:				
Mixed	*2.0*	*3.0*		
Cooperative	*12.1*	*5.5*		
State	24.6	42.8	8.4	10.7

SOURCE: *Al-Thawri* (Aden), Oct. 15, 1983, and July 14, 1984.

The results of the effort to eliminate the "feudal class" and the "bourgeoisie" and to bring about justice through "rule by the proletariat and its class allies" have not always been clear-cut gains for the average South Yemeni. The functions and privileges of the elite that has been displaced have been assumed, to a large extent, by a "new class" comprising the regime and its clients—i.e., party cadres, directors of state firms, high-level bureaucrats, and military officers.[9]

This "new class" enjoys not only a monopoly of political power but also material advantages not available to the rest of the population. Government officials often have two houses despite a severe housing shortage for most of the population. Officials also apparently do not always differentiate between "public" property and money and the personal use of them.[10] Other officials take advantage of their position to travel abroad frequently.[11] The taking of bribes for ordinary, as well as extraordinary, services rendered is common. Even public sewer workers are said to require bribes for fixing sewers in Aden.[12] At the lower end of the "new class," ordinary veterans of the NLF enjoy preference in acquiring government jobs, free housing, and help with their children's education (e.g., sons of veterans have precedence in entry to government schools, such as the

[7] In the Hadramawt (the fifth of the six province-level governorates) alone, the British found some 2,000 independent centers of authority in the 1930's. See Harold Ingrams, *Arabia and the Isles*, New York and Washington, DC, Praeger, 1966, p. 25.

[8] While no statistics are kept on migration, in the mid–1970's, Aden's official estimate of migrants was 300,000. Halliday, loc. cit., p. 7. Even if the total were now closer to 200,000, this still would represent one-third of the PDRY labor force.

[9] A witticism current in the PDRY is: "Formerly we had six Sultans; now we have 47" (referring respectively to the six principal rulers during the British period and the current membership of the YSP Central Committee).

[10] See accounts in *14 October* (Aden), May 28, 1982. Some even sell government land and cars. See *Al-Haris* (Aden), September-October 1981. *Al-Haris* is a journal published for the PDRY's internal security forces.

[11] *Al-Thawri* (Aden), July 10, 1982, adds: "Some come back home only to rest and to prepare for a new trip abroad."

[12] Ibid., June 12, 1982.

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Police Academy, even without any other qualifications).[13] Such perquisites help to perpetuate the position of this group on the social scale.

The state has sought to mobilize the rest of the population by establishing new mass organizations based on socioeconomic criteria to serve as new centers of loyalty. Peasants, students, women, workers, schoolchildren, writers, and other such groups all have their own organization, while the neighborhood security and administrative organs—the Popular Defense Committees—try to recruit individuals from all these categories.

Old loyalties and social patterns, however, appear to have resisted government attempts to change them, and in many instances, socialist terminology has been merely superimposed on traditional realities. One of the main goals of the state-run cooperative farm system, for example, has been to create a new relationship within the "production teams," one that "does not depend on kinship, family, or tribal bonds." Rather, it is supposed to be based on "cooperative labor, the nature of land ownership, and on the commitment to build socialism." But many production teams still consist of one or more extended families (a tribe?), which are called "cooperative families." Apparently, it is this type of production unit that has been the most productive one.[14] Family loyalty, nepotism, and personal clientism persist in the urban environment as well.[15]

Perhaps more serious has been the persistence of tribal loyalty. Since independence, the PDRY government has sought to replace vertical local—particularly, tribal—loyalties with "national" and "class" ones. Tribal names for individuals were banned, tribal boundaries blurred through administrative reorganizations, tribally-based organizations disbanded, and efforts made to take children outside their tribal area for schooling.[16] Yet, there are indications that tribes still function—and are still treated—as political actors.[17] Even though persons in the government may be "de-tribalized" and feel such

[13] *Al-Haris*, June 1982.

[14] *Al-Thawri*, Sept. 1, 1984.

[15] A letter to the labor union newspaper *Sawt Al-Ummal* (Aden) printed on June 18, 1982, complained that the sister of a bureaucrat in the Ministry of Labor, rather than the complainant, was given a job simply because of family ties. Personal connections, moreover, are needed even in such areas as obtaining medicine at a hospital. See *Al-Thawri*, Feb. 6, 1982.

[16] The official position is that changing the Bedouins' loyalties and way of life "will not occur directly by convincing the adults . . . which might require decades." Rather, this is to be accomplished "by educating their children and by putting them in boarding schools . . . . In a few years' time, they will become veritable missionaries to their parents for social and economic change." There are now 23 such schools, with 34,000 students. The military, rather than the Ministry of Education, runs these schools. See *14 October*, Nov. 14, 1984.

[17] For example, six tribes in the Fifth Governorate were reported to have banded together to resist the military draft; their leaders were arrested and the tribes were punished collectively by the central government (*The Daily Telegraph* [London], Dec. 7, 1982).

Indication of the still imperfect development of a national loyalty is the reported nonchalant treatment accorded the national flag, which even government organizations in the countryside are said not to raise or to simply leave flying at all times, to deteriorate in the elements (*Al-Thawri*, June 26, 1982).



Then South Yemeni President Salim Rubayyi' Ali speaks to peasants at the Mojahad state farm in the Second Governorate, where he was chairman of the executive board.

— Maxine Molyneux/Camera Press.

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loyalties to be ideologically unsound, they may nevertheless view their own tribe as a ready-made power base to be used for personal advancement.[18]

Religion

The PDRY government sees in Islam an alternative, contrasting, ideological system posing an intellectual challenge to socialism. Virtually all South Yemenis are Muslims. Islam, introduced into Southern Arabia in the 7th century A.D., struck deep roots in local society by coopting earlier tribal and regional customs. The resulting symbiosis provided mutually-reinforcing legitimacy, while permitting Islam to become relevant to people's everyday needs. Since independence, Islam has served to buttress the social and political position of a local elite that competed with the new government for power and provided the only *potential* framework for the mobilization of opposition to the regime's policies on a nationwide basis in what is otherwise a highly fragmented society.

Not unexpectedly, the goal of the PDRY government, in ideological terms, has been to establish what is called locally a "rational"—i.e., atheist—society. At first, the government promoted an aggressive anti-religious propaganda campaign, in which Islam was portrayed as oppressive and as "a remnant of the past." Violent confrontations with religious leaders were common, and a number of them were publicly humiliated, tortured, and executed.[19]

The widespread opposition that this initial approach aroused both domestically and abroad eventually led to a more circumspect religious policy. Rather than challenging people's basic beliefs, the government's strategy has shifted to weakening indirectly the role of Islam and religious leaders in society, seeking thereby to make religion less relevant to people's everyday lives. Thus, in 1970, the state took over the *awqaf,* or religious trust property, which formerly provided religious institutions and personnel a certain financial autonomy. Religious officials henceforth were to receive salaries from the state.[20] All foreign aid for religious purposes, likewise, now must be channeled through state agencies.

Moreover, marriage and divorce no longer can be performed by a *qadi,* or religious judge, without the government's approval, while the competence of the *shari'a*, or religious code, has been drastically curtailed. Education has been secularized. Religious material is excluded from the mass media and has been replaced by expositions of Marxist doctrine. Characteristically, the PDRY is the only Arab country in which the times for daily prayers or for the month-long Ramadan fast are not published in the press.[21] The interpretation of Islam within a framework of "liberation theology," presenting it as simply a social and political, rather than spiritual, system has been promoted. The Quran, for example, is taught in schools solely as a social and political document, and is portrayed as supporting anti-imperialism and social radicalism. Typically, the sermon delivered by a pro-government cleric—director of the section on religious affairs in the Ministry of the Interior—on a religious holy day in 1984 declared that "the essence of Islam ... is equality and the end of class exploitation [and] the establishment of a prosperous and just life, the promotion of democracy and social justice and a society free from social contradictions and exploitative relationships."[22]

Despite government policies, there are numerous indications that Islam remains central for most South Yemenis.[23] The government evidently feels this is the case; for example, it modifies work schedules during Ramadan to make allowances for those fasting.[24] The authorities are also sensitive to the influence of the preaching of imams, or prayer leaders, in mosques and have tried to coopt them, while reportedly cracking down on any recalcitrant ones.

Of some significance also is the reticence of Marxist government officials to openly proclaim themselves to be atheists, conscious as they are of the expected reaction of their fellow citizens, as well as that in other Arab countries. Recently, in fact, the PDRY's president, Ali Nasir Muhammad, has made it a point to project a personal image of being a practicing Muslim and has ap-

[18]During an internal power struggle in 1978, for example, one of the government figures, Salim Rubayyi' Ali, expected and got his strongest support from his native Third Governorate (Halliday, loc. cit., p. 17).

According to an émigré source, during a recent conflict within the ruling YSP the accusation of "tribalism" was hurled at some of the protagonists (*Al-Wahda* [Cairo], Feb. 15, 1984).

One Soviet visitor noted that even "many workers" (who, by Marxist theory, should be the least traditional segment of the population) "still have ties to the village" (Naumkin, loc. cit., p. 66).

[19]Such acts are chronicled in Awad Al-Arshani's *Al-Irhab al-shuyu'i fi-l-Yaman al-Janubiyya* (Communist Terrorism in South Yemen), n. p., 1978, published on behalf of one of the country's exile groups.

[20]Halliday, loc. cit., p. 10.

[21]Indeed, one letter to the editor complained that the state-run broadcasting system had aired daytime cooking programs during Ramadan, making fasting considerably more difficult (*14 October,* May 17, 1982).

[22]Ibid., July 3, 1984.

[23]That religious holidays still regulate the rhythm of everyday life may be inferred from the fact that South Yemenis want new clothes for the religious month of Ramadan (ibid., July 19, 1982). Likewise, a letter to the editor asked that during Ramadan, streets be repaired and lit for the surge in travel that occurs after sunset—i.e., once the fast can be broken (ibid., May 8, 1984).

[24]One letter, however, complained that the school year having started late, final exams coincided with Ramadan, which caused difficulties, presumably with fasting, in the intense summer heat (ibid., July 12, 1982).

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South Yemeni President Ali Nasir Muhammad shown with local Muslim leaders.

—*14 October* (Aden), Dec. 8, 1983.

peared in the media receiving religious notables in his official capacity and praying in a mosque.

Readily accessible religious broadcasts from neighboring countries and the fact that so many South Yemeni migrants work in other Muslim countries doubtless undermine the Aden government's attempt to weaken belief in Islam among its citizens. Moreover, the increasing need for foreign aid from other Arab countries, particularly in the wake of the disastrous floods of 1982, has prompted the PDRY government to adopt a more conciliatory policy toward Islam at home, at least for the short run.[25]

The Family

The regime has viewed existing family structures as a challenge to its ideology and, perhaps more important, as a stumbling block to social change and to the state's influence and control over the individual. Conflict within the family has been seen by government ideologues as an element that could facilitate the desired social change and has therefore been depicted as a "positive" factor and as "inevitable."[26]

The household and extended family have traditionally been the basic socioeconomic unit of both urban and rural South Yemen. The family was, and is, the repository and defender of an individual's honor and material interests, and the focus of his loyalty.[27] Marriage to one's cousin—designed to strengthen family ties and to preserve wealth within the family—has traditionally been strongly encouraged. Yemeni urban dwellings were typically multi-storied, capable of housing an entire extended family, thus reinforcing physical links and facilitating security in what was a harsh physical and social environment. The family has also served as a major agent of socialization, inculcating in children basic moral and social values.

From the early days of independence, the regime has described traditional family structures as both exploitative and reactionary. However, it was not until the passage of the Family Law in 1974 that a coordinated attempt was made to enforce new relationships within the family as part of a more general restructuring of society. Polygamy, arranged marriages, and the customary large dowries (which often lent to marriage the quality of an economic transaction between families) were made illegal. So were marriages between first cousins and *kafa'a,* a social custom whereby women were prevented from marrying below their family's social level.

[25]A case in point may be the willingness throughout 1983 to announce in the local press public tenders to carry out repairs on mosques in Aden, to be financed by Kuwait.

[26]See, e.g., *14 October,* Mar. 12, 1982.

[27]Today, with the large-scale migration of men abroad in search of work, the extended family also fulfills another important function: to protect the economic interests and honor of one's spouse(s) and children in one's absence.

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This intrusive legislation is highly unsettling and runs counter to deeply-ingrained social customs, many of which have actual or perceived religious sanction. In general, South Yemenis find these laws distasteful and routinely attempt to evade them. The law on dowries, for example, is regularly bypassed.[28] Families, moreover, still want to arrange marriages, and "marriages of interest"—in which social status and property considerations are decisive—are said still to be the rule.[29] Government attempts to discourage the traditional extended family by building apartments for nuclear families are also unpopular, and large traditional families will often crowd together in their new accommodations.

Apparently, it has been difficult to change values regarding the family even among the ideological "elite." A member of the YSP Central Committee, Ali Salim Al-Bid, for example, reportedly had to be disciplined for violating the law by marrying a second wife.[30] Officials have reluctantly admitted that "one hears frequent cries for the revision of these laws" and have acknowledged that, under the circumstances, the laws are "unrealistic" and even "totally irrelevant."[31]

Perhaps fearing to provoke even greater discontent, the government has not felt it wise to tamper with the traditional inheritance system. Yet this is a central element in the continuation of the existing family structure, encouraging as it does first-cousin marriage and the extended family as means of avoiding the rapid division of property otherwise prescribed by Islamic inheritance law. Without a change in the inheritance system, a rapid transformation of the family is unlikely.

Women

The government views its policy on women as an integral part of plans to change society. In South Yemen, the conduct of women has traditionally been considered one of the primary measures of a family's honor. This has been accompanied by a perception of women as weaker than men in body, mind, and morals, and as beings who require protection from outside dangers as well as from their own impulses. This combination of factors has contributed to the development of a markedly circumscribed lifestyle and role in society for women. The official goal has been to change this and to achieve for women complete equality in rights and duties with men.

Traditional dwellings in Shibam, Hadramawt.

—Sam Waagenaar/Photo Researchers.

Accordingly, the government has placed considerable emphasis on "women's liberation." Efforts have been made to induce women to abandon the veil, to be active outside the home—at school, work, and recreational activities, and in the military—and to participate in politics through the government-sponsored Yemeni General Women's Union (YGWU), founded in 1968. During the first few years after independence, the application of measures designed to achieve these results was often in an ad hoc manner and was frequently accompanied by violence to neutralize the resistance it engendered. The subsequent Family Law of 1974 enacted a number of provisions, as noted already, that were in part expected to systematize and further encourage the emancipation of women.

These and other related measures have evoked broad opposition, even after the use of force in implementing them was diminished. Opponents have argued that the undeclared aim of the government policy on women is to

[28] *Al-Thawri*, May 22, 1982, and Apr. 2, 1983. In one village, for example, the cash dowry, quite apart from the customary gifts of gold and furniture, is reported to be up to 700 Dinars, or roughly a year's wages for a young bureaucrat (*14 October*, Dec. 30, 1983).

[29] *14 October*, Nov. 6, 1980.

[30] *Al-Siyasah* (Kuwait), Feb. 9, 1981. To some extent, the government has found itself obliged to compromise with reality in this area by allowing, under special circumstances, marriage with a second wife. A fee regularizing this practice was introduced. See *Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya* (The Official Gazette—Aden), Jan. 19, 1981.

[31] *Al-Haris*, September-October 1981.

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A political demonstration by women in Mukala in 1973.

—Marie-Laure de Decker/Gamma-Liaison.

undermine the family in order to control society more easily, and even those who do not necessarily oppose change in this realm have resented what they perceive as intrusion into a very private area. The government's educational program for women, for example, has been unpopular, as it has forced women to live away from home in some cases.[32] Similarly, measures to promote women's joining the Popular Defense Committees have not been popular, and officials admit that the level of participation is "not encouraging at present."[33] The proportion of girls in the schools still substantially below that of boys.[34] The campaign to eliminate illiteracy has also generally failed to attract women, while those who have enrolled (often under pressure) show up for classes only haphazardly.[35]

Fewer women have been brought into the labor force than was hoped, despite a labor shortage in the country.[36] A good part of the reason for this has been the lack of public acceptance. In Aden and some of the larger cities, a small number of women have received a modern education and have entered the workforce as teachers, administrators, and medical personnel. Some women have even joined the national dance troupe sponsored by the Ministry of the Interior, something that would probably have been unheard of before independence. However, as one of the dancers admitted in what was probably a typical case, the price for this has been ostracism by her own family.[37] In general, it is still not widely accepted as proper for a woman to work, and indeed, the traditional view of women's role in society seems firmly entrenched even in Aden itself, the most sophisticated and least traditional milieu.

A recent short story by a local writer, Ali Ahmad Yahya, illustrates this graphically. A woman joins an all-male shopping line at a neighborhood cooperative in Aden. She immediately becomes the object of hostile stares by the men in the line, in the cafes, and passing by. Some ask indignantly "Don't you have a brother? ... Why can't he shop for you? ... What about your father?" in what is portrayed as typical reactions. In a bit of "socialist realism," the story ends with the men eventually accepting her presence after repeated visits.[38]

Sensing the unpopularity of mandatory change, the government has retreated from its earlier arbitrary enforcement of some measures. The anti-veil campaign, for example, is said to have largely lapsed.[39] Even the custom of female circumcision, which is intended to decrease a woman's sexual gratification, is still legal and said still to be widespread, though its frequency may vary according to region.

The small number of women with a modern education have constituted the core of the YGWU, which, as an organization, has supported government efforts to implement the emancipatory legislation on women already enacted, as well as to introduce further measures. The YGWU's leaders have been frustrated by what they see as the slow pace of change and by their inability to bring greater influence to bear on the process. To a great extent, however, the modern education, lifestyle, and values of the YGWU's leadership make it so different from the rest of society as to militate against its becom-

[32]Typically, because of "the force of custom," girls from the Fourth Governorate were not permitted by their families to attend a Pioneers' youth camp (*14 October*, Mar. 28, 1983).

[33]Ibid., May 5, 1982. Likewise, in the City of Shibam (Fifth Governorate), of 1,129 members of ISHID, the official youth organization, only 14 were girls (ibid., Feb. 5, 1982).

[34]A report on several districts in the Fourth Governorate, for example, revealed that girls constituted only about 11 percent of elementary-school pupils, and were very rare above the fifth grade (*Al-Thawri*, Feb. 11, 1984).

[35]Ibid., May 22, 1982.

[36]Ironically, the women's technical institutes opened in 1975 all had to be closed by 1980 because graduates could not find jobs (*14 October*, Apr. 17, 1980).

[37]*Al-Haris*, January 1983.

[38]*14 October*, Jan. 22, 1982.

[39]Maxine Molyneux's valuable field study, *State policies and the position of women workers in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen 1967 77*, Geneva, International Labour Organization, 1982, makes the point forcefully that for women in industry some of the strictures are not salient. However, she convincingly proves that women working in industry are atypical by reason of their social and geographic origins and number. In effect, there were only 1,271 women in industry out of nearly 1 million women in the country at the time of her survey. Significantly, even a woman factory worker noted of the traditional black veil-like covering, "I don't mind wearing the *sheidor*. If I don't wear it, people will speak badly of me and say 'Look, she has no religion and no modesty'" (pp 74–75).

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ing a greater force among women, even those who work in the modern sector.[40]

In fact, it appears that the YGWU is becoming weaker rather than stronger. Many of the rank-and-file members, who were pressured into joining in the early days after independence, melted away once the pressure slackened. Many branches of the YGWU have simply ceased to function.[41] Even the number of members still on the books may tend to give an exaggerated picture of the organization's activism.[42]

Women's lives are changing, to be sure, but the impetus is not always provided by government-sponsored programs, and the result may run counter to the government's intent and interests. Thus, a large number of women have been reported recently to be engaging in small "black-market" operations in Aden.[43] This new phenomenon is attributable to bottlenecks in the production and distribution of consumer goods resulting from poor planning, which creates a situation in which substantial profits can be made from small-scale trade. In addition, the large-scale emigration of the menfolk as laborers to the Gulf countries limits the number of men available for this activity. Another aspect of change in the lives of South Yemeni women not intended by the government, and probably still fairly limited, is an observed increase in the use by women of alcohol and *qat* (a traditional mild narcotic that is consumed by chewing).[44]

Youth

The PDRY's population of 2 million is a young one, with individuals 24 years of age or less accounting for 64.5 percent of the total in 1977, and probably an even greater share today. The government has been hopeful of gaining the allegiance of the country's youth, of turning it into an agent for the dissolution of the old social system and into a defender of a new, socialist society. New values have been promoted through education and indoctrination in schools, on work projects, and in the military.

[40]A report from the Sixth Governorate (Mahra) notes that few working women there belong to the YGWU (*Al-Thawri*, Feb. 20, 1982).

[41]In the Fourth Governorate (Shabwa), the YGWU—which had been actively engaged in agitation, propaganda work, and demonstrations since 1973—now has many fewer members than when initially founded. Even the cadres no longer bother to travel throughout the region on their official duties as required (*14 October*, Jan. 30, 1982).

[42]Perhaps not atypical is the case of a government employee on Socotra Island. Though she works as a typist in a visible position (at a police station), and is a divorcee (thus comparatively free), she had never attended a meeting of the YGWU since joining in 1980—presumably as a condition for obtaining her job (ibid., May 28, 1982).

[43]*Ibid.*, Mar. 13, 1983.

[44]Ibid., Dec. 30, 1979.

As can be seen in this photo of a dormitory at the Aden Technical Institute, many students retain their Muslim prayer rugs.

— ***Al-Thawri* (Aden), May 29, 1982.**

The results, however, have been disappointing to the government in many respects. While some success has been achieved in undermining traditional values among a portion of youth, the result has often been ethical and cultural disorientation rather than the expected embracing of socialism. Some change, such as the reported development among South Yemeni youths of a liking for modern Western music and bands, for example, is contrary to official desires.[45] More serious, official sources complain of increasing hooliganism, drinking, the use of *qat*, vandalism, declining school discipline, and idleness among the country's youth.[46]

ISHID (Democratic Yemeni Youth Union), the government organization tasked with overseeing youth affairs, seems ineffectual and is said to be largely isolated from its putative constituency.[47] A countrywide recruitment drive in 1983 reportedly increased membership from 37,561 to 52,717, but many were probably "paper" members joining to benefit from discounts on public transportation, cinema tickets, and sporting events that were offered as incentives to enroll.[48] The government,

[45]Ibid.

[46]See, e.g., ibid., Feb. 12 and Apr. 12, 1982, May 12, 1984.

[47]For an account of the decline in vitality and membership of ISHID in the Fourth Governorate, see ibid., Feb. 5, 1982 in what is termed a "model" ISHID unit, only 69 out of an eligible student body of 900 members (ibid., Nov. 28, 1983).

[48]Ibid., Feb. 6, 1984. Younger schoolchildren are organized into the Pioneers, but the latter number only 25,000 (ibid., Feb. 6, 1984).

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in fact, admits to the continued coolness toward ISHID by youth and speaks of the need to "reestablish trust."[49] Youths do not seem to have embraced the new system in general, and even in Aden, youth is said to be apathetic about cooperation with a government agency such as the Popular Defense Committees.[50]

Culture

The government sees the inherited South Yemeni culture as bound too closely to Islam and to traditional social structures and thereby tending to reinforce values inimical to the Marxist system on both intellectual and political planes. There have been sustained efforts aimed at "the destruction of inherited backward cultural structures which express the class ideology of preceding reactionary, imperialist, feudal, and bourgeois political forces."[51] According to official sources, culture is to be transformed into an "international proletarian" phenomenon, based on Marxist-Leninist principles. Thus, even when traditional art forms are encouraged, the content is often alien to the rich Islamic, Arab, and uniquely Yemeni flavor they once manifested.

The government's monopoly over the media, publishing, and distribution of all printed materials allows it to strictly censor and control almost everything produced locally. This control seems, however, to have stifled creativity, and the PDRY press frequently speaks of a "crisis" in culture.

Typical of the problem is the situation of the theater, a medium new to South Yemeni society. The government has placed considerable stress on the role of the theater in "creating a new life" through the presentation of "politically relevant" plays. Traveling theatrical troupes have been formed, and East European advisers have been brought in. Performances are free. However, censorship has caused the flight of talented authors, the requisite technical personnel are lacking, and financial resources

Ahmed Ali Saleh, a post-graduate of Moscow's Patrice Lumumba University, examines a work of Soviet poet Mayakovskiy in the Yemen-Soviet Friendship House in Aden.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

are limited. As a result the impact of this cultural medium has been less than satisfactory.[52]

Films, television programs, press articles, and performers from the Soviet bloc—having the desired ideological tone—are used when possible in the PDRY. However, cultural productions and products from the West, from other Arab countries (particularly Egypt), and from India are more popular than the more heavily political ones from the Soviet-bloc countries.[53]

The PDRY government feels especially uneasy about materials from the other Arab countries, since these carry messages contrary to the ones it wishes to impart—and do so in an acceptable and accessible format.[54] Moreover, the reception of radio and television broadcasts from neighboring North Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the other Gulf states, as well as the effects of the foreign media on the thousands of South Yemenis working abroad, also complicate the government's efforts to eradicate "bourgeois" cultural influences. The problem is compounded by the apparent lack of credibility of the local media among South Yemenis. One newspaper, for example, acknowledged that when international crises occur, South Yemenis turn to the BBC first.[55]

The unenviable choice is between allowing the flow of unwelcome cultural influences from outside to continue or isolating the PDRY from other Arab countries at the

[49]Ibid., Feb. 5, 1982. "Work camps," set up to mobilize youth, proved unpopular—particularly after accidents on public projects—and seem to have been sharply curtailed.

[50]Ibid., Apr. 12, 1982.

[51]*Al-Thawri*, May 22, 1982.

[52]*14 October*, Feb. 21 and June 4, 1982.

[53]Of the 70 films showing in Aden in January 1984, 44 percent were from the West, 31 percent from India, 19 percent from the Arab world, and 6 percent from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. According to a local account, the showing at the government-run Cinema Club in Aden of a Soviet film was accompanied by inattention, loud conversations, and animal catcalls on the part of the youths present (*14 October*, Apr. 12, 1982). Following that unsuccessful screening, the Cinema Club apparently found it necessary to run the glossy Western film "All That Jazz" in order to recapture its youth audience (ibid., June 23, 1982). Recently, however, there have been discussions concerning increased cooperation with the Soviet Union in the field of film (ibid., June 13, 1984).

[54]See *Al-Thawri*, May 22, 1982.

[55]*14 October*, Feb. 6, 1984.

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expense of lost economic aid and remittances. So far, the PDRY government has felt itself compelled to accept the first alternative, thus compromising its cultural policy. Indicative is the current easing in the application of the terms of the draconian State Security Law of 1975, which made it illegal for South Yemenis to talk to foreigners (particularly aimed at Arab foreigners).

The Socialist Ethic

Official efforts to inculcate a new "socialist" ethic have met with considerable indifference and resistance. The government ideal is depicted by Salih, a character in a short fictional vignette that appeared in the August 30, 1982, issue of Aden's daily *14 October.* Salih not only does his own work dutifully at the office but also performs the duties of his co-workers, who prefer to gossip; he criticizes the ticket seller on the bus for embezzling money, merchants for cheating, state-run cinema ticket-sellers for scalping, and his own wife for dumping refuse out the window. However, the other bus-riders, shoppers, moviegoers, co-workers, and even his wife all view him as a strange being, whose values are completely atypical of the society in which he lives. That 550 out of 700 workers at a public firm in Abyan were found to be absent on a workday suggests that the Salihs are the exception.[56] Those employed in the large state bureaucracy are portrayed in the mass media as equally delinquent, spending inordinate amounts of time drinking tea and gossiping.

These phenomena might be attributed to attitudes inherited from the past, were it not for the fact that South Yemenis working in neighboring countries are generally perceived to be hard workers. Perhaps their poor performance at home reflects the absence of effective material and moral incentives in the PDRY's public sector. The continued existence of the small-scale private sector in trade and services despite government limitations and scathing media campaigns attests to the persistence of a certain spirit of free enterprise in the country. The number of small entrepreneurs (or "black marketeers" as the media calls them) may, in fact, be growing.[57]

Those who have grown up since independence seem to have absorbed the new socialist ethic no better than their elders. For example, secondary-school students in Aden reportedly are eager to buy "sample exam" booklets reproduced by some enterprising individual so that they can succeed with less effort.[58]

In an effort to increase worker efficiency as well as to improve public health, the government has attacked the custom of chewing *qat.* However, despite legislation restricting its use to Thursday and Friday and a media campaign against it, the use of *qat* still seems to be a widespread problem in the PDRY according to the local media; e.g., workers are said to often take Saturday (a workday) off to chew *qat.*[59] In addition, alcohol abuse is beginning to affect South Yemen—public drunkenness is becoming a nuisance, particularly in Aden.[60]

This cartoon from the Aden newspaper 14 October *of June 4, 1982, is illustrative of the South Yemeni government's perspective on private vendors: the customer looks forward to a meal of broiled chicken; in the vendor's mind it is the customer who is to be devoured.*

Tools of Social Engineering

In pursuing its plans to transform society, the PDRY government has relied primarily on three tools: education, the YSP, and the state's administrative machinery (including the mass organizations).

[56] *Al-Thawri,* Mar. 13, 1983.

[57] See *14 October Usbu'i* (Aden), July 27, 1984. Many workers who return home from abroad apparently want to use their earnings to open a small shop or cafe or to buy a taxi, all of which runs counter to the state's long-term economic goals.

Besides clinging to entrepreneurial instincts, the South Yemenis have been resistant to a characteristic of many socialist societies—waiting patiently in queues—even though this behavior is presented by Aden media as "one of the cultural features in the lives of developed nations." See ibid., July 20, 1984.

[58] *14 October,* May 21, 1984.

[59] *14 October Usbu'i,* Aug. 12, 1982. Since *qat* must be consumed fresh, the problem is restricted mostly to the First Governorate, near the mountains where it is grown. The fact that the government collects a tax on *qat* may weaken official resolve to ban it completely, as this would cut revenue.

[60] *14 October,* Jan. 30, 1984.

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Table 2: Growth in Enrollment

	1970–71	1973	1981–82	1985 (proj.)
Primary school		183,742		382,555
Secondary school		6,933		32,777
University	103		3,641	

SOURCES *Al Thawri* (Aden), Oct. 15, 1983, and *Al-Masar* (Aden), February 1984.

The educational system. Since independence, there has been an impressive expansion of the country's educational system, at least in quantitative terms (see Table 2). The system has been modeled after those in Soviet-bloc countries, and heavy dosages of political indoctrination characterize the curriculum at all levels. A secondary-school curriculum organized on a "scientific socialist basis" was introduced gradually, beginning in 1975 and reportedly completed in the 1983/84 school year.[61] Even the kindergartens in Aden are said now to be run on the pattern of the "socialist countries," including "political lessons" for preparing instructors.[62] The boarding schools designed to make settled folk out of Bedouin youth are said to be especially politicized. However, according to an account in 1979, the majority of these students did not understand the "scientific socialism" being taught.[63]

Government planning notwithstanding, the PDRY does not seem to have had appreciably greater success than many other Arab countries in managing its educational problems. Mass illiteracy, for example, has proved resistant to change. In 1984, the government undertook yet another campaign to eliminate illiteracy, with total enrollment estimated at 218,000.[64] Similar campaigns since 1970 have not met their goals.[65] At the other end

[61]Ibid., Dec. 1, 1983.

[62]Ibid., June 4, 1982.

[63]*The New York Times*, May 27, 1979. Also, students of these schools often voice discontent with their treatment. One letter to the editor, for example, noted that a "serious reappraisal" is needed in the attitude of the administration of the Red Star Bedouin school (*14 October*, Dec. 7, 1984).

[64]*14 October*, July 8, 1984.

[65]Between 1974 and 1982, for example, only 68,505 individuals reportedly became literate through this program (*14 October*, June 28, 1984). In 1981/82, only 4,302 of those enrolled took the literacy exam, and just over half of those passed it (*14 October Usbu'i*, June 22, 1984).

Children at a Bedouin school during a rally in 1984.

—*14 October* (Aden), Nov. 14, 1984.

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of the educational scale, as is true of many other Arab countries, the PDRY is said to be approaching the saturation point of university-educated people in its economy. There have been calls to downplay the prestige of a Ph.D. in nontechnical fields and to right the balance in favor of technical training.[66]

The country's educational system suffers from limited financial resources. Even the favored Bedouin schools are now apparently suffering from the neglect and dilapidation common to most schools in the country.[67] The situation is compounded by the generally low level of the teachers' own education and motivation. Moreover, the government claims that most teachers are still "bourgeois" and have not yet become adequate instruments of social transformation.[68]

The results are predictable. Complaints surface frequently of students who, after five or six years of schooling in villages, still cannot read or write or do not even know the letters of the alphabet.[69] Absenteeism among both students and teachers is high in the provinces. This also extends to the adult anti-illiteracy campaign, whose students, moreover, are accused of being "not receptive."[70] Although advanced training in other socialist countries may facilitate indoctrination among an influential technocratic segment of South Yemenis, an apparent bias against degrees from the Soviet bloc as opposed to those from other countries may act to reduce the numbers willing to go.[71]

Military service can be a complementary instrument of education in support of social change, particularly when, as in the PDRY, there is a draft system. However, though indoctrination does occur in the PDRY army, it does not appear to be very effective or well-received. Even distribution of *Al-Raya,* the official newspaper of the armed forces, seems haphazard.[72]

The party. The YSP is the only legal forum for political activity in South Yemen. However, its projected role in initiating and controlling social change has been hindered by several weaknesses. First, the party is rather small—its claimed membership only 24,000 to 28,000 out of a population base of 2 million.[73] The share of women in the YSP membership, in particular, has remained very limited and shows no sign of changing, even in Aden.[74] Moreover, not all "members" are necessarily committed cadres; there are indications that some of the claimed membership exists only on paper, or is inactive.[75]

Keeping party members informed of the official line is itself a difficult task in the context of the PDRY's underdevelopment. The party newspaper *Al-Thawri (The Revolutionary)* and other government publications often

This cartoon from the South Yemeni military newspaper Al-Raya *of December 18, 1983, illustrates troubles encountered in getting soldiers to read it. The soldier at right is attempting to put a copy of the paper in the unit's mail carton, saying "Hey fellow! You still haven't picked up your* Al-Raya*." The other soldier replies: "Never mind! I'll pick it up another time."*

[66] *14 October,* June 4, 1982.

[67] Ibid., Jan. 30, 1984.

[68] *Al-Thawri,* May 22, 1982.

[69] Letters of complaint in ibid., Mar. 6 and Apr. 17, 1982.

[70] *14 October,* Oct. 22, 1980. Student resistance to the regime is also illustrated by the fact that even at the prestigious Aden Technical College only 45 percent of the students were members of ISHID (*Al-Thawri,* May 29, 1982).

[71] A letter to the editor, for example, notes that degrees from socialist countries are treated even in government ministries as being worth less than those obtained in the West (*Al-Thawri,* Aug. 14, 1982).

[72] One soldier also complained that "wall-magazines," a principal means of propaganda in the PDRY military, deal only with "politics" and "matters related to foreign politics." This, he claimed, was "totally irrelevant to anything going on in the unit." In order to "influence the life of the individual," he suggested, they should deal with "everyday matters" (*Al-Raya* [Aden], Mar. 27, 1983).

[73] Gus'kov, loc. cit., gives 24,000; *Pravda* (Moscow), Nov. 13, 1983, gives 28,000.

[74] While YSP membership in Aden grew by 60 percent from 1978 to 1983 overall, the number of women members increased by only 8 percent (*Al-Thawri,* Nov. 26, 1983).

[75] According to Ahmad Haydar Sa'id, a member of the YSP Central Committee of the Third Governorate, the party's leadership there has been deficient in proposing and holding meetings, leading to a general "collapse of party discipline." For example, the basic party cell of the Abyan Delta project, a high-visibility government agricultural project, failed to hold a single meeting for more than a year (*Al-Thawri,* Apr. 2, 1983).

Speaking on the YSP recently, the country's President noted that "there are still some members who hold some views which hearken back to the past. They require further attention and education from the party" (*14 October,* June 21, 1984).

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Ali Nasir Muhammad in 1979 tries out a new telephone network for the town of Ja'ar in the Third Governorate, 80 kilometers from Aden.

—ADN-ZB from EASTFOTO.

do not reach some of the provinces.[76] Even in Aden itself, the state-controlled press is often not available due to poor distribution facilities.[77]

The administrative framework. The organs of the state, including traditional means of coercion such as the police and the judicial system, are also intended to play a major role in reshaping society. However, they are far from being adequate for the task.

For example, the low level of available technology, the forbidding terrain and considerable distances involved, and a lack of trained cadres have often made police enforcement a slow and haphazard process in the countryside. In some areas of the Hadramawt, for example, the police are said to learn of crimes committed in the villages only long after they occur, and officials acknowledge that they are poorly equipped to deal with lawbreakers.[78] Even in Aden itself, moreover, there are indications that law enforcement is not sufficiently organized to deal effectively with socially related law-and-order problems.[79]

A new "Civil Police," whose precise mission remains unclear to this author, was established in 1983; so far it apparently exists only in the capital city.[80] The Popular Defense Committees, designed to provide neighborhood security and to supervise local social activities, likewise often do not function.[81] Even the distribution of mandatory identity cards, a basic tool of administration, had not been undertaken in at least one governorate, the Fourth, more than four years after the 1977 decree instituting the system.[82]

The judicial system also often functions erratically. The courts in the Third Governorate, for example, are so understaffed that they shut down when the judge has other business.[83] "A large number" of criminal cases in some areas reach court only after three or more years of waiting, by which time the records may have been lost.[84] Still other areas do not yet have secular courts at all.[85]

The regular administrative apparatus is also rudimentary, particularly in the countryside. To register a wedding with the authorities in the Third Governorate, for example, requires a trip of several days by foot from the scattered villages to a single government representative in the area.[86] Disputes between individuals, such as those over land, are solved outside the framework of the official Peasant Union, without the government being able to react.[87]

[76] *Al-Thawri* does not reach the Sixth Governorate (*14 October,* Mar. 12, 1982). *Sawt Al-Ummal* is not available in the Fifth Governorate (*Al-Thawri,* Feb. 20, 1982). In some parts of the Second Governorate, no newspapers, magazines, or books are available at all (*14 October,* Mar. 10, 1984). This is also true of Shibam, one of the larger towns of the Hadramawt, or Fifth Governorate (*Al-Thawri,* Dec. 17, 1983). Also radio and TV broadcasting outside Aden is still spotty, though this is likely to improve with time.

[77] In Aden, many of the state-run press distribution points have shut down (*Al-Thawri,* Feb. 20 and May 29, 1982).

[78] *Al-Haris,* September-October 1981.

[79] Muntazah Park, the principal recreational area in Aden, for example, is said to be the scene of gang fights among youths due to the absence of any police (*14 October,* Apr. 4, 1983). Drinking and fighting among youth are also said to occur openly in Aden cinemas (*Al-Thawri,* Apr. 17, 1982). In Crater, one of the sections of Aden, the police have only one car, and when fights break out they reportedly respond by saying they are "too busy" to intervene (*Al-Thawri,* May 8, 1982).

[80] Although the commander of the Civil Police claims that units exist throughout the country "under various forms," the editor of *Al-Thawri* concludes that in some cases "it simply doesn't exist" (*Al-Thawri,* July 28, 1984).

[81] For example, in one locality in the Second Governorate the committee's offices are usually closed, and its activity is haphazard (*14 October,* Dec. 30, 1983). This is even true of some local units in Crater (*14 October Usbu'i,* Mar. 2, 1984). Claimed membership for the Popular Defense Committees as of the end of 1983 is 173,000 (*Al-Masar* [Aden], November 1983).

[82] *14 October,* July 5, 1982. Likewise, in the Fifth Governorate, the distribution of ID cards is still "continuing." In some districts of the latter governorate, none have been issued because "there is no administrative machinery there" (ibid., Jan. 10, 1984). Reportedly, an ID is required for travel between governorates, and, in general, "it helps to enhance security functions and facilitates the duties of the police" (ibid., June 14, 1984).

[83] *Al-Haris,* January 1982.

[84] *14 October,* Mar. 28, 1983, discussing the Second Governorate.

[85] *Al-Haris,* September-October, 1981. In some areas, such as the town of Al-Dali', the local populace avoids bringing disputes to the government courts at all (*Al-Thawri,* Aug. 4, 1984).

[86] *14 October,* June 18, 1982.

[87] *Al-Thawri,* Apr. 2, 1983. Indeed, it appears that lately the government officials designated to provide "guidance" and to "raise consciousness" are not going to the countryside, and that the "education" programs there are not being implemented (ibid., Feb. 13, 1982). Likewise, Peasant Union officials in Abyan are not active and do not even go into the countryside (*14 October Usbu'i,* June 29, 1984). Even claimed membership for the Peasant Union was only 22,000 as of the end of 1983 (*Al-Masar,* November 1983).

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Students photographed in March 1983 at the Yemeni Socialist Party Central Committee's Higher School of Scientific Socialism.

—TASS from SOVFOTO

Under the circumstances, even in the total absence of any popular resistance to change, the government's policies on social change would encounter major problems in being implemented. Thanks to an impressive military apparatus, the government has proved adequate to the task of dealing effectively with overt political challenges. But, lacking adequate alternative structures to carry out needed social functions, such as adjudication, administration, or the enforcement of ordinary law and order, the government will find it particularly difficult to succeed in the more complex task of reshaping the society.

Soviet Assistance

Given the general underdevelopment of the PDRY, Aden has had to rely extensively on outside guidance and participation in social development. Given the regime's socialist orientation, it has turned particularly to the Soviet bloc for help in this area. There is a substantial Soviet presence in many aspects of the local government machinery as a result—quite apart from an extensive position in the military. Soviet and East European experts serve in positions from which they can monitor the local regime, exert their influence, and establish contacts and clients at all levels of society.

The Soviet-bloc influence is particularly evident in training programs for South Yemenis. At present, there are more than 1,200 South Yemeni students in the Soviet Union.[88] In June 1984 an agreement was signed between Havana University and Aden University, enabling graduates of the latter to go to Cuba for graduate studies. In addition, there are many Soviet and East European instructors in the PDRY. For example, about 40 percent of the teaching staff at Aden's Law School are from Soviet-bloc countries, and an East German adviser oversees the country's kindergarten program.[89] YSP members study in party schools in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, while Moscow has set up the

[88] *14 October Usbu'i*, Dec. 7, 1984.
[89] *14 October*, Nov. 10, 1983, and June 4, 1982.

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Higher School of Scientific Socialism in Aden, with branches in other cities, for which the USSR and East Germany provide instructors. According to President Ali Nasir, over 20,000 individuals have attended courses.[90]

The Soviets and East Germans have also trained many of the PDRY's journalists, and a new press cooperation protocol between Moscow and Aden was signed in October 1983.[91] The Soviets are now building an earth station in the PDRY to link that country to the Soviet Intersputnik satellite communications net. This will bring in radio and television programs from the Eastern bloc, and will also facilitate direct communications between Moscow and Aden.[92]

Cubans advise the Popular Defense Committees, which deal with everyday social matters as well as with security. East Germans provide personnel to work with ISHID; and a multi-team Soviet research mission is conducting fieldwork on the PDRY's cultural development programs.[93]

Conclusion

One may draw several conclusions regarding the course of social change in the PDRY. There is, first of all, a major gap between official theory and pronouncements, on the one hand, and the actual situation, on the other. Change has been less extensive than is usually claimed or assumed, and may often be more a matter of form than of substance.

Social transformation has not been noticeably more rapid in the PDRY than elsewhere the Arab world.[94] In some respects—e.g., veiling of women, tribal loyalty—South Yemen's society is, if anything, still more "traditional" than that in some of the other Arab states.[95] The principal exception is, of course, Aden.

This is not to say that there has been no change in South Yemeni society since 1967, even if the impetus has not always come from the government (e.g., witness the growing involvement of women in black market operations). Although societal change has been less than projected, or claimed, the Marxist-Leninist YSP regime remains committed to changing society radically and has shown a willingness to challenge traditional power bases. Severe material constraints and tactical considerations in response to general inertia explain the regime's gradual and incomplete application of its plans for society. The long-term agenda for reshaping society, however, remains—supported by ideological models *and* the interests of power politics. The continuing emphasis on developing a loyal party cadre, in particular, points to a long-term commitment to the creation of a regime infrastructure that will one day be able to impose its will on society. The success or failure of the YSP's growth will be a major factor in determining the regime's ability to coerce and convince. The regime already long ago succeeded in excluding other organized forces from the political process.

The pace and extent of the projected destruction of traditional social institutions and values give signs of becoming a point of contention, however, both between Moscow and Aden and within the PDRY government. The Soviet Union appears to favor a more radical policy even at the possible cost of engendering popular domestic opposition in the PDRY.[96] The Soviets seem to find irritating President Ali Nasir's more pragmatic, sometimes indirect, approach.[97]

Soviet doubts may be compounded by Ali Nasir's attempts, albeit tentative, to establish better ties with his Arab neighbors and the West.[98] Ali Ba Dhib (the doctrinaire pro-Moscow secretary of the Central Committee of

[90]Interview in *Al-Nahj* magazine, found as a supplement to *Al-Thawri,* May 5, 1984, p. 61.

[91]The PDRY's Media Institute (founded in 1980) adopted in its entirety a curriculum put together by Moscow University. The Institute is still affiliated to the latter and to two institutes in Eastern Europe, and there are Soviet and East European instructors on the faculty. Since its establishment, nearly 400 South Yemeni media workers have graduated (*Al-Raya,* Apr. 29, 1984).

[92]*14 October,* Aug. 2, 1984.

[93]One part of the mission's activities consists of compiling a tribal and ethnographic map of the Hadramawt and of Socotra Island through fieldwork in the countryside (ibid., Apr. 9, 1984). This can provide the researchers with first-hand knowledge of who's who in the tribal system and how it functions, as well as facilitate the establishment of contacts. Given the continuing importance of tribal politics in the PDRY, this knowledge could be of considerable importance to those who possess it.

[94]The results achieved are even more disproportionate to the effort if one takes into consideration the human suffering and loss of life that have accompanied the PDRY government's application of its plans for social change. During the first few years after independence alone, about one-fourth of the country's total population fled abroad. See Robert W. Stookey, *South Yemen, a Marxist Republic in Arabia,* Boulder, CO, and London, Westview, 1982, p.67.

[95]This is also true of some social ills, such as child labor, which is reportedly still common, for example, in Aden's markets (*14 October Usbu'i,* July 20, 1984).

[96]E.g., *Pravda* of Nov. 30, 1983, assessing the potential for social change in the PDRY's Fifth Governorate, noted that "it will not be easy to reach the projected goals.... Social and cultural progress will entail a *painful break* with outmoded customs, traditions, and religious beliefs" (emphasis added). An article in *Al-Thawri* of July 28, 1984, on the other hand, stresses gradual change, noting that "any haste or arbitrary action which accompanies this process of change will only have a contrary effect."

[97]A Soviet journalist visiting Aden noted, for example, that "hawkers ply their simple wares right on the sidewalk" (*Izvestiya* [Moscow], Nov. 19, 1983), hinting that the local government was lax in its enforcement of its ideological duties to shrink the private sector. Evaluating the PDRY government's policy of allowing returning workers to open a small business, a Soviet expert on the country expressed his skepticism that this was a positive process: "Naturally this [i.e., its utility] will depend on the effectiveness of state control, the state sector's strength, the strength of party influence on the state apparatus, and, ultimately, on whether the party implements its leading role in society" (see V. V. Naumkin, "Democratic Yemen on the Path of Socialist Orientation," in *Noveyshaya Istoriya Iemena, 1917–1982 gg.,* [The Recent History of Yemen, 1917–1982], Moscow, Nauka, 1984, p. 212). Admonitions to the effect that the YSP needs to pay greater attention to "the consolidation [of its] ideological, political, and organizational unity" (*Pravda,* Nov. 14, 1983) can also be interpreted as signs of Moscow's discontent with Ali Nasir's policies.

[98]A major article in *Pravda* of Apr. 2, 1984, reminded readers of Saudi Arabia's allegedly continuing role in training PDRY exiles opposed to the Aden regime, indicating that a major rapprochement with Riyadh would not be correct for Aden.

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the YSP), for example, lashed out at "many" who think that the PDRY should have equally good relations with all states,[99] an attack that could be read as a swipe at Ali Nasir and other would-be moderates in Aden. Quoting Ba Dhib, *Pravda* shortly thereafter subtly reminded anyone who might have forgotten that the USSR plays an important role in the PDRY's development.[100]

Indications are that during a YSP Central Committee plenum in mid-1984, Ali Nasir was accused of "being impotent from an ideological point of view to lead the political ideology of the party." There were calls from some members that former President Abd al-Fattah Isma'il, a hard-liner, be allowed to return from Moscow, where he had been living in exile since Nasir ousted him in 1980, and a number of anti-Nasir, Isma'il supporters were also brought into the Politburo.[101] Interviewed shortly thereafter about rumors of splits within the YSP leadership, Ali Nasir acknowledged that "it is natural if there are contradictions or conflicts," but he assured the interviewer that "the minority" would submit to "the majority."[102] Such expressions of confidence notwithstanding, Nasir was forced to accept the return of Isma'il in March 1985,[103] although the duties and degree of influence of the returned party figure remain unclear as of this writing. It is increasingly evident that Ali Nasir will find it hard not to accept more input from Moscow on the PDRY's future course, even if Isma'il is not given a major role to play.

The reemerging influence of the more hard-line faction has been reflected in a marked increase in ideological material in the media in 1984, as well as in a renewed emphasis on developing the mass organizations, and especially the YSP. Isma'il and his faction were known for their desire for a more rapid building of a socialist system, with a focus on a hard line vis-à-vis private property and religion. Given his North Yemeni origins, he also promoted de-tribalization as a means of undercutting his southern rivals' power bases. Tougher enforcement and security measures accompanied his greater radicalism. Such differences over social policy could contribute to further political infighting between "radicals" and "moderates" within the YSP.



Abd al-Fattah Isma'il speaking at the 60th-anniversary observance of the Great October Socialist Revolution in Moscow's Kremlin in November 1977.

—TASS from SOVFOTO

The fact that foreign participation is so extensive, however, may add more fuel to popular opposition to government measures for social change. South Yemeni émigré organizations have seized on this factor in their propaganda efforts, portraying Aden's programs as Soviet-inspired. South Yemenis already have an ingrained mistrust of foreigners, exacerbated by a history of attempted control by outside powers. If ordinary South Yemenis do identify contemporary changes with a foreign source, this would likely encourage them to resist such changes (whether actively or passively) even more strenuously than would otherwise be the case.

The widely shared experience of employment abroad among non-Yemenis—opposed until recently by the PDRY government—may reduce the cultural and politi-

[99] *Al-Thawri*, Jan. 27, 1984.

[100] *Pravda*, Apr. 2, 1984.

[101] *Al-Siyasah*, June 28, 1984, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: The Middle East and North Africa* (Washington, DC), July 2, 1984, p. C/6.

The Soviets clearly favored Isma'il's return to the PDRY, having allowed him to play an increasingly visible role in Moscow, where in early 1984 he was permitted to meet with visiting Arab politicians (see *Al-Alam* [London], July 14, 1984).

[102] According to Ali Nasir, "the question of the development of the new forms of property, that is the public and the cooperative sectors, played a big role in the debates of the Central Committee" (*14 October*, June 21, 1984).

[103] Ibid., Mar. 5, 1985.

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cal fragmentation that has characterized South Yemeni society for so long and lead to a sense of an overriding South Yemeni identity. Yet, there is the possibility that this new unity could foster increasingly vocal conservative opposition to the government's social policies for the first time on a countrywide rather than localized basis. The thousands of South Yemenis working in the Gulf states may be affected by ideas of an Islamic polity emanating from Iran, or be bitten by the capitalist bug. The impact of such trends might be magnified if large numbers of workers should return to the PDRY due to an economic slowdown in the Gulf countries. The gap between their beliefs and ideals and those of the government would likely become particularly wide since those returning workers probably could not be easily reabsorbed into the PDRY's economy. Perhaps, too, the sojourn of so many men abroad will lead to South Yemeni women's entry into the domestic labor force in greater numbers, though not necessarily in activities that the government would favor.

It seems safe to expect that, for the foreseeable future, the PDRY government will continue to face a dilemma. It can, on the one hand, try to impose its own ideological blueprint on society, even though lacking the wherewithal to offer sufficient material incentives and having inadequate administrative machinery. Yet such an effort clashes with deeply held ethical values and economic interests of much of the population. The very fact of the government's increasing role and control over the individual runs counter to South Yemeni traditions of local and individual autonomy, and the discontent likely to be generated could, eventually, spill over into the political realm. Or, on the other hand, as has happened in some areas, e.g., women's affairs and private business, the government can relax the implementation of its social policies in order to mitigate opposition. However, it thereby risks seeing society develop according to patterns that could prove inimical to the ideological goals and continued stability of the regime.

In particular, for Ali Nasir the dilemma will be whether to adopt, under pressure from Moscow and hard-liners within the YSP, a more radical domestic policy and thus risk greater popular discontent or to carry on as at present in the awareness that his hard-line rivals and their Soviet backers may move to limit further his power or perhaps even replace him.[104]

Peasants from the village of Shu'aib in the South Yemen's Second Governorate pay a visit home after a spell of working abroad.

—Maxine Molyneux/Camera Press.

[104]Such a further shift in favor of the radicals could occur at the YSP Congress scheduled for October 1985. This could put in doubt the continuation of Ali Nasir's more moderate approach to social change as well as alienate the PDRY's neighbors, thus upsetting Ali Nasir's policy of détente, which is designed to garner aid from the wealthy Gulf states.

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Notes

Conspiring to Kill the Pope

Paul B. Henze

EVIDENCE continues to mount confirming the involvement of Bulgaria in the plot to assassinate Pope John Paul II. Extensive investigations in Turkey and Italy have resulted in indictments and trials in both countries. From the information released so far, it is reasonable to expect that these cases will prove Bulgarian complicity in the acts of Mehmet Ali Ağca and his accomplice Oral Çelik. However, in light of the vigorous campaign of disinformation being perpetrated by the Bulgarians and their Soviet backers, and the tendency of some less biased observers to doubt the mounting documentation, it is useful to summarize at this time the most significant of the new findings.[1]

The notion that Ağca could have been a lone Muslim fanatic is now untenable. A conspiratorial network consisting of more than a dozen players has been exposed. The long and close ties of Turkish Mafia "Godfather" Abuzer Uğurlu to Bulgaria and his direct sponsorship of Ağca have now been confirmed. The same is true of Bekir Çelenk, who still enjoys asylum in Sofia despite repeated Turkish and Italian requests for his extradition.[2] Moreover, a check through the documentation gives a basis for some reasoned conjecture about the possible sequence of events and actions that led to Ağca's selection for the operation against the Pope.

"Progressive" Activist in Bulgarian Pay

The time-consuming and thorough reinvestigation of Ağca's confessed role in the February 1, 1979, murder of *Milliyet* editor Abdi Ipekçi that was launched by the Turkish government in early 1983, clearly reveals Ağca to have been a "progressive" activist in Bulgarian pay. The investigation probed in detail into the operations of the notorious Uğurlu, in the process exposing a broad panorama of trafficking in drugs and arms through Bulgaria.[3] It also revealed widespread corruption in the Turkish police, security, and customs services, and the involvement of both Bulgaria and Syria in many aspects of terrorism. Col. Hanefi Öncül, the military judge in charge of the reinvestigation, completed a 53-page report on January 16, 1984. As a result, Uğurlu and 23 other defendants were charged with having organized Ipekçi's murder; they were placed on trial in Ankara on March 24, 1984. Only half of the defendants are in Turkish custody; the rest, including Ağca and his closest associates, Çelik and Yalçin Özbey, are elsewhere. As of early April 1985, the trial was still in progress, with Uğurlu also a defendant in two related trials.

[1]These comments are extracted from a postscript chapter for the paperback edition of my book, *The Plot to Kill the Pope*, published in 1983 by Charles Scribners Sons, Inc., New York, and by Croom Helm, Ltd., London and Canberra. The present text is copyrighted © 1985 by the author.

[2]Evidence of Çelenk's complicity continues to accumulate and has been voluminously reported in the Turkish press. See, e.g., *Hürriyet* (Istanbul), Apr. 1, Sept. 1, and Nov. 6 and 11, 1984.

[3]US journalists and congressmen have focused increasing attention on these matters. See, e.g., Nathan Adams, "Drugs for Guns," *Reader's Digest* (Pleasantville, NY), January 1984; "Bulgarian Connection to Illicit Arms Trade is Found," *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), Aug. 10, 1984; "Drugs—the Secret Arm of the East," *Panorama* (Rome), Aug. 13, 1984; "Drugs and Terrorism, 1984," Hearings before the Subcommittee on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse of the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, US Senate, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1984; and "Bulgarian-Turkish Narcotics Connection: United States—Bulgarian Relations and International Drug Trafficking," Hearings and Markup before the Commitee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, US House of Representatives, June 7, July 24, Sept. 26, 1984, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1984.

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The Turkish investigation has helped to clarify the role in Ağca's early activities of Çelik, a school friend from Malatya,[4] who—from Italian judge Illario Martella's investigation and Ağca's own testimony—has been identified as the mysterious "second man" in the shooting of the Pope in St. Peter's Square. The shadowy Çelik, once dramatized by a few Turkish journalists assisting in Soviet disinformation efforts as proof of Ağca's rightist orientation,[5] turns out to have been as closely tied to Uğurlu and the Bulgarians as Ağca himself. Neither was a religious fanatic or a rightist militant. However, they also do not appear to have been working solely for money or adventure. Rather, the evidence indicates that they were working for the program implemented by Bulgaria and Syria to destabilize Turkey and that they had adopted what they termed anti-capitalist, anti-NATO, anti-Western views.

The most dramatic testimony supporting this conclusion comes from the report compiled by two Turkish judges who interrogated Ağca in Italy in the summer of 1983. This 88-page document reveals that:

- Ağca went to Syria with Teslim Töre, leader of the pro-Moscow communist Turkish People's Liberation Army, in the summer of 1978 for comprehensive training. During this training, Töre and Ağca met Bulgarian agents in Damascus and received money from them to take back to Turkey to support the subversive activities of two extreme-left labor groups.
- Working under the direct tutelage of Abuzer Uğurlu in Istanbul, Ağca, Töre, Çelik, and others established an organization with the aim of undermining "capitalism" and severing Turkey's NATO ties.
- Both as cover and to draw rightists into supporting anti-Western goals, Ağca developed a wide range of associations with members of Col. Alparslan Türkeş's Gray Wolves, but he never joined the National Action Party or became a Gray Wolf himself. He was not involved with Islamic fundamentalism.
- Uğurlu was in continual contact with Bulgarian agents working out of the Bulgarian consulate in Istanbul. He supplied arms not only to all sides in Turkey, but also—via Turkey—to both the Right and the Left in Iran.[6]

Ağca's own words, cited at length in this report, give a highly revealing picture of his activities and outlook at the time—he was then in his 21st year and nominally an economics student at Istanbul University:

In Syria . . . we were trained by Bulgarian specialists. This training involved the use of weapons, explosives, cold war concepts, how to carry out coups d'état, and related revolutionary theory.

I met Bekir Çelenk in Abuzer's office [in Istanbul]. . . . I took part in meetings of the Gray Wolves, but I always went alone. I also followed the activity of the Maoist-leaning Turkish Peasants' and Workers' Party [Turkish initials: TIKP]. In the fall of 1978, I had contacts with a member of the Dutch Communist Party . . . to work out a relationship between this party and the TIKP. Basically, both parties were Maoist. Their activities were having the effect of dividing leftist forces. I was charged with finding out whether there were common points between these two organizations. Teslim Töre had given me this task, and he himself was acting on behalf of the Bulgarians. All these things were part of our strategy.

In saying "we," I mean Oral Çelik and Teslim Töre besides myself. This strategy was directed toward first separating Turkey from the Western powers and drawing it into the nonaligned group and then had the aim of getting it to join the Warsaw Pact. The reason for our activity was ideological. But I can also say that there was the adventure factor in addition. In that period I saw myself as a progressive . . . from a political point of view we had relations with hundreds of members of both the Right and the Left as well as the Mafia . . . [who] were to play a secondary role to our own. . . . Our goal was to fight against the Western democracies and destroy them. . . . Bulgaria was seen as the country that could help us achieve our aim. . . . Teslim Töre and Abuzer Uğurlu . . . were in partnership for different reasons: [Töre] was working for purely revolutionary reasons; [Uğurlu] to make money off the weapons traffic.

. . . even from that time I was very well-known to the Bulgarian secret services. As a matter of fact, with Abuzer Uğurlu acting as intermediary, I and other members of my organization (Oral Çelik, Teslim Töre, Yalçin Özbey) did reports for the Bulgarian authorities relating to how the Turkish state would develop in the future. . . .

Ipekçi Killing—a "Rehearsal"?

As noted, the primary objective of the Turkish reinvestigations was to clarify circumstances surround-

[4]This and other key information in the Turkish prosecutor's report are summarized in *The Wall Street Journal*, July 17, 1984.

[5]E.g., Uğur Muncu, *Ağca Dosyasi*, Istanbul, Tekin Yayinevi, 1983. See Henze, *The Plot to Kill the Pope*, pp. 146–48.

[6]This report has not yet been officially released. A great deal of information from it has appeared in the Turkish press during the past year-and-a-half. Extensive textual excerpts from it were published in *Hürriyet*, Feb. 1, 1985, and analyzed in *Yeni Forum* (Ankara), Feb. 15, 1985. I published a long summary of this material in *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), Mar. 6, 1985.

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ing the assassination of Ipekçi. But some of the information which surfaced has implications for the plot against the Pope. In this respect, it is important to keep in mind two key findings:

- No religious motivation of any kind has come to light in the assassination of Ipekçi. Muslim fundamentalism played no role. Ağca was cultivating ties in many directions, but none with Muslim fundamentalists or with Necmettin Erbakan's demagogic National Salvation Party.
- No direct links between Ağca and any key leader of the National Action Party have been uncovered in the trial of Türkeş and other leaders of that party, which began in the spring of 1981 and is yet to be concluded. The alleged (undated) letter from Ağca to Türkeş expressing loyalty to him is thus further discredited.[7]

In lengthy conversations with Turkish interrogators about the background of the Ipekçi murder, Ağca insisted that he had no personal or even ideological motive for participating in it; it was simply part of the work he and his friends were doing for Uğurlu.

The one who selected us was Abuzer Uğurlu.... Abuzer, in order to protect himself better in his smuggling activities did not want to pick someone from the flock of people he worked with [directly].... In case one of us were arrested, it would be thought of as a political crime of the kind which students were engaging in.

To Ağca's knowledge, the killing was not planned long in advance, yet Uğurlu considered it urgent:

In a meeting in his office in January 1979, Abuzer reminded us that we were committed to carry out the Ipekçi assassination project by the first of February or within the first week of February and urged us to speed up the job.

Ağca's characteristic self-importance led him to describe himself as a major figure in planning the Ipekçi operation—making decisions about the place and time of the attack and reconnoitering the site in the days preceding it.[8] Yet, he now insists that he did not do the shooting, claiming that he had confessed in 1979 to protect his accomplices.

Are we to believe him? Ağca has an obvious motive in retracting his July 1979 Istanbul confession and seeking review in Turkey of his April 28, 1980, death sentence (in absentia). If that sentence can be commuted to a lesser one, he can be released in Italy for extradition to Turkey. And if he could clear himself of responsibility for actually committing the Ipekçi murder and avoid other murder charges, he could hope eventually—with reduction of sentences in both Italy and Turkey for good behavior and collaboration with the authorities—to salvage some of his life in his own country. Recent reports from Italy confirm that this is his current thinking.[9]

The issue is of more than incidental interest, relating as it does to the much larger question of whether the Ipekçi assassination might not have been a dress rehearsal for an attack on the Pope already being planned. Suggestive coincidences emerge if we compare probable stages in the evolution of the latter scheme with developments directly affecting Ağca.

When Ağca and his friends were in the final phase of planning the Ipekçi murder, the Pope was in Mexico taking a strong stand against liberation theology, a position sure to irritate Moscow (which pointedly failed to report the visit of John Paul II to Mexico). The success of the Ipekçi caper in contributing to destabilization in Turkey without the slightest hint of involvement by Uğurlu or his Bulgarian connection must have pleased the old men in the Kremlin. The transfer to Sofia of Moscow's highly effective Ambassador to Cuba, Nikita Tolubeyev, must have been decided at about this time (Tolubeyev arrived sometime in the summer of 1979 and was recalled to Moscow in the summer of 1983, at a time when public recognition of the Bulgarian connection in the plot was growing).[10]

If there was a plan for action against John Paul II taking shape in Moscow in the spring of 1979, the Pope's visit to Poland in the second week of June could have caused it to crystallize. What I had not previously considered was the possibility that Ağca might already have been chosen as prospective assassin by this time. It has always seemed peculiar that following Ipekçi's murder Ağca had remained in Istanbul, rather than going to a remote part of the country, or abroad. If he did not actually pull the trigger in the Ipekçi assassination, there was perhaps less reason for him to flee. But might not Uğurlu and the Bulgarians have been keeping him in a holding pattern for an as yet unidentified future operation?

The circumstances of Ağca's exposure and capture on June 25, 1979, have still not been explained; e.g., the large monetary reward offered by the Turkish jour-

[7]See *The Plot to Kill the Pope*, p. 188.

[8]Ağca may have been pretending to have more knowledge than he had of the background of the Ipekçi killing. One must allow for the possibility that (1) the killing was planned, at least tentatively, well before the plan was disclosed by Uğurlu to Ağca and his friends, and (2) that the real political motivation was never fully explained to them.

[9]See, e.g., a headline story in *Hürriyet*, Nov. 14, 1984.

[10]On Tolubeyev, see *The Plot to Kill the Pope*, pp. 102–03.

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nalists' association was never claimed. Ağca was apprehended in a well-known Gray Wolf gathering place on the basis of an anonymous telephone call. He confessed almost immediately upon being taken into custody. Everything was set up to make him look like a rightist and a loner. Was he acting out a prearranged role? Is it accidental that he surfaced within two weeks of the Pope's visit to Poland?

From the available interrogation reports, Ağca makes clear that he had been assured he would be rescued and was confident enough of rescue to confess to a crime that he may not even have committed, a crime that carried a mandatory death penalty. Other rewards must have been promised, since love of adventure or leftist ideology hardly seems sufficient to justify his having taken so great a personal risk.[11]

Ağca's confidence lasted until his trial got under way in October 1979, at which point he signaled to his sponsors that he might talk if not rescued. His escape from prison on the night of November 23, 1979, came just days before a visit of the Pope to Turkey. What we now know of Ağca's close association with the Bulgarians increases the likelihood that the letter he then wrote to *Milliyet* threatening John Paul II was composed under Bulgarian guidance, either direct or based on instructions passed to him through Uğurlu. If so, it would have been the first open move toward implementing a plan that had been in the making for nearly a year.

The next essential step would have been to strengthen the image of Ağca as a fanatic Muslim. This may explain his otherwise inexplicable trip to Iran. Curiously, according to Ağca's testimony, he finally crossed into Iran via Iğdir, near the border of Soviet Armenia, and spent several months in the small town of Mākū, in a Kurdish area of Iranian Azerbaijan before returning to Turkey, again at Iğdir.[12] While in Iran, he could have been contacted by Soviet agents. As it is, Ağca admitted to Judge Martella that during this period he was in touch with members of the Tudeh (Iranian communist) party.[13] This is an odd association for a reputedly rightist, fanatical Muslim Turk.

After he returned from Iran, Ağca remained in Turkey for two months. Uğurlu looked out for him, provided him money and an Indian passport in the name of Yoginder Singh, and presumably arranged for Ağca to go to Bulgaria in the company, it seems, of Çelik. Ağca crossed from Turkey to Bulgaria at the Kapikule border post at the beginning of July 1980 with the help of customs guards on both sides. (It is perhaps significant that at this time, the Solidarity movement in Poland had burgeoned to the point where the shaky Warsaw government would soon have to recognize it officially, and the Polish Pope was causing the Kremlin leaders ever greater pain.) In Bulgaria, Ağca was introduced by Çelenk to a Bulgarian security officer called "Sotir Kolev," who discussed action against the Pope. Kolev was actually Todor Ayvazov, "cashier" of the Bulgarian embassy in Rome.[14] The cards were now on the table, and Ağca was doubtless flattered at being selected as a key actor in a historic drama. The Bulgarians trusted him, and he would profit handsomely. Henceforth his Turkish Mafia and Gray Wolf associates would play supporting roles, while he and Çelik—the star players—would depend directly on the Bulgarians for guidance.

The Martella Investigation

Long awaited and frequently delayed, Judge Martella's 1,243-page report was finally delivered on October 26, 1984. It summarized and analyzed more than 25,000 pages of testimony. The longest chapter—running 123 pages—was devoted to the Bulgarian connection, which it establishes beyond all reasonable doubt and in great detail.[15] The Martella Report has not yet been released in its entirety, nor is the voluminous documentation upon which it is based yet open to the public. This will take place only after the completion of the trials that resulted from indictments based on the report. However, many of the details of the Martella investigation were already revealed in June 1984 in a 78-page summary by Italian State Prosecutor Antonio Albano.[16]

Martella's investigation drew on all relevant records of the Italian police and security services; reports of investigations in Turkey, Switzerland, Austria, West Germany, and other countries; ballistics tests and other technical

[11]Megalomania may have been a factor, as suggested by Ağca's extraordinary appearance on Istanbul television in July 1979, but mental unbalance clearly was not. Since writing my book, I have interviewed both Turkish and Italian psychiatrists who had examined Ağca, and all agree that he is normal and mentally stable. (The notion that he was mentally retarded, was a psychopath, or suffered from schizophrenia is a common theme played on by those attempting to deny an Eastern connection in the attempt on the Pope's life.)

[12]From Turkish interrogation of Ağca in Rome, as published in *Hürriyet*, Feb. 1, 1985. Additional detail on Ağca's actions and contacts during the period between his escape and his crossing to Iran is provided in the investigation report of Col. Öncül delivered on January 16, 1984; nothing in this information conflicts with Ağca's summary.

[13]*Hürriyet*, Nov. 28, 1984.

[14]During his cooperative interrogation in the summer of 1982, Ağca identified "Kolev" as Ayvazov when presented with photos of the Bulgarians with whom he had dealt in Rome. Ayvazov departed from Rome on November 12, 1982, less than two weeks before the arrest of Sergei Antonov. Zhelyo Vasiliev, a third Bulgarian implicated in the plot, had already been recalled to Sofia on August 24, 1982. See Claire Sterling, *Time of the Assassins; Anatomy of an Investigation*, New York, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1983, pp. 146–49.

[15]Martella's report was first summarized in *The New York Times*, Oct. 27, 1984. Key sections of the report were published in ibid., Nov. 1, 1984.

[16]Claire Sterling gave the first and most complete account of Albano's summary in *The New York Times*, June 10, 1984.

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reports; medical reports and psychiatric evaluations; press reports; testimony and depositions from an enormous range of witnesses and individuals with information bearing on the case or on the alibis of the Bulgarians and Turks implicated in it. It also includes excerpts and analysis of the extensive and detailed conversations that Martella had with Ağca and with the Turkish accomplices extradited to Italy during the investigation (Musa Serdar, Çelebi, Ömer Mersan, and Ömer Bağci), as well as interviews Martella conducted in the course of travels to Bulgaria, Turkey, and elsewhere in Europe. He gave careful attention to the alibis and claims of Sergei Antonov and the two Bulgarians who fled to Sofia. In addition, he acknowledged receiving from the Bulgarian Prosecutor General's Office "a complete indictment of Ağca addressed to the Italian judiciary," a polemical document Martella reportedly found "characterized by abnormality and partiality."[17] Martella dismissed all the elaborate and deceptive alibis that the Bulgarians concocted and purveyed to Western journalists to deflect the investigation, and recommended trial of Bulgarian plotters Antonov, Zhelyo Vasiliev, and Ayvazov, and Turkish plotters Çelik, Çelebi, Çelenk, and Bağci. Only Antonov, Çelebi, and Bağci are in Italy; the others must be tried in absentia.

The most significant new information gathered in the course of Martella's investigation relates to:

- The direct and continuous participation by the three Bulgarian intelligence operatives (Antonov, Vasiliev, and Ayvazov) in preparation for the May 13, 1981, shooting in St. Peter's Square.
- Identification of Çelik as a second gunman who shot at the Pope (probably grazing the Pope's hand) but who failed to release the panic bombs he carried.
- Unusual Bulgarian advance clearance arrangements for a customs-sealed truck which did depart from the Bulgarian embassy in Rome the evening of the assassination attempt—presumably taking Çelik to asylum—or liquidation?—in Bulgaria.[18]
- Meetings in Bulgaria as early as July 1980 on plans for killing the Pope.
- The extensive network of seemingly rightist Turks, centered around Çelenk and Çelebi, who supported and financed Ağca (and presumably Çelik) during the months preceding the attack.

As significant as the positive information Martella collected is the total absence of any substantiation for the allegations by Moscow, Sofia, and other sympathizers that there was Muslim, Nazi, NATO, American, fascist, or Italian-security support and manipulation of Ağca and his accomplices. Prosecutor Albano dismissed this vast outpouring of falsehood and disinformation as "archaic cold war propaganda."[19]

The interrogation of Ağca took a peculiar turn at the time of the June 1983 kidnaping of Emanuela Orlandi, the 15-year-old daughter of a minor Vatican official, which to this day has not been solved. As soon as he learned of this development, four days after it occurred, Ağca appears to have seen it as a belated attempt by his sponsors to bargain for his release. Consequently, on June 28, he officially retracted testimony bearing on an aborted plan to kill Lech Wałęsa during the latter's visit to Rome in January 1981. Martella made a conscious decision not to try to reach conclusions about the Wałęsa sub-plot, but meticulous analysis of data in the Martella report has led Claire Sterling to conclude that there had, indeed, been a plan to kill Wałęsa and that it involved a fourth Bulgarian—Ivan Tomov Donchev—who was probably the senior Bulgarian security officer in Rome at the time.[20]

Martella's investigation has substantiated the thesis that Antonov was not the top Bulgarian mounting the plot and that he may have been the last to be brought in on it. Antonov's role was primarily that of a support agent, and he may not have been an agent of KDS (*Komitet na Durzhavna Sigurnost*—Committee for State Security, counterpart of the Soviet KGB), since the kind of cover position he occupied is usually reserved for members of Bulgaria's RO (*Razuznavatelen Otdel*—the equivalent of the Soviet GRU or millitary intelligence). Donchev stayed in the background of the plot against the Pope, but may have been the senior Bulgarian in Rome responsible for it. Ayvazov was quite clearly the principal officer charged directly with managing it.

The Martella Report confirms the pressure under which the Bulgarians in Rome were operating, but does

[17]See. e.g., *The New York Times*, Oct. 27 and Nov. 1, 1984. Also discussed in the British, *Italian, and Turkish press.*

[18]No trace has been found of Çelik. A report in *Time* (New York), Mar. 25, 1985, that Çelik has been seen in Switzerland remains to be confirmed.

[19]Over and over again the principal Soviet "specialist" on the plot, *Literaturnaya Gazeta*'s "roving reporter" Yona Andronov, has contrived new "evidence" trying to prove that the two American researchers who have done the most to expose the Soviet-Bulgarian plot—Claire Sterling and myself—were themselves the architects of the assassination plot, operating under CIA orders. On Andronov's original 1983 series, see my article "Misinformation and Disinformation in the Plot to Kill the Pope," *Survey* (London), Autumn-Winter 1983, pp. 2–21. An even more imaginative Andronov series, based on a claimed three-year "investigation," appeared in 1984 (see *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Sept. 26, Oct. 3 and 10, 1984).

A curious sideplay in this disinformation effort came with the 1983 defection to the West of Oleg Bitov, a *Literaturnaya Gazeta* editor, who before re-defecting in 1984, described Andronov as a KGB functionary. Bitov himself published a long article in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* on Mar. 6, 1985, in which he for the first time joined the debate, repeating the entire Andronov line.

[20]For Sterling's analysis of the Wałęsa sub-plot, see *The New York Times*, Oct. 27, 1984. On Donchev, see Sterling's *Time of the Assassins*, pp. 143, 208–10. For background, see Vittorfranco S. Pisano, "Clandestine Operations in Italy: the Bulgarian Connection," *Conflict Quarterly* (New Brunswick), Winter 1984, pp. 28–38.

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not address the probable cause. As I have suggested in the original edition of my book, this was quite probably the impending death of the Primate of Poland, Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński in Warsaw.[21]

The urgency of the mission, however, is probably only one factor in the carelessness of the Bulgarians in Rome (and in many other phases of the plot as well) that is well documented by Martella. With the benefit of hindsight, one can list several other factors explaining Bulgarian shortcomings and mistakes:

- Their operational techniques did not appear careless to them—they had gotten away with them in Italy for a long time.
- They had convinced themselves that Ağca's Gray Wolf/Muslim fanatic cover would hold up, for they had already successfully exploited the Right in Turkey for leftist purposes without exposure.
- The Bulgarians in Rome, defensive about their failure when Ağca was captured, did not inform Sofia how closely implicated Antonov was; rather, they fled and left him to be caught.

This sloppiness, however, is no basis for concluding, as some have,[22] that the Bulgarian security services, operating under the guidance of the KGB, could not have mounted the plot. The evidence Martella has collected is too weighty.[23] Moreover, imagine the possibilities if Ağca had been killed or (like Çelik) had escaped. Under these circumstances Martella and his Turkish counterparts would probably not have been instructed to undertake their investigations. The Bulgarians and their backers would then have had every reason—quietly—to congratulate themselves on a highly successful intelligence operation.

But they were not so lucky. Ağca *was* caught, and the subsequent investigations—meticulously carried out by painstaking, dedicated Turkish and Italian jurists—have afforded us remarkable insight into the complicity of Bulgaria in the plot to kill the Pope. Without this evidence, which is increasingly being made public in ongoing judicial proceedings in Turkey and Italy, those investigating the provenance of the plot would be forced to rely on incomplete and inferential evidence, which is all that such covert operations normally afford.

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[21] *The Plot to Kill the Pope*, pp. 173–74, 180.

[22] See, e.g., William Hood, "Unlikely Conspiracy," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March–April 1984, pp. 67–70.

[23] On this point, see *The Wall Street Journal*, Oct. 22, 1984.

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Books

Vietnamese Voices

Douglas Pike

GEORGES BOUDAREL et al. *La bureaucratie au Vietnam* (The Bureaucracy in Vietnam). Paris, L'Harmattan, 1983.

NGUYEN CHI THIEN. *Flowers from Hell (Hoa Dia-Nguc).* Translated by Huynh Sanh Thong. New Haven, CT, Yale University Southeast Asia Studies Lac Viet Series No. 1, 1984.

NGUYEN VAN CANH. *Vietnam Under Communism 1975–1982.* Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1983.

NGUYEN NGOC HUY and STEPHEN B. YOUNG. *Understanding Vietnam.* Bussum, Netherlands, DPC Information Service, 1983.

NGUYEN LONG and HARRY H. KENDALL. *After Saigon Fell: Daily Life Under the Vietnamese Communists.* Berkeley, University of California Institute of East Asian Studies, 1981.

NGUYEN NGOC NGAN, with E.E. RICHEY. *The Will of Heaven: The Story of One Vietnamese and the End of His World.* New York, E. P. Dutton, 1982.

Cuoc Khang Chien Chong My Cuu Ngoc 1954–75; Nhung Su Kien Quan (The Anti-US Resistance War for National Salvation 1954–75: Military Events). Hanoi, People's Army Publishing House, 1980. Translated by Joint Publications Research Service (Washington, DC) as JPRS 80968, June 3, 1982.

COL. GEN. TRAN VAN TRA. *Ket Thuc Cuoc Chien Tranh 30 Nam, Tap 5: Nhung Chang Duong Lich Su Cua B–2 Thanh Dong* (Concluding the Thirty Years War, Vol. 5 of the History of the Bulwark B–2 Theater). Ho Chi Minh City, Van Nghe Publishing House, 1982. Translated by Joint Publications Research Service as JPRS 82783, February 2, 1983.

A FAMOUS American columnist once observed that the difficulty with writing about Vietnam was that everything that *could* be written about it *had* been written. He was dead wrong. Billions of words about Vietnam and its war have been dispatched in the past two decades, it is true, but almost all of them have been channeled along only a few narrow topical canyons. Vast domains of the Vietnamese intellectual landscape have remained unexplored. Virtually everything every American knows about Vietnam, or thinks he knows, comes from the American press which labors under self-imposed limitations as to what constitutes news—appropriate for the front page or evening network television—and what does not. The result is that some information, frequently oversimplified, often trivial in the long reach of history, is told over and over and over, while the rest is not reported at all. If astronomy were treated in the same manner, we would know only of falling stars.

Not only has the Vietnam story to date been badly told, it has been parochially told. Reportage and interpretation have been more or less the exclusive domain of the foreigner. The Americans (and a smattering of British and Australians), and before them for a century the French, and before the French for a millenium the Chinese, have taken it upon themselves to explain Vietnam to the world, while the Vietnamese stood by more or less mute.

I should estimate that 95 percent of the Western-language books in our extensive library at the Indochina Archive at the University of California (Berkeley) were written by foreigners. Americans read these accounts—by the David Halber-

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stams and the Frances Fitzgeralds[1]—and think themselves informed, but what they have learned is about America not Vietnam. This monopolization has extended to the media (especially television), which never have given much space or time to interpretations by Vietnamese. And it extends to academia. In 20 years of attending what seems like an endless number of academic conferences around the world on the subject of Vietnam, rarely did I see a Vietnamese face across the table from me.

We are the poorer for it. Much of the United States's failure in Vietnam—as France's and China's before it—is traceable to the Americans not seeking out and listening with empathy to Vietnamese voices, their failure to recognize that there was selfish gain in doing so. This failure continues, and it is as imperative now as it was during the war years that Vietnamese voices be heard.

THESE thoughts were occasioned by an initial browsing through the books under review here. All eight have a common characteristic: they represent Vietnamese attempts, alone or in collaboration, to communicate with outsiders. By way of factual introduction, it is useful to begin with a thumbnail sketch of the books under review, proceeding alphabetically by author:

—*La bureaucratie au Vietnam* is a collection of essays that address the problems of "government by bureau," most of them written by important Hanoi officials. It is useful as source material and has an informative introductory essay by its French author.

—*Flowers from Hell,* a collection of poems by a North Vietnamese dissident who spent much of his life in northern prisons and reeducation camps, is a fine example of the Vietnamese tradition of poetry as contemporary history. The manuscript was smuggled out of Hanoi through the British embassy, but the author's present fate is unknown.

—*Vietnam Under Communism* examines the major sectors of the postwar Vietnam scene, including communist party politics, government leadership, foreign policy, education, and religion. It was written while the author, a former Saigon law professor and prominent member of the nationalist movement called the Dai Viet, was a fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution. It is a highly informative work that provides a good survey of postwar events in Vietnam.

—*Understanding Vietnam,* the boldest, most intellectual, and most provocative of the works reviewed here, deals with a wide range of topics, some legalistic (such as the constitutional base for the reeducation camps), some highly abstract (whither the Vietnamese spirit?). But concern for the Vietnamese psyche is the unifying theme of the book, which was written while the authors were on the faculty of Harvard Law School.

—*After Saigon Fell* is an account of day-to-day life in South Vietnam in the four years following the communist takeover, written by Nguyen Long, the former dean of Van Hanh University in Saigon. A prominent Buddhist, Long stayed on in Vietnam until 1979, then came to the United States and now lives in Los Angeles. Of all the works here, this volume gives the best picture of what life is like under the Vietnamese communists.

—*The Will of Heaven* is an autobiography of a northern Catholic school teacher who relocated to the South in 1954 during Operation Exodus, the transfer of refugees following the cease-fire after Dien Bien Phu. He then settled into a new life there, even serving in the Army of the Republic of (South) Vietnam. After the war, he spent three years in a reeducation camp before escaping to Canada.

—*Military Events* is a day/year chronology of events of the Vietnam war (1954–75) as interpreted by an unnamed Hanoi military analyst. This work is a gold mine of source material about the Vietnam war as seen day-by-day in Hanoi, although some of the "facts" set down are to be treated with caution.

—*Concluding the Thirty Years War* is an account of the war's last hurrah by General Tran Van Tra, the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) commander of the "B–2 Front," the military heartland of South Vietnam. Presumably, it is the fifth volume of a five-volume memoir, although it may be the only volume that ever sees publication. General Tra reportedly irritated his superiors with his candid account (regarded as downright insulting to the Viet Cong) and as a result was retired to a villa outside of Ho Chi Minh City. It is unlikely that we will ever get another such forthright history out of Hanoi.

It is important to note, however, that these works should be judged not so much for the form of presentation as for the perspective they represent. Thus, to say that all eight fail to achieve the goal of winning over their readers, and therefore are self-defeating, is not as serious an indictment as it would be if these were Western studies dealing with the same issues. The Vietnamese writers suffer from built-in limita-

[1]See, e.g., David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest,* New York, Random House, 1972; and Frances Fitzgerald, *Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam,* New York, Atlantic Monthly Press, 1972.

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tions, but this should not be regarded as a communication failure; rather, it is a challenge to the reader to transcend the communicational barrier and achieve understanding. This can be done only if these works are read with empathy. It is in this spirit, and not as conventional literary or scholarly criticism in the Western sense, that the following comments are offered.

THE VOICES here are authentically Vietnamese, but they speak in a style of rhetoric that the reader unfamiliar with Vietnamese writing may find alien. The authors for the most part do not write in the fashion of Western scholarship. Many passages will strike the reader as intemperate, and authors at times will seem carried away by dogmatism. Not infrequently, even knowledgeable readers must struggle to comprehend; the connection between cause and effect is often remote, and inferences and conclusions simply do not always follow from the premises. The works are studded with a strange mixture of precision reporting (methods prospective boat people use to buy large quantities of sea-sickness pills without attracting police attention)[2] and sweeping generalizations (characterizing Soviet "control" of Vietnam as total).[3] Most difficult to follow is the metaphysical meandering in which an author earnestly and at length dwells on some matter of obvious importance to him but the significance of which totally escapes the Western reader.

It is easy to dismiss such writing as wooden, awkward, or insignificant. But it would be a mistake to put this peculiarity of the writing down to ineptitude. If only if were that simple, for then it could be easily remedied. Rather, there is a deeper problem here, one worth exploring since it is the key to understanding not only these Vietnamese voices but a Vietnam of the future.

The dearth of Vietnamese voices offering explanation is not solely the result of foreign efforts at monopolization. Nor is it merely the reflection of American ethnocentrism, manifested by a disinclination to listen with empathy to Vietnamese voices. It also stems in part from the fact that the Vietnamese have always been reluctant to write and speak to the outside world about themselves and their culture. Because of this reluctance they have not developed the necessary communicational skills required in the competition for attention. Seldom have I read writing by a Vietnamese that I would term successful trans-cultural communication. In the years I lived in Vietnam I knew several Vietnamese whom I considered wise in the full meaning of that word—a few whose wisdom I felt surpassed anything I had encountered in the West—yet none of these was able to speak persuasively to the average American. As for the North Vietnamese speaking to the outside world, they are their own worst enemy; the more Hanoi says the more it alienates, even its allies.

There seems to be a cultural deficiency afflicting the Vietnamese that inhibits them when pleading their case abroad, even when they are merely trying to explain themselves to foreigners. This characteristic clearly is traceable to various religious and secular influences in their heritage. Buddhist modesty, self-effacement, and other-worldliness tend to make such explanation unnecessary, even improper. Confucian scholarly reserve, the "island in the lake" mentality, regards such efforts as gauche and beneath one's dignity. An even stronger heritage is the practice of the politics of clandestinism: nothing is ever what it seems and all straightforward explanation is to be eschewed if possible. This is how the Vietnamese have inevitably dealt with foreign occupiers, first Chinese then French. Finally, there is the personal Vietnamese cultural value that dictates that one does not discuss one's life and world in an objective manner with strangers. All of this adds up to the fact that, generally speaking, Vietnamese are not good trans-cultural communicators.

AT A DEEPER level, in dealing with these books, there is a more intractable problem of trans-cultural communication: these authors may write in English (or French), but they think in Vietnamese. Readers are thus confronted by a cognitive barrier—the "mind" of Vietnam, itself part of the broader East-West dilemma of conflicting patterns of thought. The problem results, of course, from differing conceptual frameworks. Western heritage is Judaic monotheism, Greek esthetics, Roman engineering and judicial thought, and as such it is Kantian, geometric, rational. The Vietnamese (and Asian) heritage is circuitous, amorphous, and multidimensional. The two systems have thrown up differing value concepts involving space, time, and causality.

From Spengler onward, scholars have wrestled with this problem of conflicting thought patterns, the major modern figures being Karl Pribram, Hajime Nakamura, F. S. C. Northrop, Karl Popper, and Lily Abegg. Their writings have identified a vast array of cognitive differences. Whereas the West is analytical, logical, and materialistic, the East is synthetic, intuitive, and spiritual. If in the West intellectualism is objective, active, and dynamic, in the East it is subjective, passive, and static. Thought patterns in the West thus are external and intellectual; the pursuit is a realism as expressed in spa-

[2]See Long and Kendall, *After Saigon Fell*, p. 130.
[3]See Chapter 11 of Canh's *Vietnam Under Communism*.

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tial, rather than temporal, dimensions. The opposite is true of thought patterns in the East: they are internal and emotional, and the pursuit is escapism as expressed in temporal, rather than spatial, dimensions.

Hence in picking up any of these volumes, one is immediately plunged into the "mind" of Vietnam. It makes for tough going. The reader must regard the volume as a challenge. Comprehension may fall short. But these books should be read by anyone who hopes to fathom Vietnam's past and must be read by anyone who seeks to anticipate its future.

The eight books, to varying degrees, present yet another impediment. Most contain a generous supply of Vietnamese self-pity, along with a considerable amount of external blame-fixing, although this is scattered and incidental, not concentrated or deliberately focused. Such sentiment probably is inevitable in any writer who no longer has a city to build or a country to live in, as more than one Vietnamese émigré in this country has expressed it. Still, one is tempted to lash out at critical South Vietnamese for the endemic *attentisme* of their society that few ever sought to remedy, for their infuriating fatalism that allowed them to rationalize reality and put unwarranted faith in the eventual appearance of some unidentified mystical figure, some *bac si,* who would rescue them from themselves, or for their proclivity, after the fall, to blame their misfortune entirely on the United States. Even the deepest sympathy for the South Vietnamese plight does not remove this temptation, because these behavioral characteristics go far to explain why the South lost to a more determined foe who entertained little doubt about what it believed, who knew exactly what it meant to have. To succumb, however, would be harsh and cruel. Only a poet, writing from the inside, seems justified in doing so. Nguyen Chi Thien's colorless flowers are from the Gulag: "Blooming in prison, sickly, starved and cold/ They reek of damp and mold, look grey as mud." Yet, he says, "Flowers from Hell/ Real blood has watered them/ Blood mixed with animal sweat, with parting tears" (p. 1).

THE VIETNAMESE have a profound consciousness of history and at times seem hagridden by their sense of the past. All of the books reviewed here give evidence of this. Nguyen Long writes confidently of the "law of independence" in effect throughout all of Vietnam's long existence, as if the rules of history were codified and enforced by some celestial court. Hanoi officials writing in the Boudarel book ascribe to lingering ancient influences blame for the failures in modern-day Vietnamese bureaucracy. Historical allusions stud Nguyen Chi Thien's poetry. General Tran Van Tra sees his B–2 Front campaign as the last act in a drama that began a thousand years earlier when the Sons of Han arrived from China to colonize Vietnam. In the Nguyen Ngoc Huy–Stephen Young book, the burden of history goes to its outer limits, to an a-rational concept of fate imbued in the Vietnamese spirit that imposes a transcendental chain of morality from past to future that none may break or overreach—which means that communism in Vietnam is doomed, by history.

These works also offer a range of interpretative contemporary history, some particularistic, some Olympian, and some revisionist. The Canh book is perhaps the broadest and most comprehensive. The author treats all the major sectors of contemporary history: party and state leadership, political mobilization and motivation, coercive institutions, economics, foreign policy, and religion. Nguyen Long covers much of the same ground but at the microcosmic level and does it well, for he has a keen eye for the telling detail. The Ngan book is the most personalized, no more vivid than the others perhaps, but certainly more poignant.

The history we get from the Hanoi writers is extensively revisionist. Officials writing in the Boudarel book revise earlier Sino-Vietnamese history but leave most other interpretation consonant with the past. Not so with the Tra memoir and the People's Army Publishing House's *Military Events*. Both are exceptional works, highly readable, surprisingly candid, and refreshingly free of the turgid jargon of most Vietnamese Marxist writers who normally seem incapable of saying anything succinctly and interestingly. More important, these two works are highly informative, always remembering of course that the revisionism offered here is suspect.

Both works devastate many of the long (and dearly) held contentions of Vietnam war critics and of apologists for Vietnamese communism. For example, readers are told that planning for war in the South began in 1956 and was well along by 1959 when the 15th plenum met in Hanoi and ordered "armed struggle" in the South.[4] But in the 1960's, it was maintained by Hanoi and widely accepted abroad that North Vietnam was not deeply involved in the war (beyond extending moral support), that it reacted only in 1965, to the arrival of American ground troops. Few historians dared to challenge this claim, although a number doubted it. Now we are told that Vietnamese Workers' Party Secretary Le Duan set down the blueprint for the armed struggle doctrine in August 1956 and that by October 1957

[4] *Military Events,* pp. 29-30.

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there were 37 guerrilla companies organized into battalions in the South, including several in Thu Dau Mot (or Binh Duong) province outside of Saigon.[5]

We now learn, moreover, that not only was the final battle in the war fought by Northerners, but so were all the earlier ones. According to the new account, the National Liberation Front, or Viet Cong, never amounted to anything militarily, politically, or representationally.

It is also claimed that the Chinese never loomed large in the scheme of things in either the Viet Minh or Vietnam war. According to the revised version, few of the artillery shells fired at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 were Chinese-made, and Beijing was always regarded by Hanoi as a thin reed and unreliable ally. Consider the credibility once enjoyed by Senator William Fulbright and other congressional critics whose hearings for years frightened Americans with the "yellow horde" thesis, that at any moment millions of Chinese would descend into the Vietnam war. At one time, the Sino-Vietnamese relationship was described as close as "lips and teeth"; now we are told by Hanoi that what actually existed through the years was Sino-US collusion against North Vietnam.

Perhaps even more telling is the revelation that on August 2, 1964, three torpedo boats of the People's Army of Vietnam "attacked the US Destroyer Maddox . . . and chased it away."[6] Many articles, even whole books, had been written to support what then was the Hanoi position, that the Tonkin Gulf incident was an invention of President Lyndon Johnson manufactured to stampede Congress into supporting the war.

The revisionism here goes on and on—and obviously some of what is served up as history strays as far from the truth as the original version did. Still, there are nuggets of historical enlightenment to be mined here. Certainly, these two works make for interesting reading, which is more than can be said for most products of Hanoi printing presses.

In terms of significant contribution to historical interpretation, probably the Huy-Young book is the most important. The others provide raw material, the stuff from which the history will eventually be written.

WHAT IS lacking, as it is lacking in all retrospective accounts by either Vietnamese or Americans I have read, is an affective description of what those years in Vietnam were actually like for the general population. The Vietnamese have a term: *ky uc;* its literal meaning is "memory" or "faithful memory," but it connotes a broader idea, the remembrance of things past with a full consciousness, that is, a great, moving sense of "how it was."

Those who did not live in Vietnam during the war years picture it mentally as a place of terror in the night and sudden death, of assassinations and coups d'état, of spilled napalm and satchel charges hurled into hotel lobbies. But it was never really so. Those things were present, it is true, but somehow they never came to dominate the lives of the hundreds of thousands of us who lived and worked in Vietnam, but did not fight there. We always kept them in perspective. The days of our years, for Vietnamese and American civilians alike, were largely given over to ordinary personal human interests which were at least equal, in commanding our attention, to the general progress of events.

It is this the-way-we-were quality that has not yet been captured. No *ky uc* account has yet been written. I know of only one work—a memoir still in manuscript by a Vietnamese woman, of which I have seen portions and about which I am sworn to silence—that promises to fill this void.

An important final impression left by these eight books is a profound sadness. It is the inevitable sadness that comes in contemplating the long pause of time, but also it is the sadness compounded of a sense of misguided good intentions, ignorance in action, and wasted heroism. Nguyen Chi Thien must be something of an artist-prophet for he predicted the ironic folly of it all very early (writing from Hanoi in 1960) in his poem "Independence Is a Myth." It could serve as the epitaph for the dashed hopes of the Vietnamese:

Independence is myth if standing fast by Uncle Mao. Freedom is prison if worshipping Grandfather Marx. Happiness is a hoax if starving for rice. (p. 5).

[5] Ibid., pp. 22 and 23.
[6] Ibid. p. 60.

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Cambodian Tragedy

Elizabeth Becker

CRAIG ETCHESON. *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea.* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1984.

MICHAEL VICKERY. *Cambodia, 1975–1984.* Boston, MA, South End Press, 1984.

DURING THE 1960's the United States government paid out millions of dollars to students learning non-European languages under the National Defense Foreign Language fellowship program. Few graduate students in Asian studies earned their advanced degrees without support from the NDFL program. But the Great Society and the Vietnam war came to an end and so did major federal support for exotic languages, such as Vietnamese or Khmer. The once burgeoning field of Indochinese studies shrank overnight. Not only the money but also the jobs and interest disappeared. Men and women with degrees in Vietnamese or Cambodian studies were forced to seek jobs outside the United States—in England, Canada, and, most often, Australia (one of the few countries where interest in Indochina grew rather than diminished after the Vietnam war). Some of the academic experts who stayed in the United States had to find new specialties for themselves, ranging from the all-purpose international relations to women's studies. The result was a small but crucial "brain drain" in a field that has become very controversial in recent years. But if the Indochina field in general suffered, the study of contemporary Cambodia was most seriously affected. Even in the best of times, Cambodia attracted only a small number of Western scholars. After the 1975 military victory by the communist Khmer Rouge and the confusing and horrible stories about its rule, the study of contemporary Cambodia nearly disappeared.

In the years immediately following the Khmer Rouge victory much of the best work on Cambodia was published in what were openly partisan journals—the *Bulletin of the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars* and the *Southeast Asia Chronicle.* These journals were founded by scholars opposed to American involvement in Vietnam and subsequent its extension into other states of Indochina. After the war's end and the accompanying evaporation of general interest in the area, these journals were virtually alone in chronicling the actions of the communist regimes of Indochina. The few qualified scholars who were writing about Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge regime generally had opposed the United States's involvement in Indochina. Thus, their work was scrutinized as much for political bias as for the contributions they were making to the understanding of Khmer Rouge rule. At the same time, American academics with little or no background on Cambodia began to write about the Khmer Rouge. As the Pol Pot regime implemented its murderous policies, and as refugees who fled across the border into Thailand told their stories of madness in Cambodia, the field burst open with controversy.

By the time the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia in December 1978 and partially opened up the country and its archives to some Western reporters and scholars, the partisanship had become ferocious. Writers and scholars accused one another of failing to state the "truth" about various aspects of Cambodia's sad history. What could be described as a subfield developed over who said what and when, and which scholar or writer was to be trusted or condemned.

Yet, despite the obvious importance of the Cambodian revolution—the frightening questions it raises about Cambodia, Asia, superpower politics, and rural revolutions—and despite reemerging public concern about Cambodia, there is still very little support in the United States for the pursuit of scholarly studies about contemporary Cambodia. By 1984, the year in which the two books under review

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were published, in the United States there was not a single tenured professor of contemporary Cambodian history or politics trained in the subject. Of the three leading US scholars on contemporary Cambodia, none is presently living in the United States. Timothy Carney, who was trained at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Cornell University, is a State Department foreign service officer currently posted in the Republic of South Africa. Stephen Heder, another specialist from Cornell, is working for Amnesty International in London. David Chandler, a well-known historian, teaches at Monash University in Australia. Only Ben Kiernan, an Australian trained by Chandler, is doing active research in the field—on a grant from Monash University.

Moreover, the future holds little promise for potential newcomers. Although there is substantial money available for studies of how Indochinese refugees adapt to life in the United States, precious little is offered for research in Cambodia itself or, for that matter, among the Cambodians camped along the border with Thailand. For those scholars who nonetheless attempt to do research in Cambodia, there are also other major obstacles. To begin with, it is difficult to obtain a visa for Cambodia. And once in the country, a foreigner's movements and access to sources are restricted by the government and by the war raging between the Vietnamese occupation forces and the Cambodian resistance forces, among whom are many Khmer Rouge. The present environment works against sustained, serious, and thorough scholarship on Cambodia.

THE TWO BOOKS under review mirror the problems of Cambodian studies. While Craig Etcheson typifies the newcomer trying to fill the vacuum in American studies of contemporary Cambodia, Michael Vickery exemplifies the brain drain and the scars left on those who have become immersed in partisan polemics about Cambodia. Etcheson writes in his introduction (p. xiii) that he spent only one summer doing most of the research and writing for his book on the roots and development of the Khmer communist movement, *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea*. The book covers the period from 1930 to 1979. He has no previous experience with Cambodia, at least none that he mentions. Considering his limitations in time and experience, he did an admirable, if flawed, job.

Vickery's *Cambodia, 1975–1984* reflects the problems at the other extreme. Vickery has a Ph.D. in history from Yale. His thesis on the 15th– and 16th–century Khmer chronicles is considered top-notch and he is a fluent Khmer speaker. He has received various grants and temporary teaching positions in Southeast Asia and Australia, including his current research post at Adelaide University in Australia. His book is a bitter mélange of scholarship, memoirs, and polemics with other writers and scholars on Cambodia.

Both books reflect the vacuum in the United States for serious studies of Cambodia. The building blocks of any scholarly field, that is, intelligent, thought-out monographs about selected issues, are virtually nonexistent on communist Cambodia.

ETCHESON's best work can be found in the first part of his book, where he shows a confident, perceptive grasp of Khmer history, even when his account is sketchy. But as soon as he ventures into an explanation of the Khmer Rouge rule of Cambodia, the book flounders. Etcheson simply did not have the access to primary materials that would have fleshed out his subject. Nor did he have the firsthand experience that would have guided him through the available secondary sources.

Etcheson creates six categories of ideological leanings among the wartime Khmer Rouge front—ranging from Stalinists or loyal followers of Pol Pot, to Maoists who admired the Chinese revolution and were more leftist, to national communists who were followers of Prince Norodom Sihanouk. But these categories, for the most part, are arbitrary and do not hold up under empirical scrutiny. Unfortunately, Etcheson then uses these categories to explain many of the problems of the Khmer Rouge after their victory, in his contention that it was primarily the factional struggles that account for most of these problems. He draws a static picture conveying no sense of the dynamics that propelled the Khmer Rouge rulers on their course of misery. Apparently Etcheson did not take into account material taken out of Cambodia after 1979—particularly confessions from the Tuol Sleng prison or Khmer Rouge party documents[1]—or the public Vietnamese material, such as the proceedings of the 1979 trial in absentia of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary. This is a shame because his study shows that he is adept at making sense of the material he does use, and that he is able to analyze it succinctly and clearly. His discussion of the Indochina war during the 1970–75 period, for example, is quite good. He also instructively dissects the debate between author William

[1]Tuol Sleng houses some 10,000 dossiers of former prisoners. These are considered the best source of evidence on the government of Democratic Kampuchea. For an example of an article that uses these documents, see Anthony Barnett, Ben Kiernan, Chanthou Boua, "Kampuchea: a Special Report, *New Statesman* (London), May 2, 1980, pp. 669-76, which describes the prison and cites Hu Nim's confession. For Ieng Sary's admission of government responsibility for Tuol Sleng, see Elizabeth Becker, "The Death Chambers of the Khmer Rouge," *The Washington Post*, Aug. 2, 1981.

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Shawcross and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and criticizes the arguments of each on valid grounds (pp. 95–103).[2]

Finally, Etcheson does not blame Cambodia's tragedy entirely on foreign powers—a trap into which other authors fall all too readily. He gives Cambodians ample credit for creating their own nightmare, particularly by citing peasant unrest and the split in the urban elite as major reasons for the Cambodian civil war.

VICKERY has written a personal book filled with rage—rage against journalists, against all but a few experts on Cambodia, against the American government but, sadly, precious little against the Khmer Rouge. He sets up a very complicated, and often confused, goal for himself, and that goal is to defend a two-part thesis about the Khmer Rouge regime: (1) that its first two years in power were not as awful as others have made them out to be, and (2) that the worst crimes came in the last year-and-a-half of its rule. In the course of presenting his thesis, he attacks simultaneously all the writers, experts, and journalists who have argued to the contrary, often accusing them of dishonorable political motivation. He does this, first to discredit those who hold opinions that contradict his own, and second to present the current regime of Heng Samrin as the best alternative for Cambodia.

But Vickery's approach brings about the undoing of his book. At the beginning, he cautions the reader that the book is merely a "contribution" to Cambodian history and nothing more (p. ix). The text bears this out. Rather than examine his opponents' ideas thoroughly and make his own points clearly—supporting them with sustainable evidence—Vickery clutters his work with insinuation and fragments of debates about others' work and about the nature of the Khmer Rouge regime. He assumes the reader's familiarity with this material, and thereby neglects to paint a complete picture, either of Khmer Rouge rule or of the writings about it.

This is unfortunate because his political thesis is shared by a number of experts, and it deserves better treatment than he gives it. He bases much of his argument that Khmer Rouge atrocities in the early years have been exaggerated on his own study of the regional variations of Khmer Rouge rule. This is his most important scholarly contribution, found in his third chapter, but it alone cannot support his thesis. In fact, it works against it. Dramatic regional differences had been a hallmark of the Khmer Rouge movement long before it came to power. And yet, despite these differences, the regional Khmer Rouge leaders did follow central orders from Phnom Penh—from the directives to evacuate city populations to the countryside to those to liquidate people considered to be opponents of the revolution. Vickery fails to prove that there was either a qualitative or a quantitative resistance in any region to the revolutionary leaders in Phnom Penh.

This failure negates Vickery's proposition that the leaders in the East Region of the country were the only honest revolutionaries in the Khmer Rouge movement. Vickery glosses over the East Region's complicity in the massacres of the minority Islamic community of the Chams as well as the evidence that the East went along with almost every decree issued from the capital. He ignores evidence that the East shares a major responsibility for killing off Cambodian communists who returned from North Vietnam after 1970. Instead, as proof of the East's dissent, he focuses on the fact that the East was late in decreeing communal dining, an issue I find rather minor on the list of crimes of Khmer Rouge rule. Moreover, his own fine examination of regionalism suggests that other regions—the Southwest and the Northwest as well as the East—often lagged behind in implementing directives from Phnom Penh.

But we do know that the East Region did become the focus of revolutionary paranoia about the middle of 1977, the time when Vickery claims the Khmer Rouge in Phnom Penh perpetrated their truly hideous crimes (pp. 131ff and 201ff). It was then that Pol Pot began plotting and conducting a purge of the East Region in the course of preparing for war with Vietnam. As a result, some of the East Region Khmer Rouge cadres fled to Vietnam to escape execution and there formed the core of the Kampuchea National United Front for National Salvation that supported the subsequent Vietnamese invasion. The purge of the East was the bloodiest of Khmer Rouge rule. But it was preceded by purges of other regions, beginning with the purge of the North region in 1975 and 1976 and later the purge of the Northwest region. In both cases many Khmer Rouge cadres were executed. Thus, the purge of the East was a continuation of established Khmer Rouge policies, not a break with them.

To acknowledge that the East Region was not a startling exception, however, would undermine Vickery's thesis that the East Region Khmer Rouge cadres represent the best of the revolutionary tradition, precisely because it is they who escaped and came back with the Vietnamese occupation army, and now form the nucleus of the Heng Samrin regime. This "East Region thesis" first appeared during the trial of the "Pol

[2]See William Shawcross, *Sideshow*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1979, and Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years*, Boston, MA, Little, Brown & Co., 1979.

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Pot–Ieng Sary clique" in Phnom Penh in August 1979. But even the Vietnamese who masterminded this trial were not so bold as to pretend that the period from 1975 to 1977 had been anything other than murderous and criminal.

Despite such flaws, his book shows that Vickery has much to contribute to the debate about Cambodia. His sharp, impassioned, albeit savage, style is a welcome contrast to Etcheson's overly "objective" and sometimes stiff prose. And oddly enough, Vickery, who condemns journalists so roundly, is at his most eloquent when using journalistic methods. His recollections of Cambodia from the early 1960's are vivid and arresting. In his vignettes he makes penetrating if overdrawn observations about rural Cambodia, something that is missing from nearly every other account of the Khmer Rouge.

IT WOULD be coy of me if I did not mention that in his book Vickery attacks articles I wrote in 1983.[3] In his polemical fashion, he extracts from them a few points which he then proceeds to distort.

But the frustration I felt on reading Vickery's book stems not from anger but from disappointment. While I disagree with a number of his arguments, as well as with his wrongheaded and inaccurate attacks on scholars such as François Ponchaud whom I admire, I cannot help but think that Vickery could have written a more complete book. If he had had the time, the funding, and the institutional base that scholars need, I believe that his arguments would have improved, his evidence would have been fleshed out, and he might have been able to make use of more of the available sources. In the absence of such an environment, however, the factional infighting among the scholars and writers on Cambodia will continue. While the subject is explosive, the scholarship need not be. It may not be too late for the academic community in the United States to reverse the current trend and start supporting the serious, sustained scholarship on contemporary Cambodia that is so necessary.

[3] "Cycle of Poverty," *The Washington Post*, Feb. 28, 1983; and "New Rulers Obscure Role of Party Under Pol Pot," *The Washington Post*, Mar. 1, 1983.

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Soviet Fortunes in Southern Africa

Philip R. Nel

DAVID E. ALBRIGHT. *The USSR and Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s.* The Washington Papers, No. 101, New York, Praeger, 1983.

WINRICH KÜHNE. *Die Politik der Sowjetunion in Afrika* (The Policy of the Soviet Union in Africa). Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1983.

IT IS TOO EARLY to form a definitive judgment on the effect of recent peace initiatives in southern Africa on the fortunes of the Soviet Union in this region. What is clear, however, is that the accord between South Africa and Mozambique signed at Nkomati on March 16, 1984, the agreement between South Africa and Angola signed at Lusaka on February 16, 1984, and various other similar initiatives, have created expectations that the USSR may be running the danger of being pushed aside in Mozambique and Angola.[1] These expectations contrast starkly with assessments which appeared before 1984. While not all went as far as those which foresaw a steady increase in Soviet influence in southern Africa,[2] or an unfolding of a Soviet blueprint for domination,[3] most—including the two books under review—accepted the view that instability in southern Africa, exacerbated by the Republic of South Africa's alleged policy of destabilization, would create favorable opportunities for the USSR to expand its influence.

The factors that made possible a cautious yet reasonably firmly established rapprochement between South Africa and its neighbors—e.g., escalating internal conflicts, economic decline and the drought, Western initiatives, and Soviet reticence—almost miraculously peaked simultaneously. One should therefore allow for a fair element of surprise. Yet, even those commentators who offered a well-balanced treatment of the limitations under which the Soviet Union operated in Africa as a whole may have overstated the threat of a growth of Soviet influence in southern Africa.

The publications of David Albright and Winrich Kühne are good examples. As will be indicated below, both develop reasoned perspectives on the advances *and* limitations of the Soviet Union in Africa. Yet, to my mind, at the time they wrote both were a bit too alarmist about prospects for the expansion of Soviet influence in southern Africa during the 1980's.

ALBRIGHT has long ago established himself as a thorough analyst of the subject, from whose detailed research many in the field continuously draw. *The USSR and Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s* provides us with a wealth of carefully collected data in support of his thesis that although the USSR made substantial gains during the 1970's, and may be presented with various opportunities in the 1980's, there are a number of constraints on its ability to exploit these.

Kühne's study is much broader in scope and traverses almost all aspects relevant to a study of Soviet policy toward Africa. With German thoroughness, he not only addresses a host of quantitative material, but also the much more complex qualitative issues such as the role of Soviet ideology, how Soviet authors view Africa, the importance or otherwise of the long-term treaties of friendship and cooperation signed by the USSR with various African governments, and the neglected question of the compatibility of Soviet activities with accepted or partially accepted norms of international law. As such, his book must surely rate as one of the most complete

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[1] *The Economist* (London), Sept. 1, 1984, p. 14. On these accords and other developments in the region, see Peter Clement, "Moscow and Southern Africa," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March–April 1985, pp. 29–50.

[2] See, e.g., Morris Rothenberg, *The USSR and Africa: New Dimensions of Soviet Global Power,* Miami, FL, Advanced International Studies Institute, 1980.

[3] Jan A. du Plessis, *Soviet Blueprint for Southern Africa,* a South Africa Forum Position Paper, Vol. 5, No. 4, 1983.

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studies yet, and one hopes that a translation will appear soon to make it more accessible to English-speaking scholars (a short English-language summary is provided in the book).

Because of his broader scope, Kühne can pay more attention to methodological matters than does Albright. Kühne quite correctly points out the difficulties in estimating the costs involved in Soviet military deliveries and in measuring the political influence that results from the Soviet economic and military involvement. At the same time, neither issue is "solved," nor does the author advance real suggestions for any solution, such as those made by Dan Heldman.[4]

Kühne's main methodological contribution lies in his insistence that Soviet involvement should always be judged in comparison with the still considerable Western involvement in Africa. Otherwise, one falls prey to a distorted point of view (p. 253), i.e., overestimation of the extent and importance of Soviet involvement. This comparison makes exceedingly clear the limitations of Soviet influence. Furthermore, this approach enables one to appreciate the real desire of African states (including so-called Marxist-Leninist ones) to be nonaligned, which they ensure by maintaining ties with both East and West.

One final methodological comment. Both publications, like most studies of Soviet policy toward Africa, lack a clear understanding of the relationships between the writings of Soviet academics and popular writers on the one hand, and policies being pursued by the USSR on the other. This leads to a sometimes misguided imputation of policy declaration to one or another statement by some Soviet author, which disregards the "relative autonomy," especially of Soviet Africanists, and the extensive differences of opinion among them.[5] In fact, it would be useful if someone undertook to compile a list of Soviet authors and publications with indication of any direct or indirect ties they might have to decision-makers.

Nevertheless, both books establish a framework that allows one to put the record of the successes and fortunes of the Soviet Union in sub-Saharan Africa into proper perspective. This can perhaps be best illustrated by summarizing both authors' viewpoints on the objectives that the Soviet Union is pursuing through its involvement, the policy instruments it has at its disposal, and the context of international norms in which it operates.

LOOKING AT Soviet objectives, Albright introduces a useful distinction between those already being pursued by Moscow, and perceived interests that may gain importance during the 1980's. The first include the desire to (1) gain local acceptance of a lasting Soviet presence in the region, (2) obtain a voice in African affairs, (3) weaken (but not eradicate) the Western position, and (4) reduce the influence of China. Because of the very general nature of these goals, one can hardly argue with this list.

The second category may be of more importance. Here Albright discusses, as does Kühne (without maintaining the above distinction), the questions of Soviet desire to gain control of southern Africa's minerals and to dominate the sea lanes around the Cape. These goals merit attention not least because they are assumed by South Africa to be the main objectives of the Soviet Union.[6]

To be sure, Soviet leaders (and authors) have clearly indicated that they regard these two goals as important. But both Kühne and Albright emphasize that even if the USSR regards it as its objective to control resources and sea lanes, this does not imply that it regards these goals as attainable in the immediate future. A blockade of the Cape sea route as a peacetime objective can be ruled out, and even in a war situation it would entail immense, even insurmountable, logistical problems. As far as the minerals go, the Soviets are perhaps even in a better position than others to realize that all future African and South African governments, be they black or white, must ensure a steady influx of foreign currency—especially if they choose to introduce socialist economic measures internally. It is therefore unlikely, as the case of Angola proved, that they could be coaxed into denying the West access to their main export assets.

LARGE-SCALE deliveries of weapons and the provision of military training in the 1970's replaced economic aid as the main instrumentality which the Soviet Union pursues its objectives in Africa. By now the dominance of military assistance in Soviet aid is well-documented.[7]

[4]Dan C. Heldman, *The USSR and Africa: Foreign Policy Under Khrushchev*, New York, Praeger, 1981, pp. 76–105.

[5]See Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier, "The USSR, the Third World, and the Global Economy," *Problems of Communism*, July–August 1979, pp. 1–16.

[6]The 1984 Defence White Paper of South Africa continues to quote Brezhnev's putative statement to this effect in a conversation with Siad Barre of Somalia. See South African Defence Force, *White Paper on Defence and Armaments Supply, 1984*, Pretoria, Government Printing House, 1984, p. 1. Brezhnev is quoted as having said: "Our aim is to gain control of the two great treasure houses on which the West depends—the energy treasure house of the Persian Gulf and the mineral treasure house of Central and Southern Africa." It is, however, highly questionable whether this quote can be authenticated. See commentary in Robert Legvold, "The Soviet Threat to Southern Africa," *International Affairs Bulletin* (Braamfontein, Transvaal), No. 1, 1984, p. 25.

[7]See e.g., Robert H. Donaldson, Ed., *The Soviet Union in the Third World*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1981; and E. J. Feuchtwanger and Peter Nailor, Eds., *The Soviet Union and the Third World*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1981.

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Albright regards this as an indication of the financial squeeze that the Soviet Union is experiencing due to a declining economic growth rate at home. This may be part of the explanation, but Kühne emphasizes other factors as well. First, the USSR and the East European countries have shown no desire to integrate Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia into the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance, as they have done with Vietnam and Cuba—this despite Mozambique's requests to join CEMA. Second, the USSR has seemingly reconciled itself to the fact that Africa is closely tied to the "imperialist economy," and Moscow may even surreptitiously exploit this by encouraging African states to seek increased Western assistance.

Third, Soviet policymakers have indicated that they do not regard the "revolutionary process" in African countries as irreversible. The irreversibility of the revolutionary process is the main ideological determinant of the Soviet attitude toward its East European allies (the Brezhnev doctrine) and its involvement in Afghanistan. The experience of the 1960's (e.g., in Ghana) has made the USSR well aware of the reversibility of "revolution" in Africa, and accordingly has led to a more cautious approach as far as economic assistance is concerned. Finally, seen from the side of African countries, economic cooperation—limited as it is—with the East does not necessarily reflect so much a fundamental pro-Soviet attitude as the wish to counterbalance the predominance of Western economic ties. Thus, rather than being a sign of Soviet strength, it reflects Western "predominance" (Kühne, p. 135). Recognizing this, the Soviet Union probably does not expect too many pay-offs from economic aid.

Kühne has quite a few important things to say about the extent and implications of the Soviet military presence in Africa. First, he supplies an incisive comparison between the levels of Soviet and Western aid. This comparison is, of course, difficult to make for the period after 1976 due to the fact that the arms embargo against South Africa prevents the West from publicizing its support. Yet, for the period 1967-76, the value of Soviet weapons deliveries to Africa was 15 percent below the sum of all such deliveries by France, the FRG, the United Kingdom, and the US (p. 192). For the period 1975-79, the ratio changed, with the USSR supplying 60 percent more. Recently, the ratio may have leveled, due to increased US deliveries to Egypt, Morocco, Somalia, the Sudan, Liberia, and Kenya. Kühne detects a greater willingness on the part of the USSR to supply artillery pieces, surface-to-air missiles, armored vehicles and tanks, naval vessels, and supersonic jet fighters (see Table 18 in his Addendum).

Kühne points out the economic importance of arms sales for the Soviet Union. As is well-known, the USSR does not simply hand out weapons, except in the case of some small arms for national liberation movements. In all other cases, the USSR expects its clients to pay for the deliveries, and its income from arms sales may be as high as 15 percent of total export earnings, which makes arms the most important Soviet earner of foreign exchange after oil and gold.

More important, however, are the political consequences of the high level of military involvement. Both Albright and Kühne are convinced that this involvement has been used successfully to enhance Soviet influence. But Kühne is right to raise the issue of whether this effect can be durable. The success of this policy depends on the continuation of the military conflict in which the recipient is involved: which may no longer be the case in southern Africa judging from developments during 1984. Furthermore, the costs incurred by recipient states have seemingly reached that critical point—at least in Mozambique—where alternatives to military conflict are seriously considered. Accordingly, Kühne and Albright foresee a more defensive posture in Soviet involvement in the 1980's, something that is exemplified by the mild reaction of the USSR to the recent peace initiatives in southern Africa.

Kühne also discusses the question of Soviet base facilities in Africa. The question whether the USSR has gained, or wants to gain, such facilities hinges on the definition of "bases." The Soviet Union has gained access for intermittent use by its naval and air force contingents at facilities in the Dahlak Islands, Maputo, Beira, and Luanda, but has lost access to excellent facilities in Conakry and Berbera. Yet, this does not mean that the Soviet Union has established bridgeheads or secured genuine bases in Africa. Moreover, a number of joint communiqués issued by African and Soviet leaders have reiterated the position that Africa should be rid of foreign military bases.[8] In this regard, attempts by the USSR to secure the Indian Ocean as a "zone of peace" should not be seen solely as a subversive "communist ploy." It might mean mere acceptance by the Soviets that the prohibition of all foreign bases is the best they can achieve.

Direct Soviet military involvement in Africa, and especially in southern Africa, is ruled out by both authors. Not only would this entail subjecting Soviet troops to completely alien conditions and an impossible logistical exercise, but the Soviet Union at present is not likely to want to risk the probable fierce Western reaction to such an action.

[8]For documentation, see Kühne, pp. 181–82.

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In this regard, Kühne also asks whether the military clauses in the Soviet treaties of friendship and cooperation with Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia (the treaty with the Congo does not have a military clause) might be used as a pretext for an extension of the Brezhnev doctrine, as in the case of Afghanistan. Kühne thinks not, not only because of the African countries' lesser strategic importance to Moscow, but also because Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique are not regarded by the USSR as irreversibly Marxist-Leninist. To qualify as such, the Soviet Union has indicated, a country must have a proletarian-based vanguard party that "guides" the political and economic restructuring of the state according to the Soviet model. And nowhere in Africa does that situation obtain, except perhaps for the new Ethiopian party.

Kühne also looks at the issue of Moscow's use of African communist parties as a means of promoting Soviet policy. He highlights the very ambiguous attitude of the USSR toward indigenous communist parties. In the past, the Soviet Union did not react dramatically when African governments sought to curb the role of such parties in their countries, and in some cases (e.g., Egypt) actually increased government-to-government involvement despite such a development. Even in the case of South Africa, the USSR maintained diplomatic relations up to 1955, i.e., five years after the banning of the South African Communist Party, and even then the final break was initiated by South Africa.

THE QUESTION of the legitimacy—in the sense of international law—of Soviet activities in African conflicts is addressed by Kühne. This is a major contribution to the literature because it has become customary simply to accuse the Soviet Union of subversive activities and in so doing presume an international consensus on what is subversion and what is not. Kühne reminds us that Soviet support for national liberation movements is "legitimate" in terms of majority decisions by the United Nations General Assembly and of the Organization of African Unity's program for national liberation. In addition, these formulators of international norms have legitimized armed conflict as a last, but allowable, means of securing liberation. Soviet support, especially for the South West African People's Organization in Namibia, does not violate these norms.

There are a few thorny issues involved in this last statement, of course. One is the question of whether a majority decision by the UN General Assembly may be regarded as a decree of international law. A second one is the question of when a liberation struggle qualifies as legitimate and when it does not. Does the placing of bombs in public places qualify as part of a legitimate struggle or not? Be that as it may, Kühne's discussion makes us aware of the fact that a large proportion of independent states do not regard the Soviet support for national liberation movements as inadmissable, despite their condemnation of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan.

BOTH Albright and Kühne see some opportunities for the USSR to expand its influence in Africa during the 1980's despite the reverse trend in recent years and the numerous constraints under which Moscow must operate. Albright discusses in detail its volatile position especially in Somalia, Zaire, and southern Africa. This he does after an extensive and valuable treatment of all factors conducive to instability in sub-Saharan Africa, such as the lack of effective political structures for conflict resolution, economic decline and rising expectations, excessive militarization, and racial tensions.

Although Kühne is less inclined to regard these simply as favorable opportunities for the USSR, he does agree with Albright that southern Africa, and especially South Africa, is the one place where Soviet influence might expand due to military involvement in escalating conflicts. Both authors supply considerable evidence to support their views, not the least of which is South African policy, widely attributed to be one of destabilization, i.e., incursions into Angola and Mozambique, to which both refer.

Two assumptions support this argument. The first is that the Soviet Union is prepared to extend its military involvement in the wake of South Africa's raids and operations. So far, this has happened only to a small degree, i.e., through increased Soviet weapons deliveries and a marginal enlargement of the Cuban contingent in Angola. All in all, the USSR has not supplied the materiel and personnel to permanently discourage the South African Defence Force, which is what at least President Samora Machel of Mozambique had requested. It is therefore not as evident as both authors assume that a continuation of the South African policy would automatically enhance Soviet influence.

The second assumption may be of more importance. This entails an extension of the first, namely, that all cases of instability in southern Africa must by nature be conducive to the extension of Soviet influence. Without passing any judgment on South Africa's policy, it may be argued that it was premised on the insight that increased instability in those countries where the USSR has become the "status quo power"[9] would un-

[9]See William I. Zartman, "The USSR in the Third World," *Problems of Communism*, September–October 1982, pp. 76-80.

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dermine the Soviet position rather than enhance it. Before taking such a calculated risk, there has to be a fairly clear perception of Soviet unwillingness or inability to intervene. It can only be assumed that South African policymakers ruled out the possibility of such an intervention, a judgment proved correct by ensuing events. This brought the Soviet Union a considerable loss of face, and must have been one of the factors prompting Mozambique's Machel and Angola's José Eduardo dos Santos to enter into negotiations with Pretoria.

In addition, present trends prevailing, the Soviet Union has little chance to recoup. One way of doing so might have been to play a constructive mediating role in the present negotiating phase. But, because the USSR has aligned itself exclusively with one faction in the various local and regional conflicts, it can hardly secure concessions from both sides, which is precisely what is needed to maintain the momentum of the peace initiatives. Consequently, it now can only watch from the sidelines—perhaps throwing in a few weapons to try to spoil the process—while other third parties arbitrate.

This leaves us with the question of the prospects for an escalation of conflict in South Africa proper. Both authors see a distinct possibility that there will be an increase in internal strife, which cannot be definitively ruled out (witness the recent upsurge of black unrest and violent police response). However, given the present disarray of the African National Congress on the question of tactics, the fundamental rift in the liberation movement between the Black Consciousness National Forum and the multi-racial United Democratic Front, and, last but not least, the awesome power of the security apparatus in South Africa, it is unlikely that we will see a large-scale military conflict developing that would facilitate a significant influx of Soviet weaponry and personnel into the region.

Whether other third parties can play a constructive role in South Africa depends to a considerable extent on their ability to avoid the Soviet mistake of becoming too closely aligned with one side in the conflict. Moreover, as Colin Legum observes in his "Preface" to the Albright work, experience has shown that Western resistance to national liberation movements elsewhere in Africa (in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Namibia) created favorable opportunities for an expansion of Soviet influence.

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Political Economy of Socialism in Eastern Europe

Deborah Duff Milenkovitch

JAN ADAM, Ed. *Employment Policies in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.* New York, St. Martin's Press, 1982.

JAROSLAV KREJCI. *National Income and Outlay in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia.* New York, St. Martin's Press, 1982.

JAN DREWNOWSKI, Ed. *Crisis in the East European Economy.* London and Canberra, Croom Helm; New York, St. Martin's Press, 1982.

PAUL HARE, HUGO RADICE, and NIGEL SWAIN, Eds. *Hungary: A Decade of Economic Reform.* London, George Allen and Unwin, 1981.

STEPHEN R. SACKS. *Self-Management and Efficiency: Large Corporations in Yugoslavia.* London, Boston, Sydney, George Allen and Unwin, 1983.

FRED SINGLETON and BERNARD CARTER. *The Economy of Yugoslavia.* London and Canberra, Croom Helm; New York, St. Martin's Press, 1982.

SAUL ESTRIN. *Self-Management: Economic Theory and Yugoslav Practice.* Cambridge, London, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1984.

THERE IS LITTLE disagreement among experts in the West concerning the general nature of the current economic problems of Eastern Europe. The experts seem to have reached a consensus that the Soviet-type model is now *finally* ready to vindicate their earlier predictions: these economies are in a long-term low-growth trajectory. This secular trend both sharpens the internal contradictions and creates new opportunities for interaction with the world at large. The prospect of systemic failure provides hope for renewal to the citizens within and for a revision of political alignments to the nations without. Whether these hopes are justified only time will tell. At the same time, the West is becoming increasingly aware of the diversity among the states of Eastern Europe. As the performance of the Soviet-type model breaks down, so too does the Western perception dominant since the Yalta conference of 1945, in which Eastern Europe is merely a pale carbon copy and an appendage of the Soviet Union.

At this point, two questions need answering: (1) What are the truly *general* features of a Soviet-type economy that are shared by all the historically different states of Eastern Europe? Alternatively stated, is there a political economy of socialism? (2) How can we account for the diversity among these countries—Yugoslavia, Hungary, Romania, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria—within the socialist framework, and how can this diversity help to sharpen our understanding of the features common to socialism? The books by Jan Adam, Jaroslav Krejci, and Jan Drewnowski address broad problems found throughout the East European economies; the volume edited by Paul Hare, Hugo Radice, and Nigel Swain explores Hungary's New Economic Mechanism; and the books by Stephen Sacks, Fred Singleton and Bernard Carter, and Saul Estrin examine the Yugoslav economic approach. This review will focus on their contributions of substance and method to our understanding of these two questions.

THE VOLUME edited by Adam, *Employment Policies in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe,* considers a basic paradox in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe—namely, the existence simultaneously of a labor shortage and of an underutilization of labor. The reasons for this paradox are to be found in the

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forces of supply and demand, and are common to all the countries. Factors that influence the supply of labor include: the changing demographic variables (the numbers of new entrants to the labor force are expected to be lower in the Soviet Union and all East European countries, especially during the 1980's); the negligible possibilities for increasing the participation rates of the existing manpower; the performance of workers in the face of existing effort/reward relationships and difficulties of life outside the workplace. Factors that determine demand include: the tendency of managers to hoard labor, given strong incentives to meet output targets and uncertainty of input deliveries, while the rewards for cost-cutting are few; the planners' predilection for investing in capital goods for production rather than in equipment that might ease the extremely labor-intensive requirements of packaging, delivery, warehousing, and servicing.

The management of manpower requirements has been similar in all the countries. It consists of a combination of better planning for supplying particular kinds of labor, the use of material incentives for workers to increase output, but the provision of little incentive to the enterprises to conserve labor. These policies have not been particularly successful, because the core of the problem lies in the system itself. The contributions to the Adam volume underscore this point, thereby raising our interest in those features of the system that resist change.

To eliminate the paradox of labor shortage and underutilization, major changes in the system would be necessary. First, the enterprises would need to have a significant financial interest in using labor more economically. The principal way to stimulate such interest is to make enterprises profit-conscious. This can be accomplished if three requirements are met: (1) enterprises must have a large degree of autonomy in their day-to-day operations; (2) meaningful prices must be set for inputs and outputs; (3) enterprises must want to maximize profits, a desire best stimulated in the socialist context by giving to the enterprises control over a significant portion of their profits.

Of these three conditions, autonomy in daily operations has been the easiest one to fulfill. It was instituted in Yugoslavia in the 1950's and in Hungary in the late 1960's.

Meaningful prices—which are useful to planners even without full enterprise autonomy—have been a much greater problem in all these countries. Such prices are necessary to establish a rationale for profits, namely, that the firm is providing goods that society wants and needs but lacks. Introduction of meaningful prices also can help to underscore the arbitrariness of the political (as opposed to economic) redistribution of profits from profit-making enterprises to enterprises and sectors of the economy favored by the political leadership. Therefore a standard is set by which government investment policy can be criticized, thus limiting the government's arbitrary power over the surplus.

Not surprisingly, allowing enterprises to use a portion of their profits for investment is the most difficult step. Ultimately, it is through the control of the surplus of society that system managers direct the system and reproduce it, as Marx had clearly perceived over a hundred years ago in his study of capitalism. If the system managers were to surrender the control over the surplus that they presently have through their control of prices and the existing centralization of profits, this would be a revolution of major proportions.

The second requirement for eliminating the paradox of simultaneous shortage and underutilization of labor is to motivate workers at all levels to do their jobs. This calls for the carrot of material rewards and the availability of desired goods, and possibly the stick of potential unemployment for the lazy. It would certainly also require—although this is not discussed in the Adam volume—a reduction in the antagonism between the workers and the regime. System managers have tried to buy their way out of this dilemma by providing more consumer goods, but the leadership finds it difficult to procure from the system enough goods to pay the annual installments on worker demands.

It appears then that, without significant change, no major improvement in either the demand or the supply side of the labor equation can occur, and yet failure to correct either side poses problems for the regime. The Adam book demonstrates that the policies followed to date will not resolve the paradox.

IN THEIR STUDIES, Krejci and Drewnowski cast innovative nets for a better understanding of the underlying socialist system in Eastern Europe. In his *National Income and Outlay in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia,* Krejci uses national income accounts to quantify the Marxian notion of surplus. According to this definition, surplus is that portion of current production which is not necessary for the reproduction of the current labor force or for the replacement of current machinery. It can be used for augmenting capital stock, improving standards of consumption, waging wars, building pyramids, or supporting an idle class. A surplus can also be used to expand society's productive capacities and, if it were so used, could stimulate high rates of economic growth. However, if the surplus is squandered on poorly planned investment projects

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and top-heavy state administration, consumption remains low over time and there is little growth in productive output.

Krejci studies the size of the surplus in three countries with different socialist structures, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia, in the years 1967 to 1978. (It is a pity that he did not include Hungary in this comparison.) He carefully develops three concepts of surplus. While one is based on East European net material product accounts, the two more useful ones come from the cost and expenditure sides of reconstructed gross national product accounts. Krejci establishes that the surplus—however measured—was higher for Czechoslovakia than for Poland or Yugoslavia but that the rate of growth for Czechoslovakia was lower. Why that was so and how it was that the smaller surplus was used more productively by Poland and Yugoslavia are the questions Krejci's work raises.

In a different vein, the authors in the book edited by Drewnowski, *Crisis in the East European Economy,* put forth their thoughts on the causes of the Polish events of 1980-81 and on the possibility that similar crises might occur in other East European countries. Peter Wiles notes that the defects of the Soviet-type system have long been known, and he asks why they led to serious problems when they did—in the late 1970's and early 1980's—rather than earlier (p. 10). There are a number of answers to this question, in addition to the ones favored by Wiles: (1) the impact of the external shocks caused by two sharp rises in the prices of raw materials in the 1970's, which were quantitatively different from previous price hikes and which fundamentally undermined the raw-materials-intensive and energy-intensive growth strategies of the East European economies; (2) the need to expand foreign trade relations on competitive world markets in order to obtain raw materials and energy resources; (3) the exhaustion of the supply of labor that could be transferred from the agricultural sector—a development that undermined the labor-intensive growth strategy pursued in Eastern Europe; (4) the need to provide more and better consumer goods to maintain the legitimacy of the system and to motivate workers; (5) the insatiable demand for foreign capital goods because the system managers wanted shiny new equipment from abroad, and because foreign capital goods were seen as providing an alternative to systemic change; (6) in light of these five factors, the combination of concessionary prices set by producers of capital goods facing a world market depression and a Western banking system frantically trying to recycle petrodollars proved too tempting: the East European countries overborrowed from the West and found themselves unable to repay.

While these reasons are well known, Wiles underscores the importance of the human element as well. As he puts it, "there is now in all these countries a *fin de siècle* feeling: i.e., a cumulation of disappointments. Not just the economy but the whole theocratic system is no good. . ." (p. 11). Wiles believes that the only way to salvage the human factor is by increasing the use of market mechanisms.

Drewnowski, on the other hand, develops the notion of "economic tissue" (p. 76). Degradation of tissue, or rot, is brought about by the suppression of truth, the eradication of dissent, and the repudiation of fairness. The symptoms of rot are seen in increased reliance by all economic actors on strict procedural regulations as a strategy of self-protection, which results in faulty information, planning without facts, distorted evaluations, incompetence of decision-makers, complexity of procedures, and rigidity of economic targets. As a consequence, common sense is eliminated from both decision-making and human relations. The only remedy is to be found in the restoration of basic human freedoms and democratic rights, according to Drewnowski. His plea is heartfelt, and the notion of rot hits the mark. Most striking, however, is that Wiles and Drewnowski, both economists, reach the conclusion that standard economic variables alone are inadequate to illuminate the real economic issues in Eastern Europe.

OFFSETTING the general bleak picture of the Soviet-type system in Eastern Europe—whether explained by resistance to fundamental systemic change, the size and uses of surplus, or tissue degradation—are the examples of successful reform of the system in Hungary and Yugoslavia. These reforms were successful not so much because they accomplished all their economic goals, but because they showed that reform of the system was possible. Significant changes permitted enterprise autonomy, meaningful prices, some degree of decentralization of investment, a liberalized discussion of real issues, and the provision of more and better consumer goods to the population.

The volume edited by Hare, Radice, and Swain, *Hungary: A Decade of Economic Reform,* focuses on the Hungarian reform. This reform has experienced alternating swings, a broad sweep in 1968 which gave much freedom to enterprises, followed by retrenchment in the mid-1970's. The pendulum swung toward reform again in 1980, and in 1982—with a diminution of the authority of the industrial ministries and their merger into a single ministry, with new mechanisms for relating domestic prices to world-

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market prices, with a significant easing of regulations on the private and semi-private sectors of the economy, and with the breakup of monopoly enterprises into competing firms. Since this volume was published in 1981, it misses the full sweep of this cyclical pattern.

The contributors to this collection identify the needs for reform and its impact on labor and wages, agriculture, investment, technology transfer, and international trade. The authors of the individual sections provide a good understanding of these various areas and, at the same time, sensibly relate their specific topics to the general picture.

However, an important question is left unanswered: why did Hungary go down the path of reform while the other countries of the bloc did not? The authors seem to argue that the reform—a compromise between the competing demands of different interest groups—did not fundamentally alter the basic power relationships operating within Hungarian society. To support this interpretation, they contend that it was possible to introduce new policy instruments and confer new powers and rights on enterprises, but that measures aimed at challenging real power, for example, the breaking-up of larger enterprises to promote competition or the abolition of industrial ministries, would come to naught. (As we have seen, their predictions were not entirely accurate.) Furthermore, the process of reform was always accompanied by a broad policy of "exceptionalism"—the option for enterprises to avoid the uncomfortable consequences of market-type reform by claiming an exception. Prices would be changed, or subsidies granted, or other methods found to relieve economic pressure. As long as exceptionalism prevails, the beneficial effects of the reforms are muted and the existing power relationships reinforced.

A market-type economic reform causes the investment process to become the locus of tensions between the strengthened forces of the periphery (enterprise managers and financial managers), which have the logic of profits on their side, and the various vested interests and the general interests represented by the center, which have the logic of market failure on their side. Thus, the tension between center and periphery takes the form of a debate about the attributes of plan and market, reminiscent of the Yugoslav experience of the late 1950's and early 1960's, when exceptionalism developed to such an extent that the whole thrust of the Yugoslav economic reform was jeopardized. (A comparison of these processes in the Hare collection would have been enlightening.) Nevertheless, despite the failure of the Hungarian reform to win all at once, the resurgence of the pro-reform forces after 1980 attests to the fact that the struggle to continue reform is still going on. Thus, arguments presented in the Hare volume that the Hungarian reform changed little of fundamental significance seem to me to miss an important part of the story.

WHAT OF Yugoslavia's experience? Its unique system of self-management has fascinated observers since its establishment in the early 1950's. It demonstrates that there is a socialist alternative to both the hierarchically-organized, party-dominated, alienating work experience that characterizes the rest of Eastern Europe and to the capitalist experience described in both neoclassical and Marxist textbooks. In the 1950's, decisions about current operations were decentralized to the enterprise level, and the role of planning in the economy was significantly diminished. As is currently the case in Hungary, this reform brought about a struggle between the center and the periphery over the use of profits, a struggle that in Yugoslavia was exacerbated by the regional dimensions of uneven development and national diversity. Eventually, a reform was adopted in 1965 that allowed enterprises to retain their profits for reinvestment. This implied having a means for transferring capital to firms with the most profitable opportunities, and banks were reorganized to serve as such financial intermediaries.

The 1965 reforms resolved the disagreements over allocation of investment but generated new tensions, both over the role of the banks in allocating funds and, within enterprises, over the new and powerful position of the managers. Enterprise management and bank management were both gaining considerable power, independent of the party. The 1974 Constitution was adopted precisely to curb this power, although its popular appeal was based on the promise to improve the unemployment situation, reduce income differentials, and replace selfish "group-capitalist" thinking with corporate-type bargaining and decision-making processes.

The constitution provided a new organizational form for enterprises. Each enterprise was broken down into its constituent parts, each of which had its own separate profit-and-loss statement. Only direct producers were to be able to earn profits and to dispose of them. Profits were to be invested by the unit that earned them, and were not to revert to the central enterprise management for allocation. Banks were also reorganized to make them conform with this new logic of control of investment by the direct producers and to reduce bank power over the flow of investment resources.

In his *Self-Management and Efficiency: Large Corporations in Yugoslavia,* Sacks describes this

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new form of self-management as it developed in Yugoslavia in the 1970's. Using contemporary Western theory of divisionalized management of large corporations, Sacks assesses whether this form of reorganization is efficient in the Yugoslav context. He gives a critical appraisal of the process of forming prices for transfers between units operating under one roof, and the investment process of inter-unit lending. This fine theoretical work is supplemented with seven case studies drawn from 24 firms that Sacks visited in the late 1970's, and is placed in the context of the organizational forms and divisionalization prevailing elsewhere in Eastern Europe. In addition, he provides significant details about the industrial structure and giant corporations in Yugoslavia, which complements the findings of Saul Estrin (see below).

Singleton and Carter, in *The Economy of Yugoslavia,* convey accurately and concisely the facts and implications of the ethnic, historic, and geographic differences present in Yugoslavia, and their strong centrifugal impact on the economy. They argue that the institutional form of self-management by workers emerged as a means for resolving these differences. They go on to ask whether worker self-management resolves Yugoslavia's current economic problems. They see clearly that wide inter-industry pay differentials encourage all industries to try to attain the pay level of the highest-paid one, and thus have an inflationary impact. They rightly argue that Yugoslav unemployment rates must not be seen solely as the result of self-management. Instead, they ought to be viewed in the context of the large number of newly created industrial jobs and the demographic characteristics of the population, which vary among regions (p. 216). The authors deal less well with integrating the microeconomic details—for instance, their analysis of excess demand for investment, which fuels Yugoslav inflation, neglects the role of interest rates that in real terms are negative.

But their most important contribution is the perspective they give on the Yugoslav system of self-management as a response to the problems of ethnic, historical, geographic, and economic diversity. This raises two further questions: Has self-management succeeded in its task of resolving Yugoslavia's problems of diversity, or has it deepened them instead? Can self-management develop in other contexts? One of the alternatives always floating through the minds of democrats and reformers in Eastern Europe is a vision of a worker-managed system somehow purified of the elements attributed to Yugoslav mismanagement, which, in their own countries, would work "well." How would such a pure worker-managed system function in the broader context of Eastern Europe? Neoclassical theory is a means of providing an answer to this question.

In his *Self-Management: Economic Theory and Yugoslav Practice,* Estrin formally models the worker-managed enterprise in an environment of considerable market concentration, clearly the relevant context for Yugoslavia and all of Eastern Europe. He notes that dynamic models which trace outcomes over time are still too primitive, and he therefore restricts himself to static efficiency (p. 6). The worker-managed enterprise rents its capital resources and makes decisions on output and employment so as to maximize income per worker. One consequence of this practice is that profitable enterprises have high incomes per worker but no incentive to take on additional workers, while workers in less profitable enterprises have lower earnings and few chances of being hired by more profitable firms. What Estrin shows, for the period 1965-74 (when market forces were most strongly in operation), is that Yugoslav data are consistent with the predictions of this theory. In Yugoslavia, income dispersion across firms and industrial sectors is considerable, even when it is adjusted for education, occupation, skill level, or region. Estrin's careful econometric work compels facing up to some of the difficulties in the otherwise appealing system of worker self-management.

WHERE DO these books take us in our understanding of Eastern Europe? The task that lies before us is to reconcile our growing confidence that we understand the operation of the political economy of socialism with our increasing awareness that there is much diversity in Eastern Europe. What are the contributions in substance and in method of the books under review? The three multi-country studies expand our understanding of the substance of socialism somewhat, but on the whole they neither weave a new interpretation of the political economy of socialism nor point to the factors that account for differences among these countries. Their main contribution lies in methodological innovation. This is conscious in the study by Krejci, who develops and quantifies the concept of surplus as a means of identifying differences among the countries of Eastern Europe; and probably less conscious in the cases of Adam and Drewnowski, who insist on the importance of factors usually ignored in conventional economic analysis—resistance to change (Adam) and tissue degradation (Drewnowksi).

The strength of the individual country studies is substantive. Sacks and Estrin use standard neoclassical methodology to explain the theory of self-management and to measure

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the Yugoslav experience against theoretical results. Hare provides an able summary of the Hungarian reforms up to 1980. The major limitations of the four single-country studies lie in their failure to relate the individual national experiences to the experiences of other socialist countries and to the broad issues of the economy of socialism.

Where do we go from here? Marx, I believe, pointed the way over one hundred years ago in his study of capitalism. Eastern Europe today offers an unparalleled opportunity to observe states with similar ideologies, property rights, and political structures, and strikingly different national identities. Only through a careful study of individual cases in which we search for the common elements, and through the development of general theories which integrate our knowledge of the particular cases, can we come to a sharper understanding of the political economy of socialism.

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PROSPECTS FOR THE PHILIPPINES

TO THE EDITORS: The prospects of Philippine communism is a topic recently addressed by Professor David Rosenberg in this journal (September-October 1984). Rosenberg accurately distinguishes between the pro-Soviet Philippine Communist Party (PKP) and its offshoot, the Maoist Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). In 1968, when the CPP was formed, the military threat posed by communism to the regime in Manila was nonexistent. However, since 1972, the year President Marcos declared martial law, the ranks of the New People's Army—the armed wing of the CPP—have grown. A recent estimate of armed guerrilla strength is 15,000 (*The Christian Science Monitor* [Boston], Mar. 26, 1985). The NPA has also succeeded in spreading its forces throughout the vast Philippine Archipelago. According to Fidel Ramos, acting Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the guerrillas have been able to position themselves in practically all of the 73 provinces.

The successful dispersion of the NPA prevents the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from concentrating their power in a limited geographic area. At present and in the foreseeable future, the guerrillas are a fact of Philippine life.

There is little doubt that the communist threat is real and, given the current economic and political malaise in the Philippines, threatens to grow. Yet, a sense of perspective is necessary. It is unlikely that the NPA will capture Manila readily. The Philippines is too large and diverse for this. Moreover, the establishment of rural bases is several steps removed from a cohesive national revolution capable of toppling the "US-Marcos dictatorship." It is one thing to convince a peasant in an isolated village of the need to resist local military abuses. It is an entirely different matter to persuade him that the defeat of Western imperialism, the removal of US bases, and the institution of a communist regime are answers to his plight.

The local orientation of the peasantry was the bane of the earlier rural-based Marxist threat, the Huk rebellion of 1946-54. In order to assess the dangers posed by the NPA, it is useful to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (People's Liberation Army).

Rosenberg contends that the failure of the Huks was primarily internal, i.e., that "the PKP failed because of its own basic errors of political analysis, strategy, and tactics" (p. 46). While it is clear that the bold 1950 Huk policy of attempting an early seizure of power was both unwise and premature, it is not clear that greater Huk patience would have brought a different result.

In his classic work, *The Huk Rebellion,* Benjamin Kerkvliet contends that the Huk movement was largely conservative in nature. Despite the ideological overlay of Marxism, many Huks fought for a return to the traditional landlord-tenant relationship prevalent during the Spanish era.

Although that relationship was far from perfect, the bond of paternalism guaranteed a peasant's survival. The arrival of the Americans had changed this basic relationship. In administering its new possession, the United States established a free-trade relationship with the Philippines. For the new colony, this meant sudden access for the products of Philippine agriculture to a vast new market. This access, in turn, stimulated agricultural production, and the prospect of large profits changed the relationship between landlord and tenant. With access to the US market, the personal bond disappeared. Landowners left their farms for the glamor of Manila. In their place, overseers managed the daily operation of the estates with the goal of increasing production and efficiency. The old paternalistic rules were replaced by the profit motive.

Under these conditions, the peasants organized. Indeed, the postwar Huks traced their roots to the peasant organizational efforts of the prewar Philippines. During World War II, those early efforts provided the foundation for their evolution into the highly effective anti-Japanese guerrilla army. After the war, the Manila government feared the political and military strength of the Huks and sought on different occasions to suppress them militarily. As tension grew in 1945-46, there were attempts at negotiation. However, as before World War II, the government remained dominated by the rich. Thus, even nominal reforms favoring peasants were impossible.

At the start of the rebellion, the Huks numbered 10,000 battle-tested veterans. Their peasant roots and loyalties made them appear almost invincible within their home territory, the provinces of Central Luzon. Yet, by 1952 their organization was shattered. Two years later, Luis Taruc, the Huk "Supremo," surrendered, while many Huks returned to their villages never to fight again.

What had happened? Certainly, the unwise and premature optimism of 1950 contributed greatly to the Huk demise. Yet, to state as Professor Rosenberg does that the cause of failure was primarily "internal" is too narrow an answer to a complex situation. Other factors, military and political, led to the Huk demise. The army, long feared by the peasants, was reformed. Abusive officers were replaced, and soldiers were commanded to respect the rights of the peasants. The armed forces were reorganized into smaller, better trained units skilled in guerrilla warfare. Their increased mobility and restraint in dealing with villagers paid both

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political and military dividends.

The government also undermined the Huk program by implementing a series of reforms. The most dramatic was the Economic Development Corps, which promised to resettle landless peasants on the southern island of Mindanao. Actually, only 950 families were resettled (Kerkvliet, p. 234). Nevertheless, this and other moves had a devastating effect on Huk political support.

Another factor receiving little attention was the inability of the Huks to effectively expand the rebellion beyond the provinces of Central Luzon (ibid., pp. 212-13). Neither Rosenberg nor Kerkvliet emphasizes this aspect, although the latter acknowledges that the topic "certainly deserves more attention" (ibid., p. 23, fn 90). The peasants of Central Luzon knew and trusted the Huks from the war years of anti-Japanese resistance. This insured the Huks' effectiveness there in their struggle with the newly independent Philippine government. But Huk efforts to spread their doctrine to other regions were greeted by the insular apathy reserved for outsiders. This crucial failure of the Huks to extend their activities throughout the Philippines made the government's task far easier. Since Central Luzon was the only theater of war, government supply lines were short. In addition, the military could focus its considerable might in a comparatively small area. Eventually, the Huks ran out of room.

It is clear that the NPA has learned well from the failures of the Huk movement. In retrospect, it is no surprise that NPA cadres have downplayed ideology and emphasized local grievances. As demonstrated by the Huk experience, ideology was a small factor in motivating the vast majority of peasants sympathetic to the Huks. In addition, it is unlikely that the NPA will make a premature attempt to seize power, similar to the abortive Huk initiative of 1950. Unlike the Huks in 1946, the NPA in 1968 did not command the allegiance of 10,000 well-organized, battle-tested veterans. Molded in part by its initial weakness, NPA policy has been both patient and opportunistic, its strength growing largely from the mistakes of the regime.

Particularly since the Aquino murder, there is a sense of inevitable collision of opposing forces. Some believe that full-scale civil war is a likely, if not imminent, prospect. Yet, once again, a sense of perspective is necessary. The Marxists may yet win, but to do so they must overcome many substantial hurdles. Despite the increase in NPA numbers, for example, the NPA is still no match for government forces, which number approximately 200,000 men (See *Far Eastern Economic Review* [Hongkong], Mar. 10, 1983, p. 12). The NPA is also outgunned. The movement is indigenous, and there is no evidence of outside support.

Less tangible but of critical import is the nature of the masses that the NPA wants to mobilize. Can local peasant grievances become the basis for a united national revolution? The Huks, who possessed fighting experience and a cohesive organizational network, could not forge such a basis.

What might happen if, for example, a democratically elected post-Marcos government concentrated its efforts on addressing the problems of the Philippine countryside? The Huk experience is informative on this point. The limited, nonrevolutionary vision of many of the rank-and-file Huks was dramatically revealed when the Philippine government introduced a series of reforms. The man responsible, Ramon Magsaysay, was one of the few officials trusted by the peasants of Central Luzon. Largely because of that trust he became a key figure in the demise of the rebels. Although many of the reforms were marginal, they gave the impression that Manila was finally listening. For many Huks, this apparent change in attitude was sufficient to persuade them to quit the rebellion.

Today, the most noteworthy improvement of the NPA over its ideological predecessor, the Hukbalahap, has been its capacity to spread its influence, in varying degrees, throughout the archipelago. As a result, there is a stalemate. For the NPA, there are substantial problems of integration, coordination, and communication. On the battlefield, the NPA, too weak to directly challenge the military, needs time to build itself both politically and militarily. The military, although far stronger than its Marxist foe, cannot deliver the major blow because of the dispersion of its enemy.

Undoubtedly, the Aquino murder has aided the NPA. Yet, it has also increased opportunities for the moderate opposition. A dramatic increase in popular, nonviolent opposition—and pressure from Washington—has led to a number of reforms. In the May 1984 elections to the National Assembly, millions voted despite fears of governmental intimidation and fraud, and despite a well-organized boycott movement. One important election result was the emergence of a viable 60-vote opposition minority in the Assembly (see *The Wall Street Journal*, New York, Dec. 7, 1984). Elected members of the opposition now have a chance to engage in politics, and to develop programs and constituencies. Looking toward a presidential election now scheduled for 1987, the Assembly provides a means for Filipinos to assess those who would succeed Ferdinand Marcos. In addition, the leaders of the democratic opposition—criticized for their inability to cooperate with one another in the past—are now showing signs of needed cooperation. Most opposition leaders have agreed upon the need to seek a common presidential candidate should Mr. Marcos die before the 1987 presidential elections.

Despite the years of martial law, it would be a mistake to underestimate the residual strength of Philippine democracy. In the past, democracy worked well on a number of levels. Filipino voters regularly turned out incumbent presidents, and the losers, despite the power at their command, never resorted to force to retain office.

In his analysis of the Assembly elections, Professor Rosenberg suggests that the high voter turnout and strong opposition showing was due to the following: "Filipinos will take any opportunity they have to show their opposition" (p. 27). It should also be added that Filipinos understand quite well the violent consequences of the failure of a democratic transition.

Aside from the resurgence of the Assembly, other staples of Philippine democracy are making a comeback. Press censorship has been lessened, and a procedure for presidential succession has been established. Current Philippine law mandates the transfer of power to the Speaker of the National Assembly, whose main duty will be to call presidential elections.

A great source of anxiety among Philippine observers has been the possibility that the military—which President Marcos assiduously courted and rewarded—would step into the power vacuum that would be created should he depart from power suddenly. While the danger still exists, it has been lessened somewhat due to the majority report of the Agrava Commission and the resulting trial of 25 military men, including Fabian Ver, the powerful Armed Forces Chief of Staff, and a relative and close confidant of the President. General Ver's replacement, General Fidel Ramos, is a well-regarded professional soldier who has professed his support for constitutional processes.

While the Philippine situation is grim, there is still time to avoid Professor Rosenberg's scenario of sharp political polarization and increasing violence. The closest phenomenon in Philippine history to the current NPA threat was the Huk rebellion. The failure of that revolt demonstrated powerful cultural traits and geographical factors that worked against revolutionary unity and ideological blandishments. The very fact that the NPA has been forced to play down ideology indicates the types

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of problems Marxist ideologues must still confront.

In addition to the inherent problems of the radical Left, there have been a number of other developments that have strengthened the democratic center. The overwhelming participation of the Philippine electorate in the National Assembly elections demonstrated a popular preference for a peaceful response to the current crisis. In turn, the elections created a strong opposition presence in the Assembly. The chances of democracy were aided even more by signs of growing cooperation among opposition leaders, the establishment of a transition mechanism, greater freedom of the press, and the removal of the feared Ver. These developments show that democratic prospects in the Philippines are far from dead.

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ON SOVIET ISLAM

TO THE EDITORS: In his November-December 1984 article "Mullahs, Mujahidin, and Soviet Muslims," Alexandre Bennigsen attributes to me the following position: "Some Western observers have taken the position that a destabilized Muslim world on the immediate borders of the USSR has had virtually no impact on Soviet Muslims, such is the advanced state of Soviet Central Asia's 'modernization,' secularization, and 'social mobilization.' By this reckoning, Soviet efforts to purge the Muslim Central Asian population of its Islamic consciousness have been broadly successful, and consequently Islam is no longer important in the makeup of the identity of Soviet Muslim elites (although it has greater influence among the more conservative masses)" (p. 28). This statement is followed by a reference to my article "Soviet Islam and World Revolution" in *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), July 1982, pp. 487–505.

In fact, my argument is quite different. I quote from page 500 of that article: "I would argue that the Islamic revival that the Muslim world is experiencing seems to be having little direct impact on Soviet Muslims. For the masses, the arguments of the religious opposition of Egypt and Syria, or of the ruling groups in Iran, would be difficult to understand; predictions of some Western analysts that a protracted war in Afghanistan might heighten religious opposition in the Soviet Union[47] have not been borne out by the facts. Although there is no evidence of Muslim religio-political dissent in the U.S.S.R., this does not mean that Islam is not a social force in the Soviet Union for the overwhelming majority of Soviet Muslims. It is a social force, but it is not a political force. By recognizing the almost definitional relationship of Islam and the national culture of the Muslim regions, the regime is forestalling—possibly indefinitely—the likelihood that the religious leaders will be able to function as a political pressure group, as they did when they perceived themselves under threat in the early days of Soviet rule." (My footnote 47, it might be noted, cited an earlier article by Bennigsen, "Soviet Muslims and the World of Islam," which had appeared in *Problems of Communism* in March-April 1980.)

Thus, in fact, I share Bennigsen's belief that Islam is an important part of Central Asian culture and is a key factor in the formation of national identity; where we differ is in our assessment of the potential political impact of Soviet Muslims' Islamic identities.

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TO THE EDITORS: Professor Alexandre Bennigsen is an eminent proponent of one interpretation of the status of Islam in the contemporary Soviet Union. However, one can scrutinize the evidence and find support for a strikingly different interpretation. A number of specific points raised by Professor Bennigsen seem perfectly plausible, but elsewhere the logic of the argument and the supporting evidence are not strong enough to justify the certainty with which he asserts such controversial opinions.

A crucial problem is what to make of the fact that millions of Soviet citizens undoubtedly still identify with Islam, at least in some sense. It is quite a leap from noting Islam's survival to assuming that Islamic loyalties now encourage serious hostility toward the Soviet regime. My reading in Tajik sources leads me to the conclusion that at least in that republic the persistence of Islam means above all the survival of ordinary folk religion, which is bad enough from the Soviet authorities' point of view, as the embodiment of "backward" attitudes, but is still far from any hint of powerful political activism. The very fact that the regime's cultural influence is less pervasive in rural areas, where the majority of Central Asian Muslims live, has not only facilitated the survival of folk Islam but has also allowed believers more leeway to meet the demands of the Soviet system while continuing to practice their religion. Various kinds of discontent may quite possibly exist, but the important question is how willing Muslims would be to advance from grumbling to political action. Given the millions of Soviet citizens victimized by the regime's coercion, Soviet Muslims may not be ready to incur the enormous risks of taking that step.

There is also the question of whether the 45 to 50 million Soviet Muslims should be treated as a monolith, all equally committed to Islam and a single perception of what that loyalty entails, all equally dissatisfied, and all ready to combine their loyalties and antagonisms in the same way. The notion that all Muslims owe their highest loyalty to a single community of all the faithful, the *'umma,* has been a pious fiction, frequently invoked and just as frequently ignored in practice, since the first decades of Islam's existence.

Furthermore, there is the question of whether diverse notions of Islamic militance from the non-Soviet part of the *'umma* are appealing to Soviet Muslims. Many such militant movements (including those in Egypt, Syria, and Turkey) have failed thus far. Pakistan, which under Zia ul-Haq follows a variety of Islamicization, is beset with problems that may reduce its attractiveness as an exemplar for Soviet Muslims. While an Islamic revolution has taken place in Iran, that has been accomplished in the name of Shiism, a variety of Islam that has objectionable features for many Sunnis, including a large part of Iran's Sunni minority. Moreover, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni's Shiism is an innovative variety, which even some of Iran's other ayatollahs think goes too far. As for the role of Islam in the Afghan-Soviet fighting, the Afghan guerrillas are themselves divided on how much influence to accord Islam in nonspiritual matters. There is also the question of the Soviet Muslims' reaction to the fact that the war in Afghanistan has dragged on for five years. Are they impressed that the guerrillas have fought so long despite material disadvantages or do they by now consider it more important that while the guerrillas have not been defeated, neither have they won?

In some cases, the sources cited in the article do not support the assertions they are intended to buttress. A prime example of this is a quotation (pp. 28–29) from an article by Yaacov Ro'i, used to back the argument that the Soviets are worried because Islamic militance in Iran and Afghanistan has *already* stimulated increased Islamic activism among Soviet Muslims. Yet the larger passage from which that quotation is drawn (*The USSR and the Muslim World,* Winchester, MA, Allen & Unwin, 1984, pp. 167–68) argues something different. Ro'i contends that the Soviets are con-

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cerned that *Western* propaganda is exploiting Islamic activism in Iran and Afghanistan. That is quite different from saying that the stimulus and the response are contained entirely within the *'umma*. Even more important, Ro'i portrays the Soviets as seeing this foreign influence as a *potential* problem, rather than an extensive, existing one, and further contends that Soviet authorities will do whatever is necessary to ensure that this potential is never realized. In the sentence immediately following the passage quoted by Bennigsen, Ro'i states: "Surely, for example, the fact that the Soviets dwelt on the role of the mosques and the Muslim clergy as sources of trouble in Iran . . . is evidence that Moscow has earmarked these as potential sources of danger to itself and has no intention of letting either the . . . Establishment Muslim functionaries or the less easily controllable unofficial clergy . . . incite believers against the regime" (p. 168).

Several of Bennigsen's major points can be interpreted in a very different light when seen in a larger context. The increased Soviet coverage of Islam since the late 1970's need not prove that the Soviets are worried about rising Islamic militance among their own citizens (p. 29). There are three other issues, all related to each other, that are extremely important and should not be omitted from the consideration of this issue.

First, during the 1970's but before the "Islamic revival" at the end of the decade, the recovery from Stalinist regimentation gave rise to the emergence of a group of Soviet scholars of Islam who were better trained than any of their predecessors since the 1920's and were allowed greater latitude to do more serious, less polemical research on Islam. The result was a spurt of studies of how Islam at home and abroad affects people's worldly ideas and way of life, a change from the older concentration on the Marxist critique of religions as opiates of the masses.

Another reason for the increased number of Soviet publications on Islam since the late 1970's was the dramatic growth of Islamic political assertiveness abroad. These events also stimulated a host of publications in the United States and Western Europe, which see Islamic activism as affecting their interests even though the Western countries do not have significant Muslim populations.

Finally, an important part of the connection between the Islamic upsurge and Soviet publications about Islam is the fact that there are aspects of Islam's strength abroad that the Soviets liked very much. Between 1979 and 1982 the Soviets were hopeful that Islamic militance in Iran and elsewhere would render the useful service of ending the pro-Western orientation of those countries, including Algeria, South Yemen, and Syria, by serving as a tool that governments could use to rally mass support for programs that are in fact socialist-oriented.

Another major point of the article that looks quite different when seen in a broader context is the issue of the treatment of the Basmachi in the Central Asian press. This coverage may reflect a number of Soviet concerns, not just fear of existing Islamic assertiveness in Central Asia, which Bennigsen emphasizes (p. 39). Stories linking anti-Soviet activities and a vulnerable border with Afghanistan go back many years, to an era when Afghanistan was at peace internally and there was a modus vivendi between the Afghan monarchy and the Soviet government. Moreover, the Central Asian press has also given at least as much coverage to World War II as to the Basmachi. This does not apply only to the past few months (as the press anticipated the 40th anniversary of Germany's defeat); these reminders of World War II point to one of the most important messages the Soviet leadership conveys to all Soviet citizens, a message that the Basmachi stories can also support—that the Soviet Union has repeatedly been the target of vicious enemies and that therefore the many privations imposed on the Soviet citizens are justified by the need to make the country strong enough to defend itself against the hateful opponents.

The article portrays the Soviet emphasis on creating new secular rituals to replace traditional Islamic ones as indicative of an Islamic upsurge in the USSR (p. 41). Yet this concern over rituals is longstanding, not a recent innovation in response to a brewing crisis, and it applies to many parts of the Soviet Union, not just areas where there are many Muslims.

Some of the article's assertions are unsubstantiated. A prime example of this is Bennigsen's assertion that the growth of "parallel" Islam "may well be related to events in Iran and Afghanistan" (pp. 31–32), which he bases on the observation that published complaints about Sufi activity are particularly numerous in Turkmenistan, which borders Iran and Afghanistan. This does not take into account the generations of often violent hostility on the part of many Central Asian Turkmen tribes toward both Shiism and Persians or the fact that Turkmen on the Iranian side of the border have been hostile to the Islamic republic.

There certainly is, as the article asserts, anti-Islamic propaganda in the Soviet Union. However, there is no evidence that it is prompted in large part by fear of the influence of foreign Islamic militance. The theme of the propaganda is that Islam is an obstacle to the creation of a society in which all share socialist values. The "inadequacies" of citizens' attitudes is a problem that Soviet authorities face on many fronts, not just regarding Islam or just in the largely Muslim republics. The heart of the problem is that the CPSU's program for the creation of a new order is unworkable. Rather than admit the unsoundness of fundamental ideological assumptions and the methods of implementing them, Soviet authorities call for vigorous propaganda campaigns to make the population believe in the ideology so that it will behave ideally. This approach is stressed in matters having no direct relation to Islam, notably the search for improved economic performance.

The article also contends that a significant shift has occurred in anti-Islamic propaganda in the wake of the invasion of Afghanistan, in that before 1980 the themes emphasized were that Islam is anti-scientific, backward, and not in keeping with socialist values, whereas since 1980 the main theme has been the importance of improving atheist propaganda among the young (p. 40). However, at least in Tajikistan this is not the case. The supposedly pre-1980 themes remain central.

Besides, Soviet sources also present Islam in terms that have important positive sides. Thus, Islam—despite its defects in Soviet eyes—also has a historical tradition in Central Asia of supporting the masses' interests and of fighting for social justice. Both scholarly and propaganda works argue that nowadays observant Muslims can and do retain their religious belief while fulfilling their duties to the Soviet system.

Social science research of necessity entails building a larger picture from fragmentary evidence. The special problems of access to sources in the case of the Soviet Union argues for particular caution in drawing conclusions.

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MR. BENNIGSEN RESPONDS: Martha Olcott insists that Islam is a social force but not a political one; however it does, she claims, figure in the Central Asians' national identity, i.e., there is a "definitional relationship" between the two. In my view, the only way one can ignore the Islamic political content of this "definitional relationship" is to ignore 13 centuries of Islamic culture in Central Asia, which then might lead one to the conclusion,

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as it apparently has led Muriel Atkin, on the basis of reading Tajik newspapers, that "persistence of Islam means above all the survival of ordinary folk religion...."

It is essential here to find out exactly what it is that Olcott means, but unfortunately she does not explain. Is she claiming that Islam never had political meaning in Central Asia, or that the Soviet Marxist-Leninist experiment has succeeded—through social engineering and repression—in eliminating it? To conclude the first is a historical absurdity. To conclude the second is to ignore all of the Soviets' own evidence of concern about the political implications of letting Islam develop unchecked in their state. It seems to me that the burden of proof in this case lies with those who, like Olcott, claim that something fundamental has happened to Islam under Soviet rule, something that inclines its adherents to abandon Islam's politics while maintaining its sociology. Moreover, advocates of this line should explain how such a bifurcation can take place in Islam in the first place. Where is the evidence? Where are the historical precedents?

I am not surprised that Atkin has learned from the Tajik press of the "backward attitudes" of Soviet Muslims and that Islam constitutes only "ordinary folk religion." What does she expect to find? An open admission that Islam, despite massive Soviet efforts to wipe it out, still has Moscow worried, and that because of this worry Moscow feels obliged year after year to devote enormous resources to deal with it? Or perhaps an admission that the Soviet founding fathers were—dare one say it?—wrong in their belief that Islam in their empire would be as easy a target as Orthodoxy?

Having noted, correctly in my view, that the Soviet "program for the creation of a new order is unworkable" and that the Soviet leadership has substituted for their dead ideology "vigorous propaganda campaigns" to make the population believe what the leaders want it to believe, Atkin uncritically accepts the Soviets' own characterization of Islam in their empire.

In what ways does Islam have political meaning in the USSR? Literally hundreds of Soviet sources in many languages over the last 15 or so years have argued that Islamic identity and national identity combine or coincide at various junctures to impede Soviet social engineering. That is one way. But the important point here is that this merging of identities either can be "definitional," as Olcott argues (which I take to mean unintentional or unconscious), or it can be cultivated for political ends. When Soviet sociologists note that a frequent exhortation from one Muslim to another is that if they are not good Muslims they cannot be good Turkmen, Kazakhs, or Avars, this has political meaning both among the Soviet Muslims themselves and in the eyes of the Soviet regime which took the trouble to record it. The relationship between Islam and nationality in this case is political and openly so.

Another indication of Islam's political content is to be found in the equally frequent complaint that Soviet Muslims' traditional practices based on Islamic belief and ritual are stalling the evolution of the "new Soviet man." Yet a third, which is seen more and more these days, is that Islam is becoming popular not only among old men and "fanatics"—which is the way Soviet specialists have portrayed Islam's appeal in the USSR for many years—but also among younger people and even intellectuals and those with higher education, that is, that Islam is becoming a successfully subversive ideology among a larger cross section of the population than before. I would be willing to bet that systematic research would show that this particular Soviet complaint dates approximately from the upheaval in Iran and the war in Afghanistan.

Finally, there is the Soviet concern that Islam in the USSR is exploitable by outside forces, both Western and Middle Eastern. On this last point, Atkin accuses me of inappropriately using an article by Yaacov Ro'i to buttress my point that Soviet authorities are legitimately concerned about the likelihood that the Iranian situation will aggravate their "Muslim problem." Does Atkin really believe that Soviet concern about the opportunities for outside exploitation of "Islamic activism" in Afghanistan and Iran says nothing about Soviet concern with the probable resonance of such exploitation in the USSR's Muslim regions? I read Ro'i to mean that a "potential problem" is one for which there is already some evidence. Indeed, I have found plenty of evidence in the Soviet media, and a good deal of it was presented in my article (and in the Ro'i article that Atkin chose to cite). Is it conceivable that the Soviet leadership would conduct an easily documentable campaign against the dangers of spillover from Iran and Afghanistan and against the possibility that some Soviet Muslims might find something attractive in these forbidden fruits only as a preventive measure, or perhaps because they have nothing else to discuss? I think not.

All of the Soviet initiatives to eliminate the kind of impediments to their policies cited above are politically inspired, unless we are prepared to accept the view that Brezhnev-Andropov-Chernenko and company have really been only closet anthropologists who do not understand the political implications of their actions and whose real concern is Soviet Muslims' "backward attitudes." The Soviets are perfectly capable of tolerating backwardness—as in agriculture—as long as political control is not threatened.

Are Soviet Muslims themselves incapable of seeing this as a political struggle in which Islam is an important political instrument, as both Olcott and Atkin imply? I have always regarded this argument, which has surfaced often in my experience, as inherently racist. We accept without question that Catholicism in Poland or Judaism in Israel are both simultaneously social and political forces. We are prepared to accept that Catholicism is a banner around which Lithuanians, who were still heathen in the 14th century, can rally today and that this action has important political meaning. Yet the Islam of an Uzbek, whose ancestors built Samarkand 2000 years ago, strikes these same analysts as mainly a "social" phenomenon or "folk religion."

In the 1950's and 1960's this same kind of academic silliness was observable in France. I remember well that the prevailing attitude among most intellectuals at that time was that Islam could not be taken seriously as a political force in North Africa; rather, it was viewed as a sociological remnant of the medieval past. More recently, we encountered the same sort of bias among "experts" discussing the prospects of the erstwhile Shah of Iran. Who at that time took Khomeyni and his islam seriously as a political force?

Atkin deepens the confusion regarding the complex and multifarious political nature of Soviet islam when she asks "how willing Muslims would be to advance from grumbling to political action." What does she mean by "political action"? Islamic *samizdat* and *magnitizdat*? There is some of that, as I documented in my article. Passing smuggled pamphlets from Afghanistan? Also documented. Inappropriate performance by many Soviet Muslims during the first months of the invasion of Afghanistan? Documented. The survival, indeed, expansion, of "parallel" Islam and the continued, perhaps heightened activity of Sufism? Plenty of evidence, from Soviet sources, exists to substantiate both. In the case of "parallel" Islam and Sufism, there can be little doubt that to engage in them is a political act. Both are subject to penalties, extreme in the case of Sufis, and every Soviet Muslim knows it. In this sense, many Soviet Muslims have already "advanced" to "political activism."

Evidence of this kind of politi-

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cal commitment has been accumulating for years, and even the Soviets now acknowledge its existence. Take, for example, the item by E. Filimonov, "The Ideological and Social Essence of Religious Extremism," in issue No. 8 for 1984 of the authoritative antireligious journal *Nauka i Religiya* published in Moscow. Filimonov draws a clear distinction between religious "fanatics" and nationalism is a characteristic trend." He goes on to note Muslim "Ishan-Murid groups for whom the blending of religiosity and nationalsim is a characteristic trend." He goes on to note that these "extremists" consciously violate Soviet law and engage in the "use of religion for *political* aims" (my emphasis). He concludes that these political trends, "especially the sectarian underground *(podpol'ye)* must be liqiuidated." That is pretty strong language for describing how to deal with an annoying anthropological leftover, which Marxism-Leninism is supposed to make obsolete anyway.

How else, if not in the context of Islam's political power and the Soviets' own awareness of the real danger it portends, can one understand such a comment as that by K. Shulembayev (there are many more like it), in which he notes that in their sermons, "nonregistered clerics call on all Muslims to unite against all who oppose Islam" (*Komsomol'skaya Pravda,* [Moscow], June 11, 1983). There is abundant evidence of "political activism" among Soviet Muslims in which Islam figures as a dominant or subordinate stimulus. In my view, Olcott would be well advised to reconsider her categorical statement in her July 1982 *World Politics* article that "there is no evidence of Muslim religio-political dissent in the USSR." On this she was wrong in 1982, and today such a statement simply cannot be taken seriously.

Olcott's and Atkin's confusion, I believe, stems at least in part from their use of such terms as "political force" and "political activism" to explain what is happening—or, in their view, what is not happening—in the Muslim regions of the USSR. These terms have little precise meaning, especially in the Soviet Islamic context, and they convey the impression that the study and analysis of a highly diverse, subtle, and variegated political culture can be conducted successfully by using the theoretical tools of modern political journalism.

To believe that one must advance from "grumbling" to "political activism," and that this progression is the only one with political meaning, demonstrates a poor understanding of the nature of Islam and politics generally and of both in the Soviet context specifically. Islam, like any religious belief, has many layers of meaning and commitment, some of which are politically significant generally or contextually; "political activism" is not the only indicator of the political significance of Islam in Soviet society. To suggest that it is only through "political activism" that Islam can be seen to have political importance in Central Asia and the other Muslim regions of the USSR is to seriously oversimplify our understanding and study of these complex societies.

Moreover, inasmuch as an understanding of the dynamics of the Soviet Muslim regions has value in policy analysis, this kind of analytical simplification is dangerously misleading. One does not have to wait for a *jihad* to be proclaimed against Russian settlers in Kazakhstan or for the establishment of a public relations office by the Afghan Jamiat-e Islami in Tashkent to appreciate the political importance of Islam in the Soviet Muslim environment. But regarding the latter possibility, it is revealing to remember that both Colonel Qadhafi and Ayatollah Khomeyni asked Soviet permission to open permanent missions in Tashkent, and both, not surprisingly, were turned down flat. The politics of Islam, as these incidents demonstrate clearly, is part of the broader political dynamics of Soviet Muslim regions and the empire generally. One does not have to assert that the Soviet empire is in immediate danger of exploding—an extreme and unjustifiable view at the other end of the spectrum from those who claim that there is no Islamic political activity—to understand this. Analysts who ignore or gratuitously minimize the Soviet Islamic issue because they can find little evidence of "political activism" do so at more than their own peril.

While it would be ridiculous to deny that there are different kinds of influences in the Iranian and Afghan situations which could find resonance among Soviet Muslims, it is the Islamic message and the politics that are implicit in it that has Soviet officials most exercised. Atkin's suggestion that the Shiite dimension of the Iranian revolution would put Soviet Muslims off is not borne out by anything I have seen or heard, from any human or media source. In any case, this would make sense only if the message coming from Iran were primarily religious and if we could imagine groups of Soviet Central Asians gathered at the teahouse for intense theological debate. Neither is true. The message is essentially political, just as it is to largely Sunnite Pakistan, where there is also considerable admiration among all strata of the population for Khomeyni's political achievements.

I am not quite sure what Atkin means when she says that "the Afghan guerrillas are themselves divided on how much influence to accord Islam in nonspiritual matters," but if she is implying that Islam plays a marginal role in the war effort or that any of the important resistance movements in Afghanistan rejects the idea that Islam will be an essential ingredient in the structuring of the postwar political organization of Afghanistan, she is either misinformed or out of touch, as virtually every expert who has spent time in Afghanistan in the last five years would tell her.

Furthermore, it is clear from my conversations with various Afghan resistance leaders and political figures that most of them understand perfectly the Soviet anxiety about the infection of Soviet Muslims with Islamic ideas, that is, with an Islamic political consciousness. Some groups—as I noted in my article—have moved to exploit this Soviet sensitivity, which they see to have an important political payoff if negotiations for a settlement ever take place. I am preprared to believe that they know something about Islam in Soviet Central Asia that Atkin does not.

Atkin may be right to believe that the appearance since the 1970's of more Soviet publications on Islam—but not specifically anti-Islamic publications, which are something quite different—stems from a variety of reasons. But I remain unconvinced, and would like to see some serious evidence to substantiate the contention that the main stimulus was not Soviet anxiety over the possibility that upheaval in the Islamic world abroad would be reflected among Soviet Muslims. Indeed, where one does, occasionally, find several approaches to the matter of Islam contained within one volume, the result can be revealing. For example, in the impressive volume *Voprosy Nauchnogo Ateizma* (Problems of Scientific Atheism), Vol. 31, Moscow, Mysl' for the Soviet Academy of Social Sciences, 1981 (printed in 23,000 copies), the first half is devoted to the dynamism of Islam outside the USSR. The arguments are serious, objective, and clearly aim to provide reliable information on Islamic trends to a select audience. In contrast, the second half, devoted to Islam in the USSR, is classic anti-Islamic propaganda, each author seemingly trying to outdo the preceding one in stressing that Islam in the USSR is retrograde and must be wiped out. Some may see this juxtaposition as mere coincidence; I, for one, do not.

Almost all Soviet media pay incessant attention to the Soviet struggle in World War II. Atkin's claim that the recent focus of Central Asian media on the Basmachi issue is simply part of this larger campaign to raise the general level of the Soviet popula-

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tion's vigilance is ludicrous. One has only to note the timing of the Basmachi media initiative to see why.

Atkin appears to suggest that Turkmen Sufism is based on anti-Shiism and anti-Persianism. I have spent quite a lot of time in the last 40 years, including a fairly lengthy stint among the Turkmen of Iran in my earlier days, studying the Sufi issue. I have never encountered any source advancing this explanation. If Atkin has evidence of this trend, I would be most interested to see it.

Atkin selectively paraphrases me to say that "the main theme [in Soviet anti-Islamic propaganda] has been the importance of improving atheist propaganda among the young." I did indeed argue this, and I added in the same sentence that anti-Islamic literature increasingly focuses on "the absolute incompatibility of Islam and Marxism-Leninism." There is so much evidence of this latter approach in a variety of Soviet popular and scholarly writing in the last few years as to throw Atkin's subsequent claim that "Soviet sources also present Islam in terms that have important positive sides" into question. This may be true, as noted above, when these sources discuss Islam outside the USSR, but it is seldom encountered today in reference to Soviet Islam, and it certainly is not a trend of any kind.

"Social science research of necessity entails building a larger picture from fragmentary evidence," Atkin concludes. As a social scientist, she would know about this. As a historian, I know that larger pictures can seldom be built at all, and certainly not accurately, without a firm historical foundation. When a proper historical foundation has been laid, "fragmentary evidence" fills an existing void and becomes more meaningful than it is in isolation.

But is the evidence as fragmentary as Olcott and Atkin would have us think? I simply do not agree that we are so bereft of *useful research material* that we are unable to reach sensible conclusions about political life in the Soviet Muslim regions. Nor is it the case that our historical knowledge of Central Asian development, including the importance of Islam in it and to it, need suffer, except for lack of preparation. Extrapolation of the available evidence is possible and necessary. Of course, the evidence must be used with care, as is true with all evidence, and no one can disagree with Atkin's somewhat patronizing statement that the "special problems of access to sources in the case of the Soviet Union argues for particular caution in drawing conclusions." Access, I would argue, is the lesser problem. The greater problem is understanding what is already available.

ALEXANDRE BENNIGSEN
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TROTSKYITES IN SPAIN

TO THE EDITORS: Michael Sodaro, in reviewing my book *The Communist Party in Spain* in his essay "Whatever Happened to Eurocommunism?" (*Problems of Communism,* November–December 1984), writes of the "PCE's [Spanish Communist Party's] nefarious activities against Trotskyites and other rivals on the left during the Civil War" (p. 64). Since the persecution undertaken by the PCE at that time was directed against only two organizations—the anarchist National Confederation of Labor (Confederación Nacional de Trabajo) and the communist dissident Workers' Party of Marxist Unification (Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista—POUM)—the label "Trotskyite" here must refer to POUM. This repetition of a Communist falsehood, doubtless unwitting, must be corrected.

POUM was founded in 1935 when 7,000 members of the Workers' and Peasants' Bloc (Bloque Obrero y Campesino), which on the communist spectrum of the period could best be described as reflecting the views of Nikolay Bukharin, joined 250 members of the Communist Left (Izquierda Comunista), an organization that had been Trotskyite but had broken with Trotsky in 1933. POUM was sharply criticized and attacked by Trotsky; it was never a Trotskyite party. But in order to "justify" their persecution of POUM, the Communists labeled it "Trotskyite," a term that at the time seemed to offer carte blanche for any crime one wished to perpetrate.

All this is clearly explained in my book. The fact that, after nearly half a century, impartial scholars continue to repeat this Communist propaganda canard shows just how effective it was. POUM was not a member of the Fourth International (then not yet in existence) or of the Secretariat of Communist Opposition, but rather belonged to the International Bureau of Revolutionary Socialist Parties, which also included the British International Labour Party, the Italian Partito Socialista Massimalista of Angelica Balabanov, and the French Parti Ouvrier et Paysan of Marcel Pivert. It is difficult to imagine a Trotskyite group in this company.

VICTOR ALBA
Barcelona

MR. SODARO RESPONDS: Professor Alba's points concerning POUM are well-taken. In my review of his book, however, I did not say that POUM was a Trotskyite party. Rather, I was simply referring to the fact that there were pro-Trotsky elements in Spain—both in and outside of POUM—who were persecuted by the PCE during the Civil War, a fact Alba himself notes in his book. Perhaps the most prominent of these figures was Andrés Nin, who was none other than the political secretary of POUM, and whose identification with Trotsky and subsequent assassination at the hands of the communists are amply described by Professor Alba in his informative study.

MICHAEL J. SODARO
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SOVIET STRATEGIC OUTLOOK

TO THE EDITORS: I read with great interest George G. Weickhardt's article "Ustinov versus Ogarkov" in the book review section of the January-February 1985 issue of *Problems of Communism.* The piece is not so much a review as the author's interpretation of evidence about attitudes toward strategic nuclear war contained in Soviet sources, specifically in the writings of the late Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov and of former Chief of the General Staff Nikolay Ogarkov.

Weickhardt's basic thesis is that there has been a "Soviet debate between advocates of nuclear-war-fighting and those of mutual deterrence" (which groups he sees as represented by Marshals Ogarkov and Ustinov respectively) and that this debate "has recently taken a most dramatic turn, with the latter side emerging the clear victor" (by having forced Ogarkov into what is depicted as a "recantation"). Such a development, if it had indeed happened, would be of greatest political relevance. However, Weickhardt's thesis does not fit with my own conclusions from an extensive reading of Soviet source materials on security policy matters in general and of the sources that Weickhardt cites in particular.

Weickhardt adduces the following views attributable to Ustinov as evidence that the Defense Minister was a proponent of the mutual-deterrence point of view:

- Soviet doctrine does not contemplate the possibility of surviving and winning a nuclear war;
- there is no sure method of fighting a victorious nuclear war;
- only someone who is willing to commit suicide would start nuclear war;
- it is madness to count on victory in either an arms race or a nuclear war;
- one cannot disarm the ad-

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versary by a (nuclear) first strike;

- the Soviet forces have everything that is needed to rebuff an attacker.

As evidence that Ogarkov regarded nuclear warfare as feasible Weickhardt notes the following views of the Soviet Marshal:

- the introduction of nuclear rocketry will lead to the development of means to counter such weapons;
- though a nuclear first strike or first use of nuclear weapons is not advocated, victory in war against the West is a definite, "objective" possibility;
- the USSR has to be prepared for the possibility that the Western "imperialists" might unleash nuclear war.

Weickhardt does note that in May 1983, Ogarkov spoke out against starting a nuclear war, terming it mutually suicidal because each side has the capability to inflict unacceptable damage after the other's first strike. But the implication of this statement is discounted by Weickhardt's assertion that Ogarkov had been forced to "recant" his previous views (p. 81).

However, the underlying assumption that previously Ogarkov had voiced confidence in Soviet ability to wage a nuclear war, and to survive and win it, is not correct. On page 47 of the very brochure of January 1982 that Weickhardt cites, Ogarkov made it quite plain that an all-out war with the West has to be feared by the USSR because such a war would be infinitely more disastrous than World War II.

On the other hand, that alleged proponent of mutual deterrence and foe of preparation for warfare, Ustinov, is on the public record with a number of statements that say it is necessary for the USSR to make contingency preparations for war, because the Western imperialists cannot be forced to renounce permanently the use of military means and therefore might decide on aggression against the Soviet Union. In such an eventuality, one would have to be able to defend the socialist homeland successfully. In much the same vein as Ogarkov, Ustinov has explained (e.g., in *Pravda,* May 9, 1983) that decisive and fateful strikes would then be inflicted upon the Western "aggressor." In other words, successful defense is tantamount to warfare, in which the Western adversary (always cast in the role of the attacker) must be defeated so as to stop his aggression against the USSR (a country which, it is asserted, cannot but be peace-seeking by virtue of being socialist).

Following Weickhardt's patterns of interpretation, one would have to conclude, on the basis of this additional evidence, that it was Ogarkov who favored mutual deterrence and Ustinov who adhered to a war-fighting philosophy. I would, however, not make that argument, for I feel that the interpretive approach is inadequate. When a Soviet leader voices concern over what an all-out nuclear war would do to his homeland (and I have seen no responsible figure in Moscow who would not be scared), this does not mean that he wants to join the West in mutual deterrence as a basis for a common effort at war avoidance.

Such an idea would make no sense to any Soviet leader, because they all view the East-West relationship as fundamentally antagonistic. Consequently, the Western side is viewed as an adversary with whom there is an ongoing political confrontation which may, it is true, take forms less obnoxious than those of the "cold war," but which also might result in hot war in the worst case. The USSR must always be prepared for this last contingency and hence must have the capability to defend itself successfully. Since Khrushchev's downfall, any policy that would make Western-type deterrence its cornerstone has been regarded as failing to meet the basic Soviet security requirement: the ability to assure security in case of the ultimate test of an East-West war (which eventuality, to be sure, is not sought in Moscow, even as it is considered a definite possibility).

Such thinking leaves no room for the idea that mutual deterrence and common efforts to avoid war could conceivably create a framework for East-West security and stability. Instead, the Soviet leaders seek security, including avoidance of East-West war if possible, by preparing for successful defense (which they also view as an optimum means of deterring the Western "aggressor"). This pattern of thought is clearly reflected in all Soviet writing on both defense and deterrence. Whenever a Soviet author talks about his country's security needs and security efforts, it is invariably the notion of defense that is central to all he says. That is, he puts "defense" into the very place that his Western counterpart would reserve for "deterrence."

To my knowledge, no Soviet author, whether politician or academic, has ever related "deterrence" to his own country's policies. Whenever deterrence (in any sense not coinciding with successful defense) is a subject of discussion—which, to be sure, is quite rare and indulged in only by academics—it is always Western, particularly US, policy that is being discussed. Moreover, the concept is given a very negative evaluation, indicated by the Russian words chosen to translate "deterrence," which range from the mild *"sderzhivaniye"* (meaning [anti-Soviet] restraint) to the outrageous *"ustrasheniye"* (which in English-language retranslations correctly appears as "intimidation"). One cannot but conclude that deterrence as understood in the West, not only is alien to Soviet thought, but also meets with total rejection in Moscow, as has indeed been directly stated on various occasions.

The Soviet belief that successful defense prevents the West from war, poses a problem: How can that be reconciled with the simultaneous assessment (expressed, e.g., by both Ustinov and Ogarkov) that the USSR would face unacceptable damage in the eventuality of a nuclear war? Unacceptable damage makes successful defense problematic to say the least. But it would be wrong to conclude (as Weickhardt seems to do) that, for this reason, Moscow renounces its successful-defense orientation and accepts Western mutual-deterrence philosophy. Moscow respects a Western deterrent when it is there, but it certainly does not internalize the Western concept that goes along with it.

What does this mean in practice? It means that Soviet leaders know that they cannot afford a strategic nuclear war that would involve Soviet territory, and that they therefore will adapt their behavior to the existence of the US strategic nuclear deterrent whenever it is likely to play a role. But at the same time, Soviet leaders will also direct their efforts to minimizing the relevance of the US strategic nuclear deterrent in the overall East-West context, so as to maximize the impact of the military superiority that the Soviet Union feels it has acquired in Europe and in other regional theaters.

That the USSR has theater superiority was explicitly stated by Soviet leaders such as Marshals Rodion Malinovskiy and Andrey Grechko (and also by East Germany's Heinz Hoffmann) through 1976. It was only thereafter, in the context of the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR), that the Kremlin began to realize that its demand that the "existing correlation of military forces" (which, as was occasionally indicated in private, implied some military advantage for the USSR) be preserved was increasingly alienating the very Western publics from whom Moscow was seeking political support against the alleged arms race policies of NATO. It was then decided that Moscow should advocate instead the preservation of the "existing military equilibrium," and simultaneously deny any Soviet desire for military superiority. This public policy line was first voiced in Leonid Brezhnev's Tula speech of January 1977 (to which

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Weickhardt refers), and it has remained the guideline for subsequent Soviet public statements.

This change in wording, however, has not been followed by a change in practice. The Soviet armament effort in the regional theaters has not slowed down (despite already existing favorable quantitative and qualitative force ratios); nor has the USSR's basic negotiating stance at MBFR undergone a revision. When, in Bonn in May 1978, Brezhnev signed a commitment to "military parity and equilibrium" and explained to Chancellor Helmut Schmidt that he would not depart from the "existing parity in the field of medium-range systems," the Soviets had deployed only 27 SS-20 missiles armed with 81 warheads; these were to become approximately 140 missiles (with approximately 420 warheads) by the time of NATO's dual-track decision in December 1979, and had increased to 379 missiles (1,137 warheads) by late 1983, when the Western alliance finally began its counterdeployment of Pershing II and land-based cruise missiles. Yet Soviet politicians and commentators throughout this period claimed that there was parity in medium-range weapons. I should add that since 1977, the Soviet leaders have been continuously asked by Schmidt and other West European leaders to stop the SS-20 buildup, so as not to jeopardize the European balance and not to compel NATO to respond in kind.

It was Ogarkov who, on one occasion, spelled out how Soviet no-military-superiority rhetoric and the Soviet arms buildup policy fit together. In his work of January 1982, on which Weickhardt largely bases his own interpretations, Ogarkov defines military superiority as a "symbol of aggressive ambitions" (p. 20). In this sense, it is self-evident that the USSR cannot possibly strive for military superiority: being a socialist, and therefore a "peace-loving" country, which by its very social and political nature will not threaten any other country in the world, the Soviet Union cannot be accused of aggressiveness; hence, it must be seen to be utterly incapable of seeking military superiority. But such a statement should be taken for what it is intended to be: an assertion of the Soviet claim to fundamental peacefulness—and not as an expression of preference with regard to one or another kind of force correlation.

The problem remains what Moscow can hope to achieve through theater superiority, if it is forced to respect the US deterrent at the strategic nuclear level. Is there not a risk that an East-West theater war (in which theater superiority can provide for "successful defense") might escalate into a nuclear strategic duel (in which Soviet hopes for "successful defense" are bound to be frustrated)? Is not NATO's security strategy so designed as to make clear precisely that risk?

The Soviet leaders fully realize the problem. But they want to bypass their dilemma by decoupling the European theater from the mutual-deterrence strategic nuclear relationship between the two superpowers. For this reason, they have tried to exploit arms control negotiations with the US—e.g., SALT I, SALT II, and INF—to persuade the Americans to decouple themselves strategically from their European allies. This Soviet desire surfaced openly when, at the peak of superpower détente in the summer and fall of 1972, Brezhnev and Andrey Gromyko pressed Washington for a treaty on prevention of nuclear war. Since, the Soviets argued, there was a continuing risk of East-West war in Europe which was likely to turn nuclear, both the USSR and the US would be well-advised to take precautions. They should, therefore, commit themselves to using their nuclear weapons exclusively on the territories of their European allies, leaving out each other's homelands.

If Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger had accepted the proposed deal, the Soviet leadership would have been given the assurance that in case of war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, it would not have to worry about an escalation to strategic nuclear dimensions. As a consequence, the USSR could have contemplated exploiting its perceived theater superiority in Europe both militarily (for the purpose of "successful defense" in case of war) and politically (for the purpose of inducing the West Europeans to be more accommodating). More recently, the USSR has sought to promote decoupling through attempts to achieve escalation dominance in Europe and to gain the option of limiting European warfare to conventional weapons.

Seen against this general background, various premises underlying Weickhardt's interpretation of Ustinov's and Ogarkov's statements seem implausible. The assessment that nuclear war would be disastrous (were it to spread to engulf the Soviet Union) does not contradict the notion that war against NATO, if it should occur, should be winnable (as there is no "successful defense" short of victory), and indeed could be won (provided that both the political and military conditions for decoupling the European theater from the strategic nuclear relationship with the US were created). For the time being, though, the Soviet leaders are far from believing that they have already achieved their goal of decoupling, and therefore they have to keep in mind that war, if it were to go nuclear (as it might), will be unacceptable and hence unmanageable. Contrary to Weickhardt's assertions (which would have been quite appropriate for the earlier era of Marshal Vasiliy Sokolovskiy's book), there is now an expanding Soviet search for methods to keep a European war limited, should it break out. Soviet open-source writings seem to indicate an increasing expectation that this might indeed be accomplished.

In analyzing Soviet statements on security matters, one should be attentive to the context. Weickhardt fails to indicate whether a given quotation forms part of a discussion about Soviet policy or about the line followed by the Western "imperialists." It is something quite different, for example, if the statement that one cannot possibly win an East-West war means that the USSR should not cherish such hopes or if it is part of a warning addressed to the Western side implying in fact that Soviet defensive power will frustrate any aggressive design. What Weickhardt interprets as an indication of the start of Ogarkov's departure from an alleged previous advocacy of Soviet nuclear-war-fighting capability, turns out to be in fact a warning directed at the West that the US cannot possibly hope to wage a successful nuclear war against the USSR.

Also, one should read very carefully to determine whether the statement that the Soviet forces have everything they need to rebuff an aggressor really means that they should not ask for more, as Weickhardt implies is inherent in what Ustinov has said. So far, I have been unable to check the original text, but I have seen a large number of similar Soviet statements carrying the message that the forces of the USSR were fully able to thwart any military adversary's aggressive designs without saying that the Soviet Union has enough defense capability. For example, Marshal Grechko, to whom Weickhardt rightly ascribes open advocacy of Soviet military superiority and a Soviet war-fighting orientation (this in statements made prior to Brezhnev's shift of rhetoric in early 1977), on one occasion stated: "The Soviet forces have everything they need," anticipating his successor's statement almost verbatim. However, the context makes it abundantly clear that he does not mean to say that the Soviet forces should be content with what they have and should abstain from asking for more. He instead conveys the message that constant military efforts are being made, and will continue to be made, in order to maintain an adequate Soviet defense capability (see the work by Grechko quoted by Weickhardt in note 5, p. 88).

In another place, Weickhardt simply misrepresents Soviet statements. He sees (p. 79)

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Ogarkov's 1981 *Kommunist* article as saying "that the introduction of nuclear-tipped rocketry would, in accordance with Marxist dialectic, be followed by the appearance of the means of countering *(protivodeystviye)* them." The original text, however, simply carries the general message that in the course of military history the development of offensive weapons has always triggered a countervailing development of defensive weapons—with no reference to nuclear missiles whatsoever. If one wished to read something specific into the statement, one would rather be inclined to think of theater weapons, given the context.

Similarly, Grechko is summarized (p. 78) as advocating counterforce and "probably" also launch-on-warning strategies. The source indicated, however, does not say this. The only point which is made there is Grechko's call for military superiority—nothing more than the general Soviet line before 1977.

Finally, a word on the sources. It is most unlikely that a highly authoritative standard work like the *Military Encyclopedia* (which has been edited by a commission chaired by Ogarkov, to be sure, but has also come out under the imprimatur of the defense ministry as a whole) could have been used by the military man Ogarkov for purposes of veiled polemics against his military and political superior Ustinov. Even outside the pages of the *Military Encyclopedia*, it would have been extremely unusual for a Soviet military man to polemicize against his superior. There have been few such arguments even among Soviet politicians in recent years. Although in the Khrushchev period it was not uncommon for political equals to indulge in veiled esoteric policy debate, such infighting—among equals, to be sure—stopped almost totally after Brezhnev took over.

A fairly recent RAND corporation study, based on interviews with Soviet emigrants who had worked in the media, has shed light on why this has been the case. The Brezhnev team developed a strong sense of mutual solidarity vis-à-vis the public, keeping policy debates strictly within the ruling circles and prohibiting any reference in the media to the existence of such debates. In those very few cases when a Soviet politician—to be sure, only a very high-level one like, e.g., one-time Politburo member Aleksandr Shelepin—violated that rule, all other leaders quickly united against him and punished him by removing him from office. Given such circumstances, it seems inconceivable to me that a man like Ogarkov, who was clearly on a secondary echelon of power and was bound by the laws of military discipline, could have even thought of publicly challenging a member of the USSR's supreme political authority, the Politburo. It is equallly unimaginable that Ogarkov could have openly defied—even in private, let alone in public—the official line solemnly proclaimed by General Secretary Brezhnev at the 26th Party Congress in February 1981 that nuclear war, given its worldwide destructiveness, cannot be waged. Brezhnev, of course, did not rule out explicitly (though perhaps he did implicitly) the need for the USSR to prepare for optimum damage limitation and the best possible chance of military success in case the US were to "impose" nuclear war on the Soviet homeland.

My letter, though already much longer than originally intended, could not go into all the intricacies of the problems raised by Weickhardt's essay. I am also aware that in the short time available, I could not check most of his citations by going back to the Soviet originals. Much of what is at issue will require further clarification on the basis of much fuller evidence. I feel, however, that I have touched on a number of points with regard to which a better understanding is needed than Weickhardt provided in his essay.

GERHARD WETTIG
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MR. WEICKHARDT RESPONDS: I am happy that my review elicited a response from Gerhard Wettig, one of the most perceptive European analysts of East-West security problems. While we obviously disagree on the significance of the Ustinov-Ogarkov debate, we come to similar conclusions on many of the important issues. It is unfortunate, therefore, that Wettig has claimed, incorrectly, that I misread or misrepresented the Soviet sources that I cited (and which he admits he could not "check" in most cases). In this reply, I shall quote more fully from the materials in question to prove the appropriateness of my original citations, and I shall also indicate where Wetting's and my own views converge.

Wettig does not accept my premise that Soviet leaders engage in veiled debates in public, and he even denies that there was any real infighting within the top Soviet leadership during the Brezhnev era. The debate between Ustinov and Ogarkov, of course, did not flare up until Brezhnev's dotage, and Ogarkov's recantation and demotion did not occur until the reigns of Andropov and Chernenko respectively. By this time, the unity of the Brezhnev Politburo was cracking. But even in the early 1970's, three members of the Politburo—Gennadiy Voronov, Petro Shelest, and Aleksandr Shelepin—were dismissed, each of whom had challenged Brezhnev on major agricultural or security issues, sometimes in public statements. The story of these conflicts has been told at length elsewhere and need not be repeated here (see Werner G. Hahn, *The Politics of Soviet Agriculture*, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972; and Harry Gelman, *The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Detente*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1984). Wettig also ignores the extensive evidence presented in Samuel Payne's book (*The Soviet Union and SALT*, Cambridge, MA, the MIT Press, 1980) regarding the public debates in the mid- and late 1970's between the "arms controllers," who included Andrey Gromyko, and the "militarists," who included Marshal Andrey Grechko.

Today one need not look far in the Soviet press to discern veiled debates even among Politburo members. For example, in December 1984, Mikhail Gorbachëv called for a radical transformation of the Soviet economy, this occurring shortly after Politburo member Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi had argued that market-oriented reforms might lead to unemployment and ultimately to the restoration of capitalism (cf. *Pravda* [Moscow], Dec. 11, 1984, pp. 2–3; and *Kommunist* [Moscow], No. 17, November 1984, p. 42).

My book review is also not the first work to note divergence between the statements of Soviet political leaders and Soviet military leaders on the issue of whether nuclear war is winnable (see David Holloway, *The Soviet Union and the Arms Race*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1983, Ch. 3). Nor is it the first to note that Ogarkov was out of step with civilian leaders on this issue (see William Hyland, "Kto Kogo in the Kremlin?" *Problems of Communism* [Washington, DC], January–February 1982, pp. 23–24; and Dan Strode and Rebecca Strode, "Diplomacy and Defense in Soviet National Security Policy," *International Security* [Cambridge, MA], Fall 1983, pp. 91–116).

Incidentally, Ogarkov's 1981 *Kommunist* article, cited in my book review, has also been interpreted as an open challenge to Chernenko, who was of course the leader in power when Ogarkov was later sacked as chief of the General Staff. Ogarkov's strongly worded article attacked the "carelessness, complacency, and apathy" inherent in saying that war is necessarily bad and in underestimating the threat of war. Ogarkov's article followed shortly on Chernenko's own article in *Pravda*, which had elaborately stated the case that a nuclear war could not be won and would place the future of

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mankind in doubt (on this, see Martin McCauley, "Leadership and the Succession Struggle," in McCauley, Ed., *The Soviet Union After Brezhnev*, New York, Holmes & Meier, 1983, pp. 25–26; Hyland made a similar point in the article cited above).

Wettig of course initially argues that there was no substantial divergence between the views of Ustinov and Ogarkov, and that the writings of both men contain the same stock phrases—suggesting that the best deterrence is successful defense. I myself have previously recognized the ambiguities in Ogarkov's many mercurial statements on nuclear war (see "The World According to Ogarkov," *International Security*, Spring 1984, pp. 182–85). Despite these ambiguities, some of which were pointed out by Wettig, one cannot fail to discern a clear contrast between the outspoken Ogarkov's approach to nuclear war and the more circumspect approach of Ustinov, Brezhnev, and Chernenko. In trying to blur this contrast, Wettig claims, erroneously, that I misquoted Ogarkov's May 1978 *Kommunist* article (which he miscites as a 1981 article) on the issue of developing a means of countering nuclear-tipped missiles. Wettig claims that there is no reference to nuclear-tipped missiles in Ogarkov's discussion. However, Ogarkov, in noting that the experience of past wars attests to the fact that new offensive weapons inevitably lead to the development of corresponding countermeasures, explicitly states: "This in full measure applies also to rocket nuclear weapons, the rapid development of which has prompted military-scientific thought and practice to actively develop methods and means of countering them."

Wettig does not deny that Ogarkov's 1979 *Soviet Military Encyclopedia* entry openly advocates the possibility of Soviet victory in nuclear war. In fact, Wettig in one of his own articles cited Ogarkov's encyclopedia entry to support the contention that there were Soviet statements to the effect that "in the event of war the Soviet leadership will launch an offensive designed to exploit the element of surprise and to bring Europe to the Atlantic under Soviet control. In this offensive ... a Soviet first use of theater nuclear weapons is not excluded" (see his "The Garthoff-Pipes Debate on Soviet Strategic Doctrine: A European Perspective," *Strategic Review* [Washington, DC], Spring 1973, p. 72).

Wettig's argument that Soviet doctrine is always cast in terms of successful defense is undercut by Ogarkov's 1982 pamphlet, *Vsegda v gotovnosti k zashchite otechestva* (Always in Readiness for Defense of the Fatherland), Moscow, Voyenizdat, which is imbued with a cult of the offensive. According to Ogarkov, Soviet military science had between the two world wars developed for the first time "a fundamentally new mode for conducting aggressive offensive actions by technically equipped mass armies." Today such operations must be conducted on a theater-wide scale and can be conducted without pause. He observes that "with the establishment of strategic nuclear forces, the top-echelon military leadership has acquired the capability to significantly influence the achievement of strategic and military-political war objectives" (pp. 32–35).

Modern strategic operations involve combined operations by all the armed services and will require, according to Ogarkov's pamphlet, immense support on the home front to make good the enormous losses. Although nuclear war would admittedly be very destructive, Ogarkov implies that such losses can be made good. While an all-out war between socialism and imperialism is not inevitable, it remains a distinct possibility. In such a war Soviet soldiers must retain "the will to achieve victory over the enemy in any and all conditions" (pp. 40, 26, 45, and 50). Furthermore, surprise (read: which side launches its missiles first) "is becoming a factor of the greatest strategic importance" (p. 60). The goal of Soviet doctrine, in sum, is not only to defend the homeland and deliver retaliatory blows, but also to "defeat the enemy under any conditions of a developing situation" (p. 58).

This pamphlet is the most comprehensive statement of Ogarkov's views on Soviet strategic doctrine, including all of its historical, economic, theoretical, and ideological aspects and the place that nuclear weapons occupy in this doctrine. The pamphlet quoted selectively from earlier Brezhnev commentary in support of some of its arguments, but it is striking that Ogarkov neither acknowledged nor quoted the contemporaneous statements by Brezhnev, Chernenko, and Ustinov that there could be no victor in nuclear war and that to start a nuclear war is madness.

Wettig claims that he can find war-fighting talk in Ustinov's writings more or less equivalent to Ogarkov's. In this connection Wettig quotes only from Ustinov's May 9, 1983, *Pravda* article, in which the Defense Minister used the standard Soviet rhetoric about a retaliatory, or second, strike: "There is no doubt that any attempt to take aggressive actions against our country will meet with a most resolute rebuff and will prove fatal to its initiators. Retribution will strike the aggressor inevitably and without delay."

While asserting that such retaliation would be fatal to the aggressor, Ustinov did not intimate in any way that the USSR could win or should risk such a war. Ogarkov, by contrast, authorized an article that appeared in *Izvestiya* on the very same day (May 9) in which he implied that the Soviet Armed Forces, through great vigilance and resolve, could emerge victorious. During the intensive initial period of the war, the Soviet forces would "take large-scale and extremely precise and energetic actions to repel the attack" from the enemy's long-range systems. "In today's conditions," he said, "such actions can be of decisive importance...." He spoke further of the importance of assuring the steady functioning of the economic base once the war had begun.

With respect to my original citation of Ustinov's statement that Soviet forces have "everything they need," I think that Wettig attributes more importance to this piece of evidence in my argument than I myself gave it. The more important thing is that Ogarkov, prior to his recantation, never renounced, and even continued to suggest, the goal of Soviet victory in nuclear war. Ustinov *never* discussed or even referred to the possibility of winning a nuclear war; in fact, he denied such a possibility. Ustinov also did not trumpet such Ogarkov themes as the achievement of decisive strategic and political objectives through the use of nuclear weapons and the need to inculcate in soldiers the will to achieve victory in nuclear war. The difference between Ogarkov and Ustinov is more than a semantic one. One who believes that the Soviet Union can ride out a Western nuclear attack and then advance to victory is more likely to risk war in the first place and more likely to seek redundance in military equipment.

Contrary to Wettig's suggestion, Ustinov also does not confine his discussion of deterrence to a one-way relationship, i.e., he does not imply that Soviet nuclear weapons deter the imperialists from attacking the USSR, but not vice versa. The following statement is typical of Ustinov's rhetoric in 1982: "The Soviet Union proceeds from the assumption that preservation of the existing parity, a consistent reduction of armed strength and armaments with the guarantees of equal security for all parties are the basic criteria for the consolidation of peace. To count on victory in the arms race and especially in nuclear war is madness. And madness is dangerous. We do not need military superiority over the West. This is the unchanging approach of the USSR to this question" (D. F. Ustinov, *Serving the Country and the Communist Cause*, tr. by Penny Dole, New York, Pergamon Press, 1983, p. 42).

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Ustinov says that Soviet policy rules out the possibility of Soviet victory in nuclear war. The statement is not just an admonition to the West that it should not count on victory. The idea of reciprocity and mutuality in the nuclear hostage relationship also appears in Ogarkov's recantation (which came in September, not May, 1983): "With the present development and deployment of nuclear weapons in the world, the defending nation will always retain a sufficient number of nuclear weapons to enable it to inflict on the aggressor in a retaliatory strike 'unacceptable damage' as defined in his time by the former US Secretary of Defense R. McNamara.... Therefore only suicidal persons could risk a first strike in present conditions. Nuclear war can threaten catastrophe to all civilization" (*Izvestiya*, Sept. 28, 1983). It is clear that Ogarkov is discussing not just deterrence of the Western aggressor, but the mutual risk of unacceptable damage.

In my original piece, I mentioned that Marshal Akhromeyev, Ogarkov's successor, has toed the Brezhnev-Ustinov line on nuclear war. A recent piece by Akhromeyev also implicitly acknowledges the mutuality of assured destruction in nuclear war. He says that prevention of nuclear war is essential even from a military point of view because both sides have such huge arsenals of nuclear weapons that their use would lead to catastrophic and irremediable losses, including massive casualties. He further stated that the joint action by all nations is required to prevent such a war (*Kommunist*, No. 3, 1985, p. 60).

Wettig concludes that it is "most unlikely" or "extremely unusual" that Ogarkov would polemicize against his superior. What is most unusual is that the Politburo removed Ogarkov as chief of the General Staff, one of the most unusual events in Soviet civil-military relations since the ouster of Marshal Georgiy Zhukov in 1957. It is inconceivable that the Politburo would take such exceptional action unless Ogarkov had seriously challenged the party line on some important issue. Wettig's critique offers no alternate explanation for Ogarkov's removal.

Despite his rather broad attack on my essay, Wettig nonetheless agrees that the Soviets have in fact rejected all-out nuclear war as a viable option because they respect the American deterrent at the strategic level. Wettig also agrees that this recognition of the infeasibility of nuclear war represents a change from the days of Marshals Malinovskiy and Grechko, both of whom confidently predicted Soviet victory in nuclear war. Wettig thus implicitly admits that a fundamental change did occur in Soviet doctrine after Grechko, i.e., while Ustinov was minister of defense.

However, Wettig denies that the Soviets have "internalized" deterrence. I would certainly agree that Ogarkov never internalized the concept of mutual deterrence—indeed, I contend that this posture was forced on him from above. But I did not really contend that Ustinov and the political leadership had internalized it either. Wettig overlooks that I pointed out in my piece that Soviet acceptance of the idea of mutual assured destruction has not been accompanied by any ready willingness to accept major reductions in large MIRVed ICBM's, like the SS-18 and SS-19. Most American theorists of mutual deterrence would regard the elimination of such first-strike weapons to be a prerequisite of mutual deterrence. I also pointed out, as does Wettig, that the Soviet concept of parity is lopsided.

Wettig insists that the Soviets are attempting to escape from the dilemma of mutual deterrence at the strategic level by seeking and achieving both nuclear and conventional superiority in the European theater and in other regions. Soviet willingness to exploit such theater superiority is dependent, he concedes, on whether they can succeed in decoupling the European theater from the overall strategic balance and in establishing escalation dominance. I agree with Wettig's implicit conclusion that the West must pursue policies to preclude Soviet attainment of these goals. I suggested in my own piece that Ogarkov's discussion in the pamphlet *Vsegda v gotovnosti* ... of the useful employment of nuclear weapons was in the context of a limited nuclear war in Europe, but that the feasibility of such a war was clearly rejected by Ustinov and the CPSU. In the final analysis, Wettig also shies away from predicting that the USSR would risk a limited nuclear war in Europe. Certainly with Ogarkov out of the upper echelons of power, there will be one less advocate of such a war. In any event, Wettig seems ultimately to share my conclusion that nuclear war at both the strategic and European levels has been ruled out by Soviet strategists, at least given the current correlation of forces.

Because the USSR is so splendidly equipped for a conventional war in Europe, we cannot rule out the possibility that Soviet strategy contemplates such a war. At the same time, however, even such a cynical observer of Soviet motives as Edward Luttwak doubts that the USSR would risk a conventional war in Europe, for fear of escalation (see *The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union*, New York, St. Martin's, 1983).

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Annual indices for Volumes IV-to-date appear in the November-December issue (No. 6) for each year. A combined index to the first three volumes is contained in Vol. III, No. 6 (November-December 1954).

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